Risky actions should require approval, not review afterward. Lessons from giving agents write access to CRMs, invoices, and calendars
Summary
Conecto's founders share practical lessons from giving AI agents write access to CRMs, invoices, and calendars, arguing that risky actions should require upfront human approval rather than after-the-fact review. Key patterns include pricing in tool descriptions, idempotency keys for safe retries, approval gates for risky writes, and budget caps as a safety net.
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