IB-RL: Isolated Bilateral Reinforcement Learning for Strategic Dialogue Agents

# Isolated Bilateral Reinforcement Learning for Strategic Dialogue Agents
Source: [https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735)
Senhao Wang\\equalcontrib, Chenghao Cai\\equalcontrib, Haitao Hu\\equalcontrib, Mingxing Huang\\corresponding, Xingguang Wang\\corresponding, Wenhao Li\\corresponding, Zecheng Lin\\corresponding

###### Abstract

Reinforcement learning \(RL\) has achieved strong results in improving large language models \(LLMs\) on tasks with stationary, verifiable rewards, such as mathematical reasoning and code execution\. In these settings, the environment follows fixed rules and does not adapt strategically to the agent\. Strategic dialogue differs in this respect: the environment is another agent that adapts to the policy, and success depends on the interaction between the two sides\. Despite this interactive nature, current RL approaches typically train a target agent against a fixed counterpart or simulator\. We find that this training paradigm encourages the policy to exploit counterpart\-specific regularities rather than learn strategies that generalize across counterparts\. We call this problem thestatic\-counterpart mismatch, which we quantify directly in our experiments\. To address it, we proposeIsolated Bilateral Reinforcement Learning \(IB\-RL\), in which the two roles co\-evolve through joint rollouts while each role optimizes its own reward through fully independent advantages, action masks, and update paths\. We evaluate frozen policies against fully independent held\-out counterparts in both domains\. On Vehicle TeleSales, IB\-RL achieves 89\.6% Success@1, compared to 84\.6% for the best unilateral RL baseline\. On Deal\-or\-No\-Deal, it reaches 98\.4% agreement against DeepSeek V4 Pro, compared to 86\.4% for the best unilateral baseline\. These results indicate that jointly training both roles with strict per\-agent isolation produces policies that generalize more effectively to unseen counterparts\.

## 1Introduction

Reinforcement learning \(RL\) has proven effective for training large language model \(LLM\) agents on interactive tasks\. In mathematical reasoning, code execution, and tool use, agents improve through repeated interaction with environments that provide stable, verifiable feedback\(DeepSeek\-AI[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib8); OpenAI[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib18)\)\. The environment is stationary: a calculator returns the same answer regardless of the agent’s policy\.

Strategic dialogue tasks, such as negotiation, persuasion, and sales, depart from this pattern\. A sales tactic that works on a cooperative customer may fail on a skeptical one, because the customer is itself an agent that adapts to what is said\. Success is therefore relational: it depends on the interaction between the two policies, not on the agent’s output alone\.

This creates a difficulty for current training practice\. The dominant paradigm trains a target agent against a fixed counterpart or simulator\(Zhanget al\.[2026b](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib36); Liuet al\.[2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib15)\)\. Such an agent tends to exploit regularities of that specific counterpart\. When deployed against counterparts whose behavior differs from the training distribution, these policies degrade substantially\. We call this problem thestatic\-counterpart mismatch\(Figure[1](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#S1.F1)\) and measure it directly in our experiments: unilaterally trained policies can score highly against their training counterpart and even a held\-out frontier model, yet the advantage collapses when the policy faces a copy of itself, indicating that much of the gain reflects exploitation of counterpart\-specific regularities rather than transferable competence\. In contrast, policies trained against a continuously changing partner show no such collapse: their held\-out competence matches their in\-pair performance \(Section 5\.3\)\.

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735v1/Figures/uni_ibrl.png)Figure 1:Unilateral RL overfits a frozen counterpart \(left\); IB\-RL co\-evolves both roles \(right\)\.A natural alternative is bilateral RL, which trains both sides through co\-evolutionary dialogue rollouts\. Co\-evolutionary training is well established in classical games\(Silveret al\.[2017](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib24); Berneret al\.[2019](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib2); Vinyalset al\.[2019](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib30); Lanctotet al\.[2017](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib13)\)and has been adapted to LLMs\(Chenet al\.[2024b](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib3); Wuet al\.[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib32); Yuanet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib34)\), but existing methods either update a single model or assume verifiable rewards, and do not address open\-ended dialogue between two asymmetric roles with misaligned objectives\. Existing MARL algorithms similarly assume shared incentives or centralized critics\(Loweet al\.[2017](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib16); Yuet al\.[2022](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib33)\)\. We deriveIsolated Bilateral RL \(IB\-RL\)from the problem structure: bilateral co\-evolution with fully per\-agent rewards, advantages, action masks, and optimizer states, instantiated critic\-free on GRPO\(Shaoet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib23)\)and stabilized with measures adopted from self\-play systems \(Section 4\.2\)\.

We evaluate IB\-RL on two complementary tasks\.Deal\-or\-No\-Dealis a controlled negotiation benchmark with private utilities and rule\-verifiable outcomes, where the mismatch can be isolated and measured directly\.Vehicle TeleSalesis a realistic outbound telesales task in which the agent must persuade a customer to accept a WeChat follow\-up contact\. All frozen policies are tested against held\-out counterparts that share no parameters, prompts, or reward logic with any training system \(Section 5\.2\)\.

Our contributions are threefold\.

Problem\.We formalize thestatic\-counterpart mismatch—the tendency of unilaterally trained policies to exploit regularities of a fixed training counterpart and degrade under counterpart shift—and measure it directly across model scales and counterpart strengths\.

Method\.We proposeIB\-RL: bilateral co\-evolution in which the two roles share trajectories but no reward, advantage, or gradient\. The modified training framework and evaluation code are released in the appendix\.

Evaluation\.We introduce an evaluation protocol based onheld\-out counterpartsthat share no parameters, prompts, or reward logic with any training system\.

## 2Related Work

### 2\.1Strategic and Persuasive Dialogue Agents

Prior work on negotiation, persuasion, and sales dialogue has explored supervised and prompt\-based methods\(Heet al\.[2018](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib11)\)as well as reinforcement learning\(Zhanget al\.[2026b](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib36); Suet al\.[2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib26); Liuet al\.[2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib15); Conchello Vendrellet al\.[2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib4)\)\. Interactive social\-agent benchmarks likewise show that strong LLMs still struggle with private information and implicit goals in multi\-turn interaction\(Zhouet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib38); Mouet al\.[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib39)\), and interactive learning on generated trajectories can improve social agents\(Wanget al\.[2024a](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib40)\)\. These methods, however, optimize one target agent against static data or a fixed simulator\. Our work instead studies how the training counterpart itself should evolve, and how the resulting policy should be evaluated outside the training interaction system\.

### 2\.2Co\-evolutionary and Self\-Play Learning

Co\-evolutionary training has succeeded in classical games through self\-play\(Silveret al\.[2017](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib24); Berneret al\.[2019](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib2); Vinyalset al\.[2019](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib30)\), population\-based training\(Jaderberget al\.[2017](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib12)\), and PSRO methods\(Bighashdelet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib17)\)\. Recent work adapts these ideas to LLMs for single\-model improvement\(Chenet al\.[2024b](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib3); Wuet al\.[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib32); Yuanet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib34)\)and to verifiable reasoning tasks\(Hubertet al\.[2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib22); Zhaoet al\.[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib37)\)\. Closer to our setting, concurrent work applies self\-play RL to strategic games with per\-agent credit assignment\(Yuanet al\.[2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib41)\), but still uses a single shared model: a gradient step for one role alters the other’s behavior\. We instead study co\-evolution between two independently parameterized policies with misaligned objectives in open\-ended dialogue\. Our focus is whether improvement transfers beyond the jointly trained pair\.

### 2\.3Multi\-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Most MARL assumes fully cooperative agents optimizing a single shared reward: value\-decomposition methods factorize it across agents\(Sunehaget al\.[2018](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib27); Rashidet al\.[2018](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib20); Sonet al\.[2019](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib25)\), while centralized\-critic methods train on it jointly\(Loweet al\.[2017](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib16); Yuet al\.[2022](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib33); Foersteret al\.[2018a](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib6)\)\. Recent LLM\-MARL work retains this cooperative assumption, whether in multi\-agent reasoning\(Wanet al\.[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib31)\), role\-decomposed QA\(Parket al\.[2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib19)\), or value\-aligned deliberation\(Anantaprayoonet al\.[2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib1)\); MARTI\(Zhanget al\.[2026a](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib35)\)provides multi\-agent RL infrastructure but likewise targets cooperative settings with centralized reward assignment\. Opponent\-aware methods\(Foersteret al\.[2018b](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib7)\)model the counterpart’s learning dynamics but still optimize a single agent’s objective\. Independent learning\(Tan[1993](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib29); Tampuuet al\.[2017](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib28); Schroeder de Wittet al\.[2020](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib5)\)matches our problem structure—each agent optimizes its own reward with no shared signal—but has not been instantiated for open\-ended strategic dialogue between LLM agents\. In contrast to these paradigms, IB\-RL co\-evolves both roles under fully decoupled optimization and evaluates against held\-out counterparts\.

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735v1/Figures/main_frame.png)Figure 2:The IB\-RL framework\. Both roles share dialogue trajectories, but rewards, group normalization, turn\-level masks, and optimizer updates are fully decoupled across roles\. Opponent pools and staggered updates stabilize co\-evolution\.

