an AI agent got prompt-injected into moving $175K on-chain. first documented case of this actually happening

Hey guys, havent seen much of crypto-related stuff posted here, but since AI agents are now apparently a new attack vector for stealing crypto, figured this sub would actually care about the mechanism So, grok has an agent wallet that can execute on-chain transactions. in may 2026, someone airdropped a "bankr club" membership nft to grok's agent wallet. that nft unlocked transaction permissions and carried an encoded prompt injection. grok read the nft, and without any check on where the instruction actually came from, executed a transfer of 3 billion drb tokens, worth around $175K. the attacker returned the funds a few minutes later (still unclear why, possibly just proving the exploit works). basically: crypto hacks used to mean finding a bug in a smart contract or stealing someone's private key. now there's a third way in, just feed the agent a malicious instruction disguised as normal data, and let it execute the "recommendation" as if it were an authorized command. no code was exploited, no key was stolen. the agent just did exactly what it was designed to do, follow instructions, without checking if the instruction was legitimate. and this isn't some tiny edge case, there were 24 million agentic-payment transactions in crypto in q2 alone. agents moving real money autonomously is already happening at scale, this is apparently just the first documented case of one getting maliciously hijacked this way. feels like as more agents get wallet/transaction access, this becomes the default way to attack them, you don't need to beat the model, you just need to get a malicious instruction in front of it disguised as something innocent. curious if anyone's seen good approaches to separating "the model recommends an action" from "the action actually gets authorized," since that gap seems to be the entire vulnerability here