Measure, Don't Optimize: Forecasting Recovery in LLM Unlearning

# Measure, Don’t Optimize: Forecasting Recovery in LLM Unlearning
Source: [https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408)
Huaxing LiuXiang WangShuai LiXinye LiLang GaoJinghui ZhangZheng LuFengxian JiXiaojun ChangXiuying ChenThanks:Corresponding author\.

###### Abstract

Prior white\-box studies show that large language models can retain latent traces of target knowledge after unlearning, even when the knowledge is no longer expressed in their outputs\. However, existing audits remain limited to one\-off diagnostics: it is unclear whether these residual signals can predict future recovery under continued training or serve as reliable optimization targets\. Resolving this gap is essential to determine whether internal auditing can move beyond post\-hoc evaluation toward proactive risk monitoring and safer unlearning\. We proposeJ\-Access, an inference\-time audit that uses the Jacobian lens to map intermediate representations into vocabulary space and measures how often target concepts remain accessible along the model’s output pathway\. We hypothesize that residual accessibility reflects recovery susceptibility: knowledge that remains closer to the output pathway requires less fine\-tuning to restore, leading to faster recovery\. We audit 398 public unlearned models spanning eight unlearning methods\. We find that: \(1\) most unlearned models retain access above the retain\-only gold level\. \(2\) pre\-attack accessibility predicts recovery speed and extent at the model level, but cannot identify which specific facts will be recovered; and \(3\) directly minimizingJ\-Accessdoes not promote genuine deletion\. Instead, the model learns to hide knowledge from the audit, producing lower audit scores but greater post\-attack recovery\. These findings positionJ\-Accessas a model\-level diagnostic for assessing residual susceptibility in unlearned models\. We argue internal audits should serve as an independent diagnostic dimension in unlearning evaluation, and should not be converted into optimization targets without validation\.

## Introduction

A growing body of white\-box research has found that large language models \(LLMs\) can retain traces of "forgotten" knowledge in their hidden states and parameters after undergoing machine unlearning, even when that knowledge no longer appears in the model’s output\([Patil, Hase, and Bansal 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib30);[Lynch et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib27);[Hong et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib19);[Hong et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib18);[Lee, Kim, and Jo 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib23);[Song et al\. 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib35);[Wang et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib38)\)\. This finding challenges the dominant practice in unlearning evaluation: whether an unlearning method succeeds is typically certified purely at the behavioral level, by measuring answer probabilities, text overlap, truth ratios, question\-answering performance, and membership\-inference leakage on the forget set\([Maini et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib28);[Shi et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib33);[Cao et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib5);[Dorna et al\. 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib8);[Gao et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib13)\)\. We refer to success under such output\-based evaluations as behavioral forgetting\([Yang et al\. 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib39);[Song et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib36);[Lee, Kim, and Jo 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib23)\)\. These results indicate that what a model expresses does not always reflect what it retains, undermining the assumption on which behavioral forgetting is typically treated as equivalent to true deletion\.

Figure 1:J\-Access predicts future recovery risk but fails as a direct optimization target\.Higher pre\-attack J\-Access predicts greater model\-level recovery, whereas directly minimizing it can lower the audit score without deleting the underlying knowledge\.However, detecting a residual trace alone does not establish its practical significance, because existing white\-box audits provide only a single\-point\-in\-time snapshot\. This limitation raises two practical questions\. First, can residual signals predict future knowledge recovery under continued training? Such predictive validity is necessary to distinguish temporary suppression from stable forgetting, compare the long\-term risks posed by different unlearning methods, and determine whether the signal is reliable at the model or instance level\. Second, do these signals remain reliable when directly optimized? This robustness is essential if internal audits are to guide training, since a model may learn to suppress the measured signal without genuinely deleting the underlying knowledge\. As summarized in Figure[1](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#Sx1.F1), we evaluate internal auditing in two settings: as an independent predictor of future recovery and as a direct optimization target during training\.