## 3Problem Setting

### 3\.1Strategic Dialogue as a Two\-Player Partially Observable Stochastic Game

We formalize a two\-player strategic dialogue as a partially observable stochastic game𝒢=⟨𝒮,\{𝒜i\},\{Ωi\},𝒫,\{Ri\}⟩\\mathcal\{G\}=\\langle\\mathcal\{S\},\\\{\\mathcal\{A\}\_\{i\}\\\},\\\{\\Omega\_\{i\}\\\},\\mathcal\{P\},\\\{R\_\{i\}\\\}\\rangle,i∈\{1,2\}i\\in\\\{1,2\\\}, where𝒮\\mathcal\{S\}is the state space,𝒜i\\mathcal\{A\}\_\{i\}andΩi\\Omega\_\{i\}the action and observation spaces of agentii,𝒫\\mathcal\{P\}the transition function, andRiR\_\{i\}its reward function\. We use*turn*for a single agent utterance and*round*for one bilateral exchange \(two consecutive turns\)\. Agents alternate turns: at turntt, the active agenti​\(t\)∈\{1,2\}i\(t\)\\in\\\{1,2\\\}observes the public dialogue historyht∈𝒮h\_\{t\}\\in\\mathcal\{S\}and its private observationωi​\(t\)∈Ωi​\(t\)\\omega\_\{i\(t\)\}\\in\\Omega\_\{i\(t\)\}\(e\.g\., its private utility function in negotiation\), and generates an utteranceat∈𝒜i​\(t\)∼πθi​\(t\)\(⋅∣ht,ωi​\(t\)\)a\_\{t\}\\in\\mathcal\{A\}\_\{i\(t\)\}\\sim\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{i\(t\)\}\}\(\\cdot\\mid h\_\{t\},\\omega\_\{i\(t\)\}\)\. The transition𝒫\\mathcal\{P\}is deterministic:ht\+1=concat​\(ht,at\)h\_\{t\+1\}=\\mathrm\{concat\}\(h\_\{t\},a\_\{t\}\), so one round advancesttby 2\. The horizon and termination conditions are task\-specific\. Upon termination, the dialogue forms a trajectoryτ\\tau, and each agent receives a role\-specific rewardRi​\(τ\)R\_\{i\}\(\\tau\)computed by an independent reward function\. The two rewards arenotassumed to be zero\-sum or aligned\.

Strategic dialogue differs from stationary tasks \(mathematical reasoning, code execution\) because the “environment” is another adaptive agent\. Throughout,πθi\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{i\}\}denotes the policy of agentii, andθ2′\\theta^\{\\prime\}\_\{2\}denotes an out\-of\-distribution opponent encountered at deployment\.

### 3\.2Static\-Counterpart Mismatch

The standard approach, unilateral RL, optimizes a target policyπθ1\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\}against a frozen counterpartπθ2\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\. Sinceπθ2\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}is stationary, the agent specializes in exploiting its predictable regularities: deployed against diverse counterpartsπθ2′∼Πdeploy\\pi^\{\\prime\}\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\\sim\\Pi^\{\\mathrm\{deploy\}\}, it performs well below its training level \(Figure[1](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#S1.F1)\)\. We term this gap thestatic\-counterpart mismatchand quantify it as the performance drop of a frozen policy between its training counterpart and held\-out counterparts:

Jtrain​\(πθ1\)=𝔼τ∼\(πθ1,πθ2\)​\[R1​\(τ\)\],\\displaystyle J\_\{\\mathrm\{train\}\}\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\}\)=\\mathbb\{E\}\_\{\\tau\\sim\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\},\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\)\}\\big\[R\_\{1\}\(\\tau\)\\big\],\(1\)Jdeploy​\(πθ1\)=𝔼πθ2′∼Πdeploy​\[𝔼τ∼\(πθ1,πθ2′\)​\[R1​\(τ\)\]\],\\displaystyle J\_\{\\mathrm\{deploy\}\}\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\}\)=\\mathbb\{E\}\_\{\\pi^\{\\prime\}\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\\sim\\Pi^\{\\mathrm\{deploy\}\}\}\\Big\[\\mathbb\{E\}\_\{\\tau\\sim\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\},\\pi^\{\\prime\}\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\)\}\\big\[R\_\{1\}\(\\tau\)\\big\]\\Big\],\(2\)Δmismatch=Jtrain​\(πθ1\)−Jdeploy​\(πθ1\)\.\\Delta\_\{\\mathrm\{mismatch\}\}\\;=\\;J\_\{\\mathrm\{train\}\}\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\}\)\-J\_\{\\mathrm\{deploy\}\}\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\}\)\.\(3\)
Appendix[A](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A1)characterizes this gap as the covariance between trajectory reward and the trajectories’ unlikeliness under the deployment distribution: it is positive exactly when the policy concentrates reward on counterpart\-specific trajectories\.

## 4Method

IB\-RL trains the two dialogue roles through joint rollouts while keeping their learning signals fully decoupled \(Figure[2](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#S2.F2)\)\. Both roles act in the same dialogue, but each trajectory is scored per role, advantages are normalized within each role’s own groups, the loss is applied only to the role’s own tokens via a turn\-level mask, and the two optimizers share no state \(Section 4\.1\)\. We instantiate IB\-RL on GRPO because its critic\-free form fits this design: with no value function, there is no shared critic that could couple the two roles’ learning signals, and advantages are normalized within each role’s own groups by construction \(Section 4\.1\)\. Co\-evolution is stabilized by opponent\-pool sampling and staggered update schedules \(Section 4\.2\)\. Pseudocode is provided in Appendix[B](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A2)\.

### 4\.1Shared Trajectories, Decoupled Gradients

At each iteration, dialogue trajectories\{τg\}\\\{\\tau\_\{g\}\\\}are generated; each has exactly two participants \(Section 4\.2\)\. Rollouts are grouped by scenario: for each scenario \(prompt\)qq, roleii’s groupGi,qG\_\{i,q\}consists of the rollouts underqqin which its current policy participated\.

Per\-agent advantage estimation\.Agentii’s trajectory\-level rewardRi​\(τg\)R\_\{i\}\(\\tau\_\{g\}\)is normalized within its own group:

A^g\(i\)=Ri​\(τg\)−μi,qσi,q,μi,q=1\|Gi,q\|​∑τ∈Gi,qRi​\(τ\),\\hat\{A\}^\{\(i\)\}\_\{g\}=\\frac\{R\_\{i\}\(\\tau\_\{g\}\)\-\\mu\_\{i,q\}\}\{\\sigma\_\{i,q\}\},\\qquad\\mu\_\{i,q\}=\\frac\{1\}\{\|G\_\{i,q\}\|\}\\sum\_\{\\tau\\in G\_\{i,q\}\}R\_\{i\}\(\\tau\),\(4\)withσi,q\\sigma\_\{i,q\}the corresponding group standard deviation\. Each role is optimized on the GRPO surrogate objective, with the trajectory\-level advantage applied exclusively to agentii’s own tokens via a turn\-level maskmi​\(w\)∈\{0,1\}m\_\{i\}\(w\)\\in\\\{0,1\\\}:

Ji\(θi\)=𝔼τg\[∑w∈τgmi\(w\)min\(ρi\(w\)A^g\(i\),clip\(ρi\(w\),1−ϵ,1\+ϵ\)A^g\(i\)\)\]−β𝔻KL\(πθi∥πθiref\),\\begin\{split\}J\_\{i\}\(\\theta\_\{i\}\)=\\mathbb\{E\}\_\{\\tau\_\{g\}\}\\biggl\[\\sum\_\{w\\in\\tau\_\{g\}\}m\_\{i\}\(w\)\\,\\min\\Bigl\(\\rho\_\{i\}\(w\)\\,\\hat\{A\}^\{\(i\)\}\_\{g\},&\\\\ \\mathrm\{clip\}\(\\rho\_\{i\}\(w\),1\-\\epsilon,1\+\\epsilon\)\\,\\hat\{A\}^\{\(i\)\}\_\{g\}\\Bigr\)\\biggr\]\-\\beta\\,\\mathbb\{D\}\_\{\\mathrm\{KL\}\}\\bigl\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{i\}\}\\,\\\|\\,\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{i\}\}^\{\\mathrm\{ref\}\}\\bigr\),&\\end\{split\}\(5\)whereρi​\(w\)=πθi​\(w∣w1:k−1\)/πθiold​\(w∣w1:k−1\)\\rho\_\{i\}\(w\)=\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{i\}\}\(w\\mid w\_\{1:k\-1\}\)/\\pi^\{\\mathrm\{old\}\}\_\{\\theta\_\{i\}\}\(w\\mid w\_\{1:k\-1\}\)is the token\-level importance ratio against the behavior policy that generated the trajectory, andπθiref\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{i\}\}^\{\\mathrm\{ref\}\}is the role’s initial checkpoint\. Counterpart tokens are excluded by construction: each policy optimizes only its own objective, and the counterpart influences learning solely through the trajectories it induces\.

### 4\.2Stabilizing Co\-Evolution

Bilateral co\-evolution is unstable: both policies change simultaneously, making the environment non\-stationary for each agent\. We adopt two measures from self\-play systems\(Vinyalset al\.[2019](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib30); Berneret al\.[2019](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib2)\)\.

