Behavioral Privacy Leakage in Agentic Negotiation: Formalizing and Mitigating Inference Attacks via Randomized Policies
Summary
This paper formalizes behavioral privacy leakage in multi-round agentic negotiation and proposes an adaptive stochastic policy that provides differential privacy guarantees while maintaining high negotiation utility.
View Cached Full Text
Cached at: 07/20/26, 05:26 PM
Paper page - Behavioral Privacy Leakage in Agentic Negotiation: Formalizing and Mitigating Inference Attacks via Randomized Policies
Source: https://huggingface.co/papers/2607.06815
Abstract
Autonomousnegotiationagentsareincreasinglydeployedinhigh-stakessettingssuchasinsuranceandprocurement.Whilecryptographictechniquesprotectexplicitlydisclosedconstraintvalues,theyfailtoaddressasubtlerthreat:behavioralprivacyleakage,whereanadversaryinfersprivateconstraintsfromobservablenegotiationdynamicssuchasconcessiontrajectories,timing,andconvergencepatterns.Thispaperinvestigatesbehavioraldifferentialprivacyinmulti-roundnegotiationprotocols.Wedesignanadaptivestochasticnegotiationpolicythatjointlyguarantees(varepsilon,δ)-differentialprivacy,almost-sureconvergenceoftheoffersequence(reachingagreementwhenthecounterparty’sreservationvaluepermits),andhighnegotiationutility.Evaluatedon3,000syntheticbilateralnegotiations,ourmechanismreducesadversarialinferenceaccuracyby43-50%whilemaintaininganegotiationsuccessrateandutilityabove90%,demonstratingthatstrongprivacyguaranteescanbeachievedwithoutsignificantlossofperformance.
View arXiv pageView PDFAdd to collection
Get this paper in your agent:
hf papers read 2607\.06815
Don’t have the latest CLI?curl \-LsSf https://hf\.co/cli/install\.sh \| bash
Models citing this paper0
No model linking this paper
Cite arxiv.org/abs/2607.06815 in a model README.md to link it from this page.
Datasets citing this paper0
No dataset linking this paper
Cite arxiv.org/abs/2607.06815 in a dataset README.md to link it from this page.
Spaces citing this paper0
No Space linking this paper
Cite arxiv.org/abs/2607.06815 in a Space README.md to link it from this page.
Collections including this paper0
No Collection including this paper
Add this paper to acollectionto link it from this page.
Similar Articles
Agentic AI & Crypto: The Need for Privacy in Agentic Trading Markets
An analysis of how autonomous AI agents are beginning to trade, negotiate, and manage crypto assets 24/7, and why privacy technologies like zero-knowledge proofs are critical to prevent front-running and surveillance in this emerging agentic trading market.
Do LLM Agents Negotiate Rationally? A Mechanism-Design Framework for Verifiable Multi-Agent Interaction over A2A/MCP
This paper presents a mechanism-design framework for verifying negotiation and allocation tasks in LLM agents using A2A/MCP protocols. It evaluates rational behavior across models, finding that mechanism-level incentive compatibility does not automatically transfer to LLM agents.
Multi-Agent Privacy Game in Federated Learning: A Unified Mean-Field View
This paper introduces a mean-field privacy game framework for federated learning, enabling tractable Nash equilibrium analysis for arbitrarily many clients with heterogeneous privacy preferences and yielding a personalized privacy guarantee.
A Policy Algebra for Trust-Preserving Agentic AI Execution (24 minute read)
This paper proposes a policy algebra to define trust-preserving execution in agentic AI systems, ensuring reliable capability through constraints on actions and evaluating with metrics like intervention rates and task completion.
When Aggregate Alignment Misleads: Auditing Policy Repair Without Per-State Expert Actions
This paper studies the evaluation of agentic AI systems that repair decision policies when per-state expert action labels are unavailable, using a hotel-pricing simulator with region-level diagnostic feedback. It finds that aggregate alignment can be misleading and proposes evaluating policy repair by closed-loop outcome rather than behavioral distance.