Division-36/Z-Jail

Source: https://github.com/Division-36/Z-Jail

Z-Jail

Multi-layer sandbox for native code execution on Linux.
Seven independent defence layers — no external dependencies, ~130 KiB PIE binary.

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    Z-Jail                            │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Truthimatics Public Version  (evidence-based verdict engine)       │
│  Namespaces    (mount, pid, net, ipc, uts)           │
│  pivot_root    (chroot on steroids)                  │
│  Capabilities  (drop all, lock securebits)           │
│  NO_NEW_PRIVS  (no privilege escalation)             │
│  seccomp-BPF   (whitelist: 15 syscalls only)         │
│  Audit         (JSON logging + BLAKE2b hashing)      │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Table of Contents

• Quick Start
• Why Z-Jail
• Architecture
• Layers
• Usage
• Build & Install
• Testing
• Performance
• Threat Model
• Documentation
• Roadmap
• License

Quick Start

git clone https://github.com/Division-36/Z-Jail.git
cd Z-Jail
make
sudo ./z_jail --root=/path/to/rootfs --seccomp-enforce -- /bin/ls

The --root directory should contain a minimal filesystem with the target binary and its dependencies (for static binaries, just the binary is enough).

Why Z-Jail

Existing sandboxing solutions make trade-offs:

Z-Jail fills the niche between bwrap (minimal, no seccomp-by-default) and nsjail (featureful, heavy deps). It is designed for CI pipelines, CTF jail challenges, and lightweight code evaluation where you need defence-in-depth without pulling in a container runtime.

Architecture

Data Flow

flowchart LR
    CLI[CLI args] --> P[parse_args]
    P --> C{clone namespaces}
    C -->|child| CR[child_run]
    C -->|parent| W[waitpid]
    CR --> RL[setrlimit]
    RL --> FD[close fds >= 3]
    FD --> DUMP[PR_SET_DUMPABLE=0]
    DUMP --> PV[pivot_root]
    PV --> NNP[PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS]
    NNP --> CAP[drop capabilities]
    CAP --> SC[seccomp-BPF]
    SC --> SIG[signal parent]
    SIG --> EX[execve target]
    W --> A[audit JSON]
    A --> EXIT[exit]

Layer Ordering

Each layer is ordered so that a later layer can’t be undone by an earlier one:

1. setrlimit — cap CPU, address space, file count, processes before anything else
2. fd scrub — close all inherited fds except the report pipe
3. PR_SET_DUMPABLE=0 — core dumps disabled, /proc/self/mem locked down
4. pivot_root — detach from host filesystem; old root unmounted lazily
5. PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS — no setuid, no capset escalation after this point
6. drop_caps — zero out all capabilities, lock securebits
7. seccomp-BPF — restrict syscalls to whitelist only
8. signal parent — tell the parent the sandbox is ready
9. execve — replace process with the target binary

sequenceDiagram
    participant P as Parent
    participant C as Child
    P->>C: clone (NEWNS|NEWPID|NEWNET|NEWIPC|NEWUTS)
    Note over C: setrlimit(CPU, AS, NOFILE, NPROC)
    Note over C: close(all fds > 2)
    Note over C: PR_SET_DUMPABLE=0
    Note over C: pivot_root → chdir("/") → umount -l
    Note over C: PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
    Note over C: capset(all zero) + securebits
    Note over C: seccomp(SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, whitelist)
    C->>P: write(pipe, ready=1)
    Note over C: execve(target)
    P->>P: waitpid
    P->>P: write audit JSON

Layers

1. Truthimatics Public Version

Evidence-based verdict engine. Collects weighted observations about the executed binary and determines a final verdict (DETERMINISTIC, REJECT, or UNCERTAIN). Each observation carries a weight; any single observation with weight >50% of total decides the verdict.

2. Namespaces

Five namespaces are created via clone():

Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial namespace.

3. pivot_root

Replaces the mount namespace root with the --root directory:

1. Bind-mount the root directory onto itself (MS_BIND|MS_REC)
2. pivot_root(new_root, put_old) — swap the mount tree
3. chdir("/") — move into the new root
4. umount2("/.pivot_old", MNT_DETACH) — detach old root
5. rmdir("/.pivot_old") — clean up

This is strictly stronger than chroot(2) — there is no way for the sandboxed process to escape back to the host root, even with CLONE_NEWNS from inside the sandbox (which is already blocked by seccomp).

4. Capabilities

All capabilities are dropped via:

capset(hdr, data)  // data = {0, 0, 0}
prctl(SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED | SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP | ...)

The process drops setuid/setgid before capset so the uid change takes effect while CAP_SETUID is still held. After capset, all caps are gone and the securebits are locked — no re-enablement is possible.

5. NO_NEW_PRIVS

prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);

Prevents the process or its children from gaining new privileges via setuid binaries, file capabilities, or LSM transitions. Irreversible.