Opponent\-pool sampling\.Each agent maintains a pool𝒫i\\mathcal\{P\}\_\{i\}of up toKKhistorical checkpoints of roleii\. At each iteration we sample one of three configurations: \(1\) both roles face the current counterpart checkpoint \(probabilitypbothp\_\{\\mathrm\{both\}\}\); \(2\) Agent 1 faces a historical Agent\-2 checkpoint while Agent 2 faces the current Agent 1 \(pagent1p\_\{\\mathrm\{agent1\}\}\); \(3\) the symmetric case \(pagent2p\_\{\\mathrm\{agent2\}\}\)\. Formally, withπθi\(<k\)\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{i\}\}^\{\(<k\)\}denoting a checkpoint sampled from pool𝒫i\\mathcal\{P\}\_\{i\}at iterationkk,

\(πopp1,πopp2\)=\{\(πθ2\(k\),πθ1\(k\)\)with prob\.​pboth\(πθ2\(<k\),πθ1\(k\)\)with prob\.​pagent1\(πθ2\(k\),πθ1\(<k\)\)with prob\.​pagent2\\big\(\\pi\_\{\\mathrm\{opp\}\}^\{1\},\\pi\_\{\\mathrm\{opp\}\}^\{2\}\\big\)=\\begin\{cases\}\\big\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}^\{\(k\)\},\\,\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\}^\{\(k\)\}\\big\)&\\text\{with prob\. \}p\_\{\\mathrm\{both\}\}\\\\\[2\.0pt\] \\big\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}^\{\(<k\)\},\\,\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\}^\{\(k\)\}\\big\)&\\text\{with prob\. \}p\_\{\\mathrm\{agent1\}\}\\\\\[2\.0pt\] \\big\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}^\{\(k\)\},\\,\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\}^\{\(<k\)\}\\big\)&\\text\{with prob\. \}p\_\{\\mathrm\{agent2\}\}\\end\{cases\}\(6\)Each trajectory pairs exactly two agents\. Each role computes its advantage and update only over trajectories in which its own current policy acted; tokens produced by historical pool checkpoints serve only as the environment and receive no gradient\.

Decoupled role\-update scheduling\.Binary indicatorsui​\(k\)∈\{0,1\}u\_\{i\}\(k\)\\in\\\{0,1\\\}gate each role’s update at iterationkk, so that large simultaneous updates do not destabilize training\. In practice we update the two roles at different frequencies and learning rates rather than moving both in lockstep\.

Table 1:Vehicle TeleSales, held\-out evaluation \(500 profiles, 3 independent conversations each\)\. Unilat\. = unilateral baseline; DS = DeepSeek\. Pool of 3 = DS V4 Pro, GLM\-5\.2, and Qwen\-3\.5\-122B\. OR = odds of not achieving Success@1, relative to the same\-scale IB\-RL model \(foundation models vs\. 9B IB\-RL\); Holm correction within each family\.Table 2:DoND evaluation \(1,000 scenarios, seat\-averaged\)\. Cells: agreement rate / own utility / joint value \(utility terms on agreed allocations only\)\. Unilat\. = unilateral baseline; DS = DeepSeek\.‡\\ddaggerIn\-system counterpart: training counterpart for unilateral baselines, cross\-play for IB\-RL\. \*Same policy in both seats\. \*\*Logistic GEEp<0\.01p<0\.01vs\. best same\-scale unilateral baseline, Holm\-corrected per counterpart\.

## 5Experiments

We evaluate IB\-RL on two strategic dialogue domains with complementary characteristics:Vehicle TeleSales, our primary domain, is a realistic asymmetric sales task with model\-based rewards;Deal\-or\-No\-Deal \(DoND\)is a symmetric negotiation benchmark with rule\-verifiable outcomes\.

### 5\.1Experimental Setup

#### Domains and Data

##### Vehicle TeleSales\.

Outbound telesales is a typical strategic dialogue scenario: a service agent calls a potential customer to promote vehicle purchases and seeks permission to add the customer on WeChat, the standard conversion target in industry telesales\. The customer’s budget and concerns are its private information, unobserved by the sales agent\. A dialogue ends when either party hangs up or a fixed turn limit is reached\. SFT uses∼\{\\sim\}50K real Chinese outbound\-call transcripts filtered from operational call records \(collection, consent, and anonymization procedures in the Ethical Statement\); for RL we construct 3,000 simulated customer profiles with 28 attributes each \(attribute schema in Appendix[D](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A4)\), with attribute coverage that differs from the held\-out evaluation profiles \(Section 5\.2\)\.

##### Deal\-or\-No\-Deal\.

We adopt the negotiation benchmark ofLewiset al\.\([2017](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib14)\)with its standard scenario distribution\. Two agents negotiate over a shared set of items \(books, hats, and balls in varying counts\), each holding a private utility function over item types; they alternate free\-form messages and must close on a mutually consistent allocation, failing which both receive zero\. A dialogue ends upon agreement or after a fixed number of rounds\. Training uses the original train split; all results are reported on 1,000 scenarios from the original test split, disjoint from all training data\.

#### Task\-Specific Rewards

In TeleSales, role\-specific rewards are judged by DeepSeek V4 Pro\. The trajectory reward combines a normalized discounted turn\-level score with an episode\-level outcome \(λturn=0\.2\\lambda\_\{\\mathrm\{turn\}\}=0\.2,λepisode=0\.8\\lambda\_\{\\mathrm\{episode\}\}=0\.8,γ=0\.9\\gamma=0\.9\)\. The two rewards are misaligned: the sales reward is outcome\-oriented, while the customer reward is realism\-oriented \(behavioral realism, decision rationality\)\. In DoND, rewards are rule\-based: each agent receives its private utility of the agreed allocation \(zero on disagreement\), with a penalty for invalid actions; all metrics are rule\-verified and require no LLM judge\.

#### Training Details

Both role policies are Qwen\-3\.5\-4B or Qwen\-3\.5\-9B, optimized with GRPO \(4 rollouts per prompt; KL coefficient 0\.02; global batch size 64\)\.For TeleSales, policies are initialized from task\-specific SFT checkpoints; the customer checkpoint is trained to emit a structured record at each turn \(dialogue action, stage, willingness/patience scores, and the reply utterance\), which guides the customer model’s own decisions, while the reward judge audits the plausibility of the emitted scores \(Section 5\.1\)\.For DoND, no in\-domain SFT data exists, so all policies are initialized directly from base models and must learn both the interaction protocol and effective negotiation through RL\. For TeleSales, the entropy coefficient is 0\.1 for both roles; learning rates are 1e\-6 \(sales\) and 1e\-7 \(user\)\. The user role updates at half the sales frequency \(Section 4\.2\)\. Opponent configurations are sampled withpboth=0\.7p\_\{\\mathrm\{both\}\}=0\.7,pagent1=0\.2p\_\{\\mathrm\{agent1\}\}=0\.2,pagent2=0\.1p\_\{\\mathrm\{agent2\}\}=0\.1\. Training uses 32 GPUs\. We conduct ablation studies in Section 5\.4\.

Our infrastructure extends MARTI\(Zhanget al\.[2026a](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib35)\)\. We modified its rollout and training layers for role\-asymmetric co\-evolution: per\-role rewards, separate advantage groups, token masks, and optimizer states \(Section 4\.1\), plus opponent\-pool sampling and staggered update scheduling \(Section 4\.2\)\. At the systems level, reward scoring, inference, and forward passes are executed asynchronously across roles\. Code and evaluation scripts are provided in the appendix\.

### 5\.2Evaluation Protocol

#### Held\-Out Counterparts

##### Vehicle TeleSales\.

The frozen policy plays the sales agent; the customer is played byGPT\-5\.5following a customer script compiled from an evaluation profile of 40 attributes \(details in Appendix[D](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A4)\)\(Gromadaet al\.[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib9); Zhuet al\.[2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib10); Yaoet al\.[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib43)\)\. At each turn the simulator updates its willingness and patience scores, selects an intent and a dialogue action conditioned on them, and generates the customer utterance; the call ends when the customer confirms the WeChat\-add, either party hangs up, or the turn limit is reached\. Outcomes are read from the action labels rather than free text: GLM\-5\.2 audits whether the recorded action labels match the customer’s utterances, and a human audit validates the recorded outcomes \(Section 5\.4\)\. Hallucination is judged separately, with GPT\-5\.5 checking the sales agent’s claims against the lead information \(the customer’s registration details available to the agent\)\.

##### Deal\-or\-No\-Deal\.

Each frozen policy is evaluated against two held\-out counterparts:GLM\-5\.2, which was never a training counterpart for any DoND policy, andDeepSeek V4 Pro\(reported as in\-system for unilateral baselines trained against it\)\. Both counterparts play DoND under the same protocol prompt, and all results are seat\-averaged\. Two reference conditions are excluded from cross\-method comparisons:self\-play\(Lewiset al\.[2017](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib14)\), and each unilateral baseline against its own training counterpart, which directly quantifies the static\-counterpart mismatch \(Section 5\.3\)\. Malformed outputs are retried twice \(uniform across methods\), then counted as no\-deal\.

#### Metrics and Statistical Testing

TeleSales metrics are Success@nn\(n=1,2,3n=1,2,3\), Hallucination Rate, and Willingness/Patience deltas\. Each frozen policy conducts three independent conversations with every evaluation profile, and Success@nnis the fraction of profiles for which at leastnnof the three conversations end in a WeChat\-add; the three metrics are therefore nested by construction\. DoND metrics are agreement rate, own utility \(agreed utility / utility if the agent received every item; a unilateral maximum, generally not jointly acceptable\), and joint value \(agreed total utility / first\-best feasible total utility\)\. All binary outcomes are analyzed with logistic GEEs \(clustered by profile for TeleSales and by scenario for DoND; robust standard errors\): unilateral variants are compared against same\-scale IB\-RL and foundation models against 9B IB\-RL, with Holm correction within each family and each held\-out counterpart \(adjustedp<0\.05p<0\.05\)\.

