@alex_verem: Giving an AI agent your passwords is insane. Someone built the open-source alternative. The problem sits under every ag…
Summary
OpenConnector is an open-source gateway that enables AI agents to securely interact with apps like Gmail and Notion by managing credentials behind a runtime, ensuring secrets are not exposed to the model.
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Giving an AI agent your passwords is insane. Someone built the open-source alternative.
The problem sits under every agent demo you’ve seen. An agent that reads your email, updates your Notion, and files your invoices needs your logins, and that handover of raw passwords and API keys is where most people close the tab.
OpenConnector puts an open-source gateway between the agent and your apps. Credentials stay locked behind the runtime while the agent gets a catalog of ready-made actions for over 800 services, from Gmail and Slack to Notion and Airtable. The agent asks for an action, the gateway runs it against the real service, and the secrets never touch the model’s context.
The controls are the part I like. You decide which actions an agent can touch through allow and block policies, scope access per connection, hand out runtime tokens instead of real keys, and read redacted logs of every run.
It speaks MCP out of the box, ships thousands of prebuilt actions in TypeScript, and self-hosts with one Docker command or a push to Cloudflare. The project is young, and the whole stack, from the provider catalog to the action executors, sits open for anyone to inspect.
Agents are getting hands. A gateway like this decides what those hands are allowed to hold, and I’d rather that layer be open source than a black box.
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