APEX-Harm: Evaluating Agent Safety in Shared Professional Workspaces
Summary
APEX-Harm 是一个评估长时程 AI 代理在共享专业工作环境中遭受注入攻击脆弱性的基准,涵盖金融、咨询和法律任务,结果显示脚本类攻击成功率高达 73-84%,表明任务输出正确并不等于行为安全。
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Paper page - APEX-Harm: Evaluating Agent Safety in Shared Professional Workspaces
Source: https://huggingface.co/papers/2610.13623
Abstract
APEX-Harm evaluates long-horizon agent vulnerabilities to injection attacks across large multi-tool workspaces, revealing high success rates for script-based attacks despite correct task outputs.
Professional agents increasingly work through command-line interfaces and multiple tools over shared workspaces containing files, messages, and business applications. These environments create safety risks that are difficult to capture with attacks placed at a single, known read location. We introduceAPEX-Harm, a benchmark for evaluating prompt andscript injectionagainstlong-horizon agentsperforming finance, consulting, and legal tasks in large workspaces. Each task contains 115 to 328 files, together with email, calendar, chat, document, spreadsheet, PDF, and code-execution tools exposed throughMCP servers. The benchmark includes six attack categories covering static and dynamic injections,task-specific script replacement, and attacker-provided generic scripts, and evaluates attack success, exposure, and task performance. We evaluate 12 frontier models on 180 task instances per model. Opus 5 and Sonnet 5 have the lowest overallattack success rates (8% and 20%), whiletask-specific script replacementand attacker-provided generic script attacks remain substantially more effective, averaging 81-84% and 73% attack success, respectively. Gemini 3.8 Flash achieves the highest mean task score (0.877) while still exhibiting a 33%attack success rate. These results show that completing the requested task is not sufficient evidence of safe behavior: an agent can produce a correct deliverable while also performing an unauthorized action in the workspace.
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