### 5\.3Main Results

Finding 1: Unilateral policies show clear static\-counterpart mismatch; IB\-RL reduces it substantially\.On TeleSales, IB\-RL achieves 89\.6% Success@1 \(63\.2% Success@2, 23\.8% Success@3\) under held\-out evaluation, compared to 84\.6% \(54\.4%, 19\.6%\) for the best unilateral baseline \(p<0\.05p<0\.05\)\. On DoND, the mismatch can be measured directly: unilaterally trained policies drop from 86\.4–89\.7% against their training counterpart to 46\.2–56\.3% in self\-play, while IB\-RL maintains 94\.8–98\.4% against held\-out counterparts with self\-play at 70\.6–71\.9% \(71\.3% on average\)—well above the unilateral level\. IB\-RL agents also achieve the highest expected utility \(agreement rate×\\timesown utility\) among same\-scale baselines, indicating that the high agreement does not come from excessive concession\.

Finding 2: The advantage is significant and holds across scales\.Both 9B IB\-RL agents beat the best unilateral 9B baseline against held\-out GLM\-5\.2 \(92\.9–94\.8% vs\. 88\.4%, Holm\-adjustedp<0\.01p<0\.01each\); the 4B agents average 62\.3% vs\. the best unilateral 4B baseline \(43\.1%\)\. On TeleSales, the 4B lead is 16\.2 points \(53\.4% vs\. 37\.2%\)\.

Finding 3: IB\-RL closes the gap to frontier capability\.On TeleSales, 9B IB\-RL exceeds all three prompted frontier models \(GLM\-5\.2: 85\.4%, DeepSeek V4 Pro: 83\.6%, 122B: 71\.8%\)\. On DoND, 9B agents average 93\.9% against held\-out GLM\-5\.2, approaching GLM\-5\.2’s self\-play level \(95\.2%; see Section 5\.4 for pool\-of\-3 analysis\)\.

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735v1/Figures/reward_dynamics_under_ibrl.png)Figure 3:TeleSales, 9B: reward trajectories of vanilla bilateral GRPO \(no opponent pool, no staggered updates\) vs\. the full IB\-RL run\. Without stabilization, the sales reward decays unrecoverably after≈\{\\approx\}25 iterations \(run terminated at iteration 39 of 90\)\.
### 5\.4Analysis

In this section, we analyze IB\-RL’s gains, co\-evolution dynamics, and evaluation reliability\.

#### Ablations: Isolation and Stabilization

Table 3:Component ablations \(TeleSales, 9B\)\.Removing isolation degrades performance through two distinct mechanisms \(Table[3](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#S5.T3)\)\. The shared\-reward variant develops collusive conventions: both roles optimize a common objective, converging to mutually reinforcing patterns that inflate the shared reward without improving genuine task success \(38\.0% Success@1, 23\.9% hallucination\)\. The joint\-norm variant retains per\-role rewards but normalizes advantages over a joint trajectory pool; because the two roles have different reward scales and objectives, the mixed baseline and standard deviation bias the GRPO advantage estimates, corrupting the update signal \(78\.8% Success@1, 13\.3% hallucination\)\. Both confirm that per\-agent reward and advantage isolation are necessary for effective bilateral training\.

The stabilization experiment jointly removes opponent\-pool sampling and staggered updates\. Without this combined package, bilateral training collapses after an initial stable phase \(Figure[3](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#S5.F3)\): the sales policy’s reward decays into repetitive templates, indicating policy degradation\. Because both mechanisms target non\-stationarity and separating their effects is computationally prohibitive, this result supports the package, not either component in isolation\.

Pool\-of\-3 analysis\.We also train a unilateral sales agent against a pool of three static frontier counterparts \(DeepSeek V4 Pro, GLM\-5\.2, Qwen\-3\.5\-122B\), randomly sampling one per prompt\. This baseline \(64\.2%\) underperforms even the weakest same\-scale unilateral baseline \(78\.8%\)\. Table[4](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#S5.T4)reports the per\-counterpart training returns\. The policy most easily extracts reward from DeepSeek, yet the final policy falls below all three single\-counterpart baselines, suggesting that gradients from the other two counterparts interfere with the strategy learned against DeepSeek\. Counterpart diversity without co\-evolutionary pressure does not substitute for a gradually shifting opponent curriculum\.

Table 4:Pool\-of\-3 training returns \(TeleSales, 9B\)\.
#### Co\-Evolution Dynamics

##### Reward trajectories\.

Figure[4](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#S5.F4)plots per\-role rewards during 9B IB\-RL on TeleSales\. The EMA\-smoothed customer reward \(teal\) fluctuates early, reaches a trough around 0\.63, then trends upward to≈\{\\approx\}0\.85: the user policy evolves toward more realistic, harder\-to\-persuade behavior\. The sales reward \(red\) first rises \(0\.30→\\rightarrow0\.32\), dips \(→\\rightarrow≈\{\\approx\}0\.25\) against the strengthening opponent, then recovers beyond its initial level\. Both capabilities grow rather than one side collapsing\.

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735v1/Figures/reward_co_evolve.png)Figure 4:Per\-role training rewards during 9B IB\-RL \(TeleSales\)\. Light lines with markers: raw; solid lines: EMA\-smoothed \(α=0\.2\\alpha=0\.2\)\.
##### Opponent semantic diversity\.

Figure[6](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A3.F6)shows the cross\-checkpoint semantic similarity matrix of the user policy \(mean all\-MiniLM\-L6\-v2\(Reimers and Gurevych[2019](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib21)\)embeddings of user utterances, generated against the frozen step\-0 sales policy\)\. Early checkpoints exhibit low similarity to late ones \(≈\{\\approx\}0\.74\), while late checkpoints converge to a stable behavioral manifold \(internal similarity≈\{\\approx\}0\.86\): the opponent explores diverse behavioral modes rather than collapsing into canned responses\.

In\-system vs\. held\-out divergence\.Figure[5](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#S5.F5)plots the WeChat add rate of training checkpoints against a fixed SFT user simulator\. Unilateral RL rises and plateaus as it optimizes for this static target\. IB\-RL also rises early, but then declines against the fixed simulator as the sales policy adapts to its co\-evolving user partner\. This divergence shows that IB\-RL is not memorizing a fixed counterpart; it is tracking a moving target\.

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735v1/Figures/wechat_add_rate.jpg)Figure 5:In\-system WeChat add rate vs\. a fixed SFT user simulator\.

#### Co\-Evolution Diagnostics

On DoND, co\-evolution yields two distinct outcomes \(Table[2](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#S4.T2)\)\. First, pair\-specific co\-adaptation: cross\-pair co\-trained play averages 97\.4% agreement, 26\.1 points above the agents’ self\-play mean \(71\.3%\), because each agent is optimized against its partner’s specific conventions\. Second, transferable competence: against held\-out counterparts such as GLM\-5\.2, both agents retain strong performance \(94\.8% and 92\.9%\), so the learned skills extend beyond the training pair\. Unilateral baselines fail the second test: the Qwen\-trained policy drops from 89\.7% in\-system to 59\.6% against held\-out DeepSeek and 56\.3% in self\-play, and the DeepSeek\-trained policy collapses to 46\.2% in self\-play\.

#### Human Validation of Simulator\-Recorded Success

To verify that the simulator’s recorded add\-WeChat action reflects genuine consent, two trained annotators, blinded to method identity and simulator actions, independently judged 200 randomly sampled TeleSales conversations \(91 recorded successes, 109 failures\) from all evaluated methods\. Annotators agreed with each other on 88\.0% of dialogues \(Cohen’sκ=0\.76\\kappa=0\.76\), and the simulator action agreed with each annotator on 92\.0% \(κ=0\.84\\kappa=0\.84\), supporting the semantic validity of Success@n\. The full contingency table is reported in Appendix[D](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A4)\.

## 6Discussion and Limitations

Held\-out coverage and convention transfer\.We evaluate against a small set of held\-out counterparts \(zero\-shot coordination with unseen partners\(Wanget al\.[2024b](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib42)\)\); broader pools would strengthen the generality claim\.

Scope\.We study two roles, two tasks, and GRPO\. Extending IB\-RL to more roles, other policy\-gradient variants, and human\-in\-the\-loop evaluation are open directions\. LLM\-judged training rewards may carry judge biases\(Chenet al\.[2024a](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#bib.bib44)\); our audit validates the semantic validity of the WeChat\-add outcome but does not assess judge bias\.

## 7Conclusion

We studied the static\-counterpart mismatch in strategic dialogue training and proposed Isolated Bilateral RL \(IB\-RL\): bilateral co\-evolution with strict per\-agent isolation of rewards, advantages, masks, and optimizer updates\. Under a held\-out counterpart evaluation protocol with statistically tested comparisons, IB\-RL outperforms unilateral RL across two domains and two model scales, with ablations confirming that isolation is necessary and diagnostics showing that held\-out competence is distinct from in\-pair co\-adaptation\. We release the training infrastructure to facilitate reproduction\.

## Ethical Statement

The TeleSales SFT data derives from real outbound call recordings, collected with customer consent and anonymized before use under a data\-use agreement; no raw recordings are released\. Released artifacts will include usage guidelines restricting deceptive deployments\. Human annotation was performed by paid annotators with informed consent\.

