Auditable Claims about AI Agents
Summary
This paper extends the Auditable Agents framework's Policy Checkability dimension to claims about AI agents, defining when a claim is auditable and proving that independent record coverage, per-action authorization binding, and completeness are necessary for verification, with practical guidance for operators and standard setters.
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# Auditable Claims about AI Agents Source: [https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07459](https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07459) [View PDF](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2610.07459) > Abstract:Organizations make claims about their AI agents: a person approves every external email, every action is logged, an evaluation shows the agent is safe to deploy\. Article 12 of the EU AI Act requires high\-risk systems to allow the automatic recording of events but does not say which records settle a given claim\. The position is one sentence: to be checked, a claim about an agent must first name its policy, its scope, the records that would settle it, and who writes them\. Adapting the preconditions of an assurance engagement, we call a claim auditable when these elements and a decision rule are fixed before any verdict and the records are obtainable\. This extends the Policy Checkability dimension of our Auditable Agents framework from single actions to claims\. Agents add three conditions: coverage by an independent record, authorization bound to each action's arguments, and completeness beyond integrity\. Under an explicit model, we prove that support is impossible without each wherever its hypotheses hold\. A claim\-check table applies the method to six common claims, anchored in current NIST, IETF, and OWASP drafts\. A worked case follows one claim through five evidence states\. We close with a practice box and steps for operators, buyers, auditors, and standard setters\. ## Submission history From: Xiyang Hu \[[view email](https://arxiv.org/show-email/4966f27e/2610.07459)\] **\[v1\]**Mon, 5 Oct 2026 22:11:11 UTC \(945 KB\)
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