6. seccomp-BPF (whitelist-v1)

Allow-list of 15 syscalls — anything not on the list gets SECCOMP_RET_KILL:

The BPF filter is generated dynamically: for each whitelist entry, a jump chain is emitted that either allows (if syscall matches) or falls through to KILL. Architecture is checked first (AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64).

The filter is verified independently by a standalone test (tests/seccomp_filter_test.c, 8/8 pass) that fork+execves test cases against a real prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) without needing root.

7. Audit

Every execution produces a JSON audit record:

{
  "schema": "z-jail.audit/v1",
  "build_id": "Z-Jail/v1+dev",
  "timestamp": 1749000000,
  "duration_ns": 8500000,
  "executable": "/bin/ls",
  "verdict": "DETERMINISTIC",
  "exit_code": 0,
  "sandbox": {
    "seccomp_filter": "whitelist-v1",
    "seccomp_whitelist_size": 15,
    "seccomp_arg_rules_size": 2,
    "namespaces": ["mount","pid","net","ipc","uts"],
    "pivot_root": "/var/run/z-jail/roots/default",
    "no_new_privs": true,
    "capabilities_dropped": true
  },
  "content_fingerprint": "0e5751c026e543b2e8ab2eb06099daa1..."
}

Written to build/audits/<binary-name>.audit.json. The content_fingerprint is a BLAKE2b-256 hash of the target binary, computed by the parent after the child finishes.

Usage

z_jail --root=<dir> [--seccomp-enforce] [--self-hash=<hex>]
       [--quiet] [--verbose] -- <program> [args...]

Examples

# Run a static binary with all protections
sudo z_jail --root=./roots --seccomp-enforce -- bin/hello_static

# Run with binary integrity verification
sudo z_jail --root=./roots --seccomp-enforce \
  --self-hash=$(sha256sum z_jail | cut -c1-64) -- bin/program

# Quiet mode (no audit JSON)
sudo z_jail --root=./roots --quiet -- bin/program

Exit Codes

Build & Install

Requirements

• Linux kernel ≥ 5.4 (namespaces, seccomp-BPF, pivot_root)
• GCC ≥ 11 (tested on 11.4, 13.2, 15.2)
• No external libraries — just the standard C toolchain

Commands

make              # build z_jail (~130 KiB PIE binary)
make install      # install to /usr/local/bin + man page
make clean        # remove build artifacts
make dist         # create release tarball
make check        # smoke test (--version + --help)

The binary is built as a Position Independent Executable with -fstack-protector-strong, -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2, full RELRO, and -z now.

Compile-time Options

make CC=clang CFLAGS="-O3 -march=native"   # custom compiler/flags

Testing

Quick Test (no root)

# seccomp filter logic (8 tests)
tests/build/seccomp_filter_test

# BLAKE2b known-answer test
tests/build/blake2b_known

These don’t need root and run in under 100 ms.

Full Test Suite

make -C tests setup          # build payloads + test roots
sudo bash tests/run_tests.sh # 17 scenarios

Requires root for namespace creation. The test suite covers:

Performance

Numbers from WSL2 (Kali Linux, GCC 15.2.0, -O2 -g):

Latency breakdown (approx): clone + namespaces ~3 ms, pivot_root ~2 ms, seccomp + caps ~1 ms, execve ~1 ms, waitpid + audit ~1 ms.

Threat Model

In Scope

• Arbitrary native code execution by an untrusted payload
• Escape via chroot, mount, ptrace, socket, process_vm_writev
• Fork bombs, CPU exhaustion (RLIMIT_CPU), memory exhaustion (RLIMIT_AS)
• File descriptor leaks across execve
• setuid / dynamic linker / LD_PRELOAD escalation
• seccomp filter removal or capability re-enablement

Out of Scope

• Kernel zero-days outside the permitted syscall surface
• Hardware side channels (Spectre, Meltdown)
• Co-located VM escape via shared /proc, /sys mounts
• Network egress beyond what CLONE_NEWNET + blocked socket provides
• Resource starvation of sibling sandboxes (needs cgroup support)

Assumptions

• Host kernel is unmodified Linux ≥ 5.4
• clone(CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_NEWPID|...) succeeds (requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
• Target binary is statically linked (or dynamic libraries are available in --root)
• --self-hash=<hex> is configured in production deployments

Documentation

Roadmap

v1 (current)

• 7-layer defence-in-depth sandbox
• BLAKE2b-256 content fingerprinting
• Audit JSON output
• 17 test scenarios
• man page, completions (bash, zsh, fish)

v2 (planned)

• External seccomp policy file (JSON or BPF source)
• Custom namespace flags per sandbox instance
• Configurable syscall whitelist via CLI
• Performance profiling hooks for CI integration
• Release signing (minisign/signify)

Status

License

Axiom Public License v1.0 — see LICENSE for the full text.

Free for independent researchers and small-scale laboratories (budget ≤ $1M USD). Commercial use, government use, and reverse engineering are strictly prohibited without written authorization.

Z-Jail was built on WSL2 (Kali Linux, GCC 15.2.0), targeting Linux 5.4+. Maintained by Division-36. Report issues at the issue tracker.