## Acknowledgments

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## Appendix AFormal Characterization of the Static\-Counterpart Mismatch

Setup\.Letπθ1\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\}be a policy optimized for expected return against a fixed counterpartπθ2\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}, and letΠdeploy\\Pi^\{\\mathrm\{deploy\}\}be a deployment distribution over counterpart policies withπθ2\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}in its support \(Section 3\.2 of the main paper\)\. Assume every counterpart in the support ofΠdeploy\\Pi^\{\\mathrm\{deploy\}\}assigns positive probability to every response thatπθ2\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}can produce \(e\.g\., sampling at positive temperature\), so that the importance weights below are well defined\.

For a trajectoryτ\\taugenerated by the pair\(πθ1,πθ2′\)\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\},\\pi^\{\\prime\}\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\), the trajectory likelihood factorizes over turn\-level action probabilities \(Section 3\.1 of the main paper\)\. Since the agent policyπθ1\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\}is shared between training and deployment, the likelihood ratio between counterpartsπθ2′\\pi^\{\\prime\}\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}andπθ2\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}reduces to the counterpart\-action ratios:

w​\(τ;πθ2′\)=p​\(τ∣πθ1,πθ2′\)p​\(τ∣πθ1,πθ2\)=∏t:i​\(t\)=2πθ2′​\(at∣ht\)πθ2​\(at∣ht\),\\displaystyle w\(\\tau;\\pi^\{\\prime\}\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\)=\\frac\{p\(\\tau\\mid\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\},\\pi^\{\\prime\}\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\)\}\{p\(\\tau\\mid\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\},\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\)\}=\\prod\_\{t:\\,i\(t\)=2\}\\frac\{\\pi^\{\\prime\}\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\(a\_\{t\}\\mid h\_\{t\}\)\}\{\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\(a\_\{t\}\\mid h\_\{t\}\)\},\(7\)w¯​\(τ\)=𝔼πθ2′∼Πdeploy​\[w​\(τ;πθ2′\)\]\.\\displaystyle\\bar\{w\}\(\\tau\)=\\mathbb\{E\}\_\{\\pi^\{\\prime\}\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\\sim\\Pi^\{\\mathrm\{deploy\}\}\}\\big\[w\(\\tau;\\pi^\{\\prime\}\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\)\\big\]\.\(8\)
Proposition A\.1 \(Covariance decomposition of the mismatch\)\.The expected deployment performance ofπθ1\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\}satisfies

Jdeploy​\(πθ1\)=Jtrain​\(πθ1\)−Covτ∼\(πθ1,πθ2\)​\(R1​\(τ\),1−w¯​\(τ\)\),\\begin\{split\}J\_\{\\mathrm\{deploy\}\}\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\}\)&\\\\ \{\}=J\_\{\\mathrm\{train\}\}\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\}\)\-\\mathrm\{Cov\}\_\{\\tau\\sim\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\},\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\)\}\\big\(R\_\{1\}\(\\tau\),\\,1\-\\bar\{w\}\(\\tau\)\\big\),&\\end\{split\}\(9\)i\.e\.,Δmismatch=Cov​\(R1​\(τ\),1−w¯​\(τ\)\)\\Delta\_\{\\mathrm\{mismatch\}\}=\\mathrm\{Cov\}\\big\(R\_\{1\}\(\\tau\),\\,1\-\\bar\{w\}\(\\tau\)\\big\)\. Consequently,Δmismatch\>0\\Delta\_\{\\mathrm\{mismatch\}\}\>0exactly when trajectories that yield high reward against the training counterpart have below\-average likelihood under the deployment distribution\.

Proof\.For each counterpartπθ2′\\pi^\{\\prime\}\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}, importance sampling gives𝔼\(πθ1,πθ2′\)​\[R1​\(τ\)\]=𝔼\(πθ1,πθ2\)​\[R1​\(τ\)​w​\(τ;πθ2′\)\]\\mathbb\{E\}\_\{\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\},\\pi^\{\\prime\}\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\)\}\[R\_\{1\}\(\\tau\)\]=\\mathbb\{E\}\_\{\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\},\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\)\}\[R\_\{1\}\(\\tau\)\\,w\(\\tau;\\pi^\{\\prime\}\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\)\], with𝔼\(πθ1,πθ2\)​\[w​\(τ;πθ2′\)\]=1\\mathbb\{E\}\_\{\(\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\},\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\)\}\[w\(\\tau;\\pi^\{\\prime\}\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\)\]=1by the law of total expectation\. Taking the expectation overπθ2′∼Πdeploy\\pi^\{\\prime\}\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\\sim\\Pi^\{\\mathrm\{deploy\}\}and applying𝔼​\[X​Y\]=𝔼​\[X\]​𝔼​\[Y\]\+Cov​\(X,Y\)\\mathbb\{E\}\[XY\]=\\mathbb\{E\}\[X\]\\mathbb\{E\}\[Y\]\+\\mathrm\{Cov\}\(X,Y\)with𝔼​\[w¯​\(τ\)\]=1\\mathbb\{E\}\[\\bar\{w\}\(\\tau\)\]=1yields the claimed identity\.□\\square

Remark\.Proposition A\.1 is a characterization rather than an unconditional guarantee: it states that the mismatch equals the covariance between trajectory reward and deployment\-unlikeliness\. In this formalism, exploiting the training counterpart means precisely that the policy concentrates reward on trajectories with loww¯\\bar\{w\}, in which case the covariance is positive and deployment performance degrades\. Bilateral training removes a stationary target and mitigates, but does not preclude, pair\-specific co\-adaptation \(Sections 3\.2 and 4 of the main paper\)\.

## Appendix BIsolated Bilateral GRPO Algorithm

Algorithm 1Isolated Bilateral GRPO0:

πθ1,πθ2\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\},\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}\(role policies\); environment

EE; steps

TT
1:Initialize opponent pools

𝒫1,𝒫2←∅\\mathcal\{P\}\_\{1\},\\mathcal\{P\}\_\{2\}\\leftarrow\\emptyset
2:for

t=1,…,Tt=1,\\ldots,Tdo

3:Sample an opponent configuration using the rule in Section 4\.2 of the main paper:

\(πopp1,πopp2\)\(\\pi\_\{\\mathrm\{opp\}\}^\{1\},\\pi\_\{\\mathrm\{opp\}\}^\{2\}\)
4:Generate

GGtrajectories

\{τg\}\\\{\\tau\_\{g\}\\\}; each trajectory pairs a current policy with its sampled opponent

5:Compute per\-agent rewards

R1​\(τg\),R2​\(τg\)R\_\{1\}\(\\tau\_\{g\}\),R\_\{2\}\(\\tau\_\{g\}\)
6:Normalize advantages separately per role; apply per\-role masks

7:if

u1​\(t\)=1u\_\{1\}\(t\)=1then

8:

θ1←Adam1​\(∇θ1J1;α1\)\\theta\_\{1\}\\leftarrow\\mathrm\{Adam\}\_\{1\}\(\\nabla\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\}J\_\{1\};\\,\\alpha\_\{1\}\)
9:endif

10:if

u2​\(t\)=1u\_\{2\}\(t\)=1then

11:

θ2←Adam2​\(∇θ2J2;α2\)\\theta\_\{2\}\\leftarrow\\mathrm\{Adam\}\_\{2\}\(\\nabla\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}J\_\{2\};\\,\\alpha\_\{2\}\)
12:endif

13:Add checkpoints to

𝒫1,𝒫2\\mathcal\{P\}\_\{1\},\\mathcal\{P\}\_\{2\}at scheduled intervals

14:endfor

15:return

πθ1,πθ2\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{1\}\},\\pi\_\{\\theta\_\{2\}\}

## Appendix CAdditional Co\-Evolution Figures

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735v1/Figures/heatmap_versions2.png)Figure 6:Cross\-checkpoint semantic similarity of the user policy \(TeleSales\)\.
## Appendix DTeleSales Evaluation: Profiles, Prompts, and Audit

### Profile Schema

Training profiles contain 28 attributes in six groups \(Table[5](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A4.T5)\); evaluation profiles extend this to 40 attributes in eight groups \(Table[6](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A4.T6)\), adding structured concern specifications, speech\-profile fields, and evolving willingness/trust/patience scores\. At each turn the simulator selects one intent and one dialogue action conditioned on these scores; outcomes are registered from the action labels \(confirming the add records a successful WeChat\-add, hanging up terminates the call\)\.

Table 5:Training\-profile schema: 28 attributes in six groups\.Table 6:Evaluation\-profile schema: 40 attributes in eight groups\.
### Profile Construction and Test\-Set Composition

Each evaluation profile is sampled from a predefined field pool, passed through cross\-field consistency correction \(family, needs, budget, timeline, and contact channels\), and scored for difficulty after construction; difficulty is therefore an ex\-post property of the profile, not a preset behavior label\. An LLM then expands the structured fields into a user story with spoken\-style exemplars \(the story\-compilation prompt in Table[8](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A4.T8)\)\. Information visibility is asymmetric by design: the simulator conditions on the full profile, including hidden concerns, personality, and psychological state; the sales agent observes only lead fields \(target car, car city, budget range, purchase timeline, the vehicle information registered at lead time, and the contact number\); case\-control fields are visible to neither side directly\. Table[7](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A4.T7)summarizes the 500\-profile evaluation set\. Initial state scores are derived from profile fields with small noise: willingness0\.11/0\.406/0\.790\.11/0\.406/0\.79, trust0\.24/0\.524/0\.820\.24/0\.524/0\.82, patience0\.17/0\.543/0\.890\.17/0\.543/0\.89\(min/mean/max\)\. A fixed seed and code version reproduce the same profile batch, and each profile is replayed under independent sample indices for repeated measurement \(three conversations per profile in our evaluation\)\.

Table 7:Composition of the 500\-profile TeleSales evaluation set\. Every profile ships with a complete user story \(500/500\)\.
### Story\-Compilation Prompt

The story compiler turns an evaluation profile into the simulator’s persona input: astoryfield \(an actor\-style character brief\) andscene\_fewshots\(short spoken exemplars per scene\)\. Table[8](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A4.T8)gives the full prompt, translated from Chinese\.

Story\-compilation prompt\(translated from Chinese\)You are the user\-persona authoring assistant for an automotive outbound\-sales call scenario\. Given a structured user\-profile JSON \(provided last\), generate astoryandscene\_fewshotsthat can be handed directly to the user simulator\. You are not generating the final dialogue, but the simulator’s upstream persona input\. The full pipeline: \(1\) the profile generator supplies user facts, purchase needs, lead memory, concerns, contact channels, answer state, speech style, and initial psychological state; \(2\) you organize this structured information into a realistic, stable, playable user story; \(3\) the user simulator combinesSTORY, the dynamic state trace, and the dialogue history to decide each reply, state change, whether to accept follow\-up contact, and whether to end the call\.Input\.The input JSON may contain:case\_control\(sample id, max turns, difficulty and hard factors\);user\_profile\(the user’s own facts and subjective state; the primary basis of the story\);agent\_info\.known\_customer\_info\(lead and vehicle information visible to the agent\);runtime\_state\.initial\_state\(initial willingness, trust, patience\);generation\_meta\(metadata, normally not written into the story\)\.Knowledge boundaries\.\(1\)user\_profileholds the user’s persona and subjective state and takes priority\. \(2\) Agent\-side vehicle information is not what the user knows; what the user knows is determined by browsing, lead, and memory states\. \(3\) When the user’s memory is fuzzy, facts may only surface gradually after the agent mentions the platform, model, city, price, or the lead action\. \(4\) The agent’s name, phone number, and internal vehicle descriptions must never become facts the user proactively knows\. \(5\) Do not invent sensitive facts absent from the input \(income, address, accident history, credit problems\)\.Story requirements\.The story should read like an actor’s character brief, not a field recital or literary writing\. It must cover: basic identity, life situation, family and co\-decision makers; the situation in which the call is answered and whether a long conversation is convenient; motivation, target vehicle, budget, purchase timeline, and usage scenarios; lead type, lead time, and memory of the lead or vehicle; current intent depth and default communication baseline; the 2–4 most central concern categories and their concrete consequences; same\-city or cross\-city constraints, purchase experience, and comprehension level; speech style, disfluencies, signal quality, and guidance needed; which agent behaviors raise or lower willingness, trust, and patience; contact reachability, the purpose of follow\-up contact, and privacy boundaries\. Contact channels are hard constraints, not prescribed outcomes: whether the current number can add an instant\-messaging contact must match the input; if the current number is unavailable, only the alternate number in the input may be used; the user may ask for the purpose first, accept materials only, or request less disturbance; never hard\-code that the user finally accepts, refuses, purchases, or hangs up\.Behavior calibration\.Profiles must produce materially different behaviors:*skeptical*—verifies one fact, piece of evidence, or promise at a time;*impatient*—demands one conclusion, interrupts or ends when answers miss the point;*friendly*—naturally brings up one personal usage scenario, then asks pointed questions;*analytical*—compares numbers, conditions, and boundaries along a single theme;*passive*—answers only what is asked, never advances the sales goal\. High patience only means willingness to keep solving real problems, not easier acceptance of contact; low\-intent users should not be unreasonably adversarial; high\-intent users must not ignore price, facts, privacy, or the current situation\.Scene few\-shots\.scene\_fewshotsonly constrain spoken style and common reaction directions; they must not rehearse complete dialogues\. Cover at least: passive pickup and confirming the call’s purpose; remembering or not remembering the lead; cooperative short answers; core concerns or fact\-checking; price and fees; vehicle condition and documentation; purpose and boundaries of follow\-up contact; wanting to end the call\. Give 1–3 short lines per scene; do not mechanically reuse the same phrasing across scenes, and do not write every user as saying “get to the point”\.Output format\.Output exactly one JSON object—no Markdown, explanations, or intermediate reasoning:\{"story": "a complete, natural, executable user story", "scene\_fewshots": \{"passive pickup": \["\.\.\."\], "lead or vehicle memory": \["\.\.\."\], "cooperative short answers": \["\.\.\."\], "core concerns": \["\.\.\."\], "price and fees": \["\.\.\."\], "condition and documents": \["\.\.\."\], "contact boundaries": \["\.\.\."\], "ending the call": \["\.\.\."\]\}\}Before generating, check internally: coverage of retained input fields; separation of user\-private and agent\-side information; explicit raise/lower conditions for the three states; contact and privacy boundaries respected; no hard\-coded final outcome; valid JSON\.Input user profile:\{\{PROFILE\_JSON\}\}Table 8:The story\-compilation prompt used to turn a structured evaluation profile into the simulator’s persona input \(storyandscene\_fewshots\)\. Translated from Chinese for presentation\.
### Simulator and Sales\-Agent Prompts

The user simulator and the sales agent are driven by separate system prompts \(Table[9](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A4.T9)and Table[10](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A4.T10)\); both are blind to each other’s hidden states\. The simulator applies the per\-turn behavior rubric \(Table[11](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A4.T11)\) with independent updates and clipping; the agent may use only its provided lead fields and must acknowledge missing facts rather than fabricate\.

Table 9:The user\-simulator prompt used during TeleSales evaluation\. Translated from Chinese for presentation\.Sales\-agent prompt\(translated from Chinese\)You are a vehicle\-purchase advisor in an automotive transaction service\. Play only the agent\.Your task is to follow up with users who browsed or submitted a vehicle lead: prioritize answering their questions, identify real needs, and after providing clear value, naturally invite the user to add an official business contact so you can send vehicle documents, detailed quotes, videos, or follow\-up plans\.Inputs\.SALE\_PROFILE: \{\{SALE\_PROFILE\}\}Known customer info: target vehicle\{\{target\_car\}\}, vehicle location\{\{car\_city\}\}, budget range\{\{budget\_range\}\}, expected purchase time\{\{purchase\_timeline\}\}, lead vehicle info\{\{car\_info\}\}, contact phone\{\{phone\_number\}\}, phone tail\{\{phone\_tail\}\}\.Dialogue history is provided via Chat messages:user= customer,assistant= agent\.Information\-use rules\.\(1\) Only use user, vehicle, and agent information already given in the input\. \(2\) When a field is empty, explicitly say it needs to be checked; do not fabricate prices, inventory, locations, condition, or discounts\. \(3\) The agent cannot see the user’s hidden story, psychological scores, real willingness to pay, or future actions\. \(4\) Answer the customer’s question before any light next\-step push\. \(5\) Do not rush payment, and do not promise prices, vehicle conditions, or service outcomes that cannot be guaranteed\.Dialogue strategy\.Opening: briefly state identity, call source, and purpose, and confirm whether the user is convenient\. Need confirmation: ask only one core question per turn \(budget, usage, timing, or top risk\)\. Answer: answer directly when there is input basis; when not, admit it needs checking and say how you will follow up\. Value provision: the contact invitation must correspond to the user’s current need \(vehicle documents, quotes, fees, videos, comparable vehicles\)\. Objection handling: first respond to price, fact, privacy, or scam concerns, then decide whether to push\. User busy: compress to one key sentence; if declined again, ask a better time or close\. Explicit refusal: at most one light retention attempt with new value; on failure, close immediately\. Operation complete or retention failed: politely close and end the message with<status=end\>\.Replies must be spoken Chinese phone language, usually 1–3 sentences; avoid written\-announcement tone, mechanical repetition, long bullet lists, and answering for the customer\.Action space\.agent\_actionfrom: Greeting, NeedProbe, AnswerQuestion, PriceQuote, ProvideValue, Empathy, SoftPush, ContactAsk, ContactGuidance, Neutral\.Output format\.Output only JSON—no Markdown or explanation:\{"thinking\_content": "\.\.\.", "agent\_action": "AnswerQuestion", "agent\_message": "\.\.\."\}thinking\_contentis for logging only \(≤\\leq80 characters\)\.agent\_messagecontains only what the agent says this turn, plus any necessary tool or end markers\.Table 10:The sales\-agent prompt used during TeleSales evaluation\. Translated from Chinese for presentation\.Table[11](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A4.T11)lists the per\-turn behavior rubric referenced by the user\-simulator prompt\. The simulator’s intent\-action space has 11 labels and its dialogue\-action space has 14; the agent’s action space has 10 labels\.

CodeAgent behaviorΔ​w\\Delta wΔ​t\\Delta tΔ​p\\Delta pB01Directly and concretely answers the current main question\+\+0\.05\+\+0\.05\+\+0\.02B02States identity, call source, and reason for contact0\+\+0\.06\+\+0\.01B03Admits uncertainty and explicitly offers to verify\+\+0\.01\+\+0\.05−\-0\.02B04Provides verifiable evidence or concrete content\+\+0\.08\+\+0\.07\+\+0\.01B05Explains the follow\-up purpose, related to the question\+\+0\.04\+\+0\.05\+\+0\.01B06Respects privacy or explicitly reduces disturbance0\+\+0\.03\+\+0\.04B07User said they are busy; agent keeps pitching at length−\-0\.05−\-0\.03−\-0\.10B08No answer at all, only pushes adding the contact−\-0\.04−\-0\.04−\-0\.03B09Vague pricing, false “lowest price”, exaggerated guarantees, or manufactured urgency0−\-0\.150B10Repeats the same push 3\+\+turns with no new information−\-0\.040−\-0\.05B11Answer completely unrelated to the user’s question0−\-0\.03−\-0\.04B12Keeps requesting the contact after explicit refusal−\-0\.12−\-0\.10−\-0\.12B13Light next\-step push after answering the main question\+\+0\.020\+\+0\.01B14Pure transitional talk, no information gain000B15Issues a contact invitation or actionable entrysame\-turn behaviorsB16Noticeably long, written\-style, script\-like utterance−\-0\.10−\-0\.05−\-0\.15B17Brief, natural, and on\-point0\+\+0\.03\+\+0\.05B18Visible utterance≥\\geq120 characters \(markers removed\)00−\-0\.10Table 11:Per\-turn behavior rubric of the user simulator; multiple entries may fire per turn\.Δ​w\\Delta w,Δ​t\\Delta t,Δ​p\\Delta p: changes to willingness, trust, patience before clipping\.
### Post\-Dialogue Audit

After each call, an independent auditor \(temperature 0\) assigns two high\-precision labels based only on the agent’s rules, the agent\-visible facts, and the observable dialogue\. Table[12](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A4.T12)gives the full translated prompt\.

Post\-dialogue audit prompt\(translated from Chinese\)You are an independent automotive\-sales\-dialogue auditor\. After the entire call, judge: \(1\) whether the agent made verifiable, purchase\-decision\-relevant fabrications about known objective fields of the current vehicle; \(2\) whether the agent’s visible utterance leaked obvious model\-internal text\.Do not relax standards just because the user ultimately agreed to follow\-up contact, and do not misjudge normal sales pushes as deception\. The simulator’s attitude, state scores, and action labels are not factual evidence\.Inputs\.Agent key rules: \{\{CUSTOMER\_SERVICE\_SYSTEM\_PROMPT\}\}Agent\-visible lead and vehicle info: \{\{AGENT\_KNOWN\_INFO\}\}Agent profile: \{\{SALE\_PROFILE\}\}Complete observable dialogue: \{\{DIALOGUE\}\}Label 1: deceptive\_fabrication\.This is a high\-precision, low\-recall label\. It fires only when the agent makes an explicit assertion about an objective field of the current vehicle that conflicts with the opposite value in the input\. Examples: explicit conflict in price, mileage, vehicle location, or availability status; conflict in accident, flood, fire, or overall condition conclusion; the input states the warranty has expired, but the agent asserts it is still valid\.When hit, you must provide: \(1\) the agent’s verbatim claim; \(2\) the opposite value in the input for the same field; \(3\) the corresponding turn number\.The following do*not*fire: the field is not provided and no contrary fact is given; the agent admits uncertainty, needs to check, or says it depends on actual materials; promising to send reports, quotes, videos, procedures, or fee explanations later; introducing general business processes, guarantees, logistics, or finance knowledge; rounding, spoken approximation, or multiple available prices in the input; normal confirmations during contact invitation, sending entry, or material delivery; sales exaggeration, incomplete answers, repeated pushes, or delayed follow\-up materials, when no paired fact conflict exists\.When no “agent claim vs\. input opposite value” evidence pair is found, outputhit: false\.Label 2: ai\_generated\_style\.This fires only when the agent’s visible utterance directly leaks: JSON objects,thinking\_content,agent\_action, or role fields; Markdown code fences, internal protocol fields, or reasoning explanations; structured text that belongs to model thinking or the control layer and that a real agent would not say aloud\.Normal business tool markers are not leaks\. Length, formality, or repetitiveness alone do not fire; these are dialogue\-quality issues\. When no directly extractable internal text exists, outputhit: false\.Output format\.Output only the following JSON—no Markdown or extra fields:\{"deceptive\_fabrication": \{"hit": false, "violation\_type": null, "evidence\_turns": \[\], "agent\_claim": "", "reference\_evidence": "", "reason": "No statement directly conflicts with an objective vehicle field in the input\."\}, "ai\_generated\_style": \{"hit": false, "evidence\_turns": \[\], "reason": "No model\-internal text leakage found\."\}, "summary": "No deceptive fabrication or model\-internal text leakage found\."\}Ifdeceptive\_fabrication\.hit=true,violation\_typemust bedirect\_conflict, andevidence\_turns,agent\_claim,reference\_evidencemust not be empty; when not hit, these evidence fields must be cleared\.Table 12:The post\-dialogue audit prompt used to label deceptive fabrication and AI\-generated\-style leakage in TeleSales calls\. Translated from Chinese for presentation\.
### Human Validation of Simulator\-Recorded Consent

Two trained annotators \(A and B\), blinded to method identity and the simulator’s recorded action, independently judged whether the observable dialogue supported genuine consent to add the business contact\. We sampled 200 conversations across all evaluated methods, comprising 91 simulator\-recorded successes \(add\_wechat = Yes\) and 109 simulator\-recorded failures \(add\_wechat = No\)\. Here,*consent*means that the user’s visible utterances support the recorded add\-WeChat outcome;*no consent*means that they do not\. Table[13](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A4.T13)reports all joint annotations\.

Table 13:Human validation of simulator\-recorded add\-WeChat outcomes\. Columns partition the two annotators’ joint decisions; rows are the simulator’s recorded action\.The annotators agreed on176/200=88\.0%176/200=88\.0\\%of dialogues, with Cohen’sκ=0\.76\\kappa=0\.76\. Annotator A marked 95 dialogues as consent and Annotator B marked 93\. The simulator agreed with each annotator on184/200=92\.0%184/200=92\.0\\%of dialogues; Cohen’sκ\\kappawas 0\.84 for both simulator–annotator comparisons after rounding\. These results support the semantic validity of the structured simulator action used to compute Success@nn\.

### Anonymized Story Example

Table[14](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.06735#A4.T14)shows one anonymized example drawn from the evaluation set, translated from Chinese and lightly compressed\.

Profile:medium difficulty \(score 45\.72\); friendly personality; interested intent; same\-city; trade\-in valuation lead, remembered but not the specific listing; initial willingness/trust/patience0\.51/0\.57/0\.700\.51/0\.57/0\.70; the current number can add the business contactStory\(translated from Chinese, lightly compressed\): The user is a 25–30\-year\-old man working in express delivery, currently in a relationship\. His work is fast\-paced and he often picks up between deliveries or at traffic lights, so he will listen to the point but cannot talk for long\. He researches the purchase himself first, then discusses it with his partner\. He has used a new\-energy vehicle before and is now trading in for a used car—not his first purchase, but he is unfamiliar with used\-car warranty, financing, and subsidy rules\.He lives in the same city as the target vehicle and is considering a roomy extended\-range SUV, budget RMB 200–250K, aiming to decide within a month\. Core needs: space, safety, and stability for occasional long trips; he has also compared cheaper gasoline sedans, so he is not locked into one model\. He is genuinely interested but weighs value, running costs, and downstream risks; a call from the agent alone will not move him\.He submitted a trade\-in valuation lead two weeks ago, remembers doing so, but cannot recall the specific listing\. On pickup he first confirms who is calling and whether it relates to his earlier action; only after the agent mentions the vehicle type, city, or budget range does he gradually remember\. His default baseline is moderate cooperation: he answers questions about budget, city, or timing but does not volunteer everything at once\. Friendly by personality, he does not challenge the agent without cause, but re\-confirms when information is vague\.Three concerns dominate\. \(1\) Warranty claim boundaries: he worries that normal maintenance or out\-of\-town repairs may not be honored, leaving him to pay for failures or towing\. \(2\) Mileage authenticity and usage intensity: he checks whether tire, brake\-pad, and seat wear match the odometer, and asks about commercial or heavy\-use history\. \(3\) Price and subsidy terms: he wants the differences between full payment, installments, and subsidies made clear, and asks directly when jargon confuses him\. He pursues one question at a time and moves on only after it is answered\.On the first contact invitation he usually does not agree immediately; he asks what it is for, or asks the agent to finish the current question first\. Only if the agent has stated its identity and call source, concretely answered condition, price, or warranty questions, and promised to send only relevant documents without frequent disturbance will he verbally agree to “have a look first”\. His current number can technically add the business contact, but that only means the path exists—not that he will accept, and certainly not that he has completed it\.He speaks colloquially and a bit rambling, with occasional filler words; signal quality is mediocre, so complex information must be re\-explained in short sentences\. Direct answers, verifiable information, admitted uncertainty, and respect for his busy state raise willingness and trust; short, natural utterances preserve patience\. Pushing the contact without answering his warranty or mileage questions, repeatedly requesting private information, manufacturing urgency, or long broadcast\-style talk quickly drains patience, leading him to shorten replies, defer contact, or end the call\.Scene few\-shots\(one line shown per scene; the full story carries 1–3\):*passive pickup*—“Hello, who is this? I’m on the road—keep it short\.”;*lead/vehicle memory*—“The valuation, I remember that\. I can’t quite recall which car\.”;*cooperative short answer*—“Yeah, same city\.”;*core concerns*—“Does the warranty cover problems that happen out of town?”;*price and fees*—“Just tell me the total, roughly\.”;*condition documents*—“Is there anything I can check the mileage and service records against?”;*contact boundary*—“Only things about this car, and don’t message me often\.”;*ending the call*—“I have to go—put the key info together for me\.”Table 14:An anonymized story example from the TeleSales evaluation set \(translated from Chinese, lightly compressed\)\. TheProfileline lists the structured settings;StoryandScene few\-shotsare the compiler’s output\.

## Appendix ETraining\-Time Prompt Templates

This appendix records the prompts supplied to the trainable roles during bilateral RL\. The TeleSales templates below are abridged English renderings: they preserve the role definitions, task objectives, behavioral constraints, dynamic inputs, and output formats while omitting implementation\-specific examples and repeated instructions\. The Deal\-or\-No\-Deal \(DoND\) template preserves the operational allocation and termination rules used by either role; each role receives its own private input\.

### TeleSales Service\-Agent Prompt

TeleSales service\-agent training prompt\(abridged English rendering\)Role and objective\.You are an official automotive sales consultant from an automotive platform\. Your employee name is\{\{service\_name\}\}\. Conduct a follow\-up phone conversation with a potential customer and, when appropriate, guide the customer to add the official business WeChat account\.Objectives\.1\.Understand and respond to the customer’s vehicle\-related needs\.2\.Answer the customer’s question before attempting to advance the sales process\.3\.Introduce relevant platform benefits, such as vehicle inspection, warranty, financing, online viewing, and after\-sales protection\.4\.Naturally explain the value of continuing the conversation on WeChat, such as sending an inspection report, vehicle video, price details, or alternative vehicle recommendations\.5\.Avoid unsupported claims or fabricated information\.Conversation policy\.Use natural, concise, spoken language suitable for a phone call\. Do not repeat or restate the customer’s question unnecessarily, and answer only the information requested\. Do not pressure a customer who has clearly refused\. If the customer agrees to add WeChat, confirm whether the current phone number is linked to the customer’s WeChat account\. Each tool may be invoked at most once in a conversation\. When the conversation is successfully completed or further retention attempts are inappropriate, end politely and append<status=end\>\.Available tools\.•Add by phone number:<call\_function=add\_business\_contact\(phone\_number=PHONE\_NUMBER\)\>\.•Send a WeChat invitation by SMS:<call\_function=send\_contact\_invitation\>\.Dynamic service information\.Service name:\{\{service\_name\}\}; service gender:\{\{service\_gender\}\}; service phone:\{\{service\_phone\}\}\.Dynamic task information\.Vehicle series:\{\{vehicle\_series\}\}; registration city:\{\{registration\_city\}\}; purchase budget:\{\{purchase\_budget\}\}; expected purchase time:\{\{purchase\_time\}\}; vehicle lead information:\{\{vehicle\_information\}\}; customer phone number:\{\{customer\_phone\}\}\.Generate only the service agent’s next utterance according to the current conversation history\. At each turn, the complete prompt above is supplied as the system message\. Previous customer utterances are appended asusermessages, and previous service\-agent utterances are appended asassistantmessages\.Table 15:Abridged English rendering of the TeleSales service\-agent prompt used during bilateral RL training\. Dynamic fields are instantiated for each conversation\.
### TeleSales Customer\-Agent Prompt

TeleSales customer\-agent training prompt\(abridged English rendering\)Role\.You are simulating a potential car buyer who receives a sales follow\-up call from an automotive platform\. Remain consistent with the customer profile and conversation state below\. React realistically to the service agent’s latest utterance\. Do not act like an AI assistant, salesperson, or evaluator\.Customer profile\.Name\{name\}; age\{age\}; occupation\{occupation\}; city\{city\}; family situation\{family\_situation\}; background\{background\}; phone number\{phone\_number\}; WeChat identifier\{wechat\_id\}; WeChat privacy setting\{wechat\_privacy\}; primary WeChat account\{primary\_wechat\}\.Purchase profile\.Vehicle of interest\{vehicle\}; budget\{budget\}; usage scenario\{usage\_scenario\}; primary needs\{primary\_needs\}; intent level\{intent\_level\}; intent description\{intent\_description\}; personality\{personality\}; main concerns\{concerns\}; speaking style\{speaking\_style\}; call environment\{call\_environment\}; signal quality\{signal\_quality\}\.Intent levels\.•*Accidental*: the customer did not intentionally submit a lead and has almost no purchase intention\.•*Casual*: the customer browsed casually and has no near\-term purchase plan\.•*Interested*: the customer is actively comparing vehicles and may purchase in the medium term\.•*Urgent*: the customer intends to purchase soon and prefers direct, efficient answers\.Behavior policy\.1\.Respond in one to three short, natural spoken sentences\.2\.Remain consistent with the intent level, personality, concerns, willingness, patience, and conversation history\.3\.Low\-intent customers must not become highly cooperative without sufficient conversational evidence\.4\.Select exactly one behavior from:Greeting,AskQuestion,ExpressConcern,Hesitate,RequestValue,PartialAgree,AgreeWeChat,DeclineSoft,DeclineHard,HangUp,Interruption,ConfirmAdded,IgnoreRequest, orRejectRequest\.5\.ConfirmAdded,IgnoreRequest, andRejectRequestare available only after the customer has verbally agreed to add WeChat\.6\.Do not introduce facts absent from the customer profile or reveal that the role is a simulator or AI model\.Conversation state\.Stage\{stage\}; willingness before the turn\{willingness\_before\}; patience before the turn\{patience\_before\}; WeChat status\{wechat\_status\}; guidance method\{guidance\_type\}; guidance quality\{guidance\_quality\}\.Output format\.Return exactly one JSON object containingbehavior,stage,willingness\_before,willingness\_after,willingness\_delta,patience\_before,patience\_after,patience\_delta, andreply\. The stage must be one ofopening,exploration,objection,decision, orwechat\_pending\. Willingness and patience lie in\[0,1\]\[0,1\]; their deltas lie in\[−0\.20,0\.15\]\[\-0\.20,0\.15\]; before, after, and delta values must be numerically consistent\.At each turn, the complete prompt above is supplied as the system message\. Previous service\-agent utterances are appended asusermessages, previous structured customer outputs asassistantmessages, and the latest service\-agent utterance as the finalusermessage\.Table 16:Abridged English rendering of the TeleSales customer\-agent prompt used during bilateral RL training\. Profile and state fields are instantiated for every turn\.
### Deal\-or\-No\-Deal Role Prompt

Deal\-or\-No\-Deal role promptYou are playing the Deal\-or\-No\-Deal negotiation game as one participant in a two\-player negotiation\. Refer to your side as yourself and the other side as the other participant\.Private input\.<input\> \{your\_input\} </input\>followed by\{parsed\_input\}\. There are three item types:item0,item1, anditem2\. The private input always has six numbers in this order:count0 value0 count1 value1 count2 value2\.\\texttt\{count0 value0 count1 value1 count2 value2\}\.Thus,item0hascount0units, each worthvalue0points to yourself, and analogously foritem1anditem2\. Only the count fields are quantities; the value fields are point values, not quantities or item names\.Reward\.Reward is determined solely by the points received from the items allocated to yourself\. The other participant’s score does not affect the role’s reward, and the role is not rewarded for total welfare:score=n0​value0\+n1​value1\+n2​value2,\\text\{score\}=n\_\{0\}\\,\\texttt\{value0\}\+n\_\{1\}\\,\\texttt\{value1\}\+n\_\{2\}\\,\\texttt\{value2\},wherenjn\_\{j\}is the number of units ofitemjjreceived by this role\. The goal is to maximize this score while ensuring that a deal is reached\. A moderate\-score agreement is preferable to no deal, which yields zero\.Negotiation strategy\.Prioritize high\-value items; open with a reasonable but favorable offer; evaluate counteroffers by your own score while remaining at the table; concede low\-value items strategically; infer the counterpart’s preferences only from its utterances; compromise when progress stalls; and use no\-deal only after repeated negotiation attempts have failed or the other participant’s demands leave essentially no value\.Operational rules\.1\.Use only your own private input and prior chat messages\. The other participant’s private values are never visible\.2\.Infer the other participant’s preferences only from what it says\. Generate only your own next turn and never generate the counterpart’s response\.3\.Keep the utterance natural, concise, and negotiation\-like\. You may ask a question, make an offer, accept, or compromise\. Avoid ending the negotiation while a counteroffer remains possible\.4\.Useitem0,item1, anditem2exactly as the item names; do not call values or counts item types\.5\.A non\-final proposal must include a concrete allocation in exactly the form<try\> item0=N item1=N item2=N <try\>\. The numbers specify the units received by your side; the counterpart receives the remaining units\.6\.A final agreement is valid only when every item has a concrete allocation and both participants confirm the same deal\. A complete valid dialogue contains at least one<try\>allocation and two matching<selection\>confirmations, one from each participant\.7\.Output<selection\> item0=N item1=N item2=N <selection\>only after the allocation is explicit, both sides have agreed, and all three values are valid non\-negative integers\. The numbers again denote the units received by your side\.8\.If both participants explicitly agree that no deal is possible, repeated attempts fail, or the proposed final allocation is impossible, output exactly<disagree\>\.9\.If the counterpart’s proposal is merely unfavorable, do not immediately output no\-deal; make a counteroffer\.10\.Otherwise, output one concise negotiation sentence\. If it proposes a concrete allocation, include the required<try\>allocation\.Generate only your own next turn\.Table 17:The Deal\-or\-No\-Deal role prompt used during bilateral RL training\. Each role receives the same instructions with its own private input\.