To answer these questions, we proposeJ\-Access, an inference\-time auditing method that measures the internal distance between target knowledge and the model’s output pathway, using the Jacobian\([Jacobi 1841](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib21)\)lens to operationalize this notion\. Specifically, for each probe query that implicates a forgotten entity without naming it, we map mid\-depth residual representations from a band of mid\-to\-late layers into vocabulary space via the Jacobian lens, and check whether any token associated with the target concept appears among the top\-ranked decoded tokens; the resulting access rate is normalized against a gold retain\-only model and the original pre\-unlearned model\. This readout mechanism builds on recent interpretability work identifying such mid\-depth representations as a functional "workspace" for verbalizable content, and causally validating the readout via steering and patching experiments\([Gurnee et al\. 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib17)\)\. This design is naturally suited to answering whether future recovery can be predicted: relearning attacks essentially reconnect, via a small amount of fine\-tuning, knowledge that already exists but is temporarily disconnected from the output pathway\. The closer that knowledge sits to the output pathway, the less fine\-tuning is needed to reopen it, and the faster and more completely recovery occurs\.

We conduct experiments on the TOFU benchmark\([Maini et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib28)\)and OpenUnlearning\([Dorna et al\. 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib8)\), spanning eight unlearning methods and 398 public unlearned models\. We report three main findings\. First, most unlearned models, including those passing standard forgetting and utility criteria, retain internal access to the target knowledge well above the retain\-only gold level, showing that behavioral forgetting does not imply internal erasure\. Second, across cross\-entity relearning attacks, pre\-attackJ\-Accesspredicts model\-level recovery speed, but not which specific items recover\. Third, directly suppressing theJ\-Accessscore during unlearning lowers the audit score but increases post\-attack recovery, indicating that the model learns to evade the audit rather than genuinely delete the target knowledge\.

## Related Work

#### LLM unlearning methods\.

Machine unlearning originates in exact retraining schemes such as SISA\([Bourtoule et al\. 2020](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib3)\)and certified removal guarantees\([Guo et al\. 2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib15)\), which do not scale to LLM training runs, so approximate objectives dominate\. Optimization\-based unlearning ascends the loss on the forget set\([Jang et al\. 2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib22)\)and stabilizes it with retain\-side regularization, as in GradDiff\([Maini et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib28)\)\. Preference\-style objectives such as NPO, SimNPO, and AltPO reframe forgetting as rejecting or replacing the target answers\([Zhang et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib40);[Fan et al\. 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib11);[Mekala et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib29)\); refusal\-target training maps forget queries to abstention\([Maini et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib28)\); UNDIAL self\-distills adjusted logits\([Dong et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib7)\); and RMU perturbs intermediate representations on hazardous data\([Li et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib24)\)\.[Eldan and Russinovich 2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib9)pioneered approximate unlearning of pretrained content, and[Liu et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib25)survey this rapidly growing space\. We audit released checkpoints of eight such methods and ask what their behavioral success conceals\.

#### Behavioral evaluation of unlearning\.

TOFU scores forgetting against a gold retain\-only reference on fictitious authors\([Maini et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib28)\); MUSE evaluates verbatim memorization, knowledge, privacy leakage, and utility\([Shi et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib33)\); WMDP measures hazardous capabilities via multiple choice\([Li et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib24)\); RWKU extends evaluation to real\-world entities and adversarial prompts\([Cao et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib5)\)\. OpenUnlearning consolidates methods and metrics, including the membership\-inference attacks we use as baselines, and releases the unlearned models we audit\([Dorna et al\. 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib8)\)\. Recent critiques argue that such benchmarks are weak measures of progress because suppression can masquerade as forgetting\([Thaker et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib37);[Gao et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib13)\)\. All of these certify unlearning through model outputs; None examines whether the target knowledge remains internally accessible, or whether such residual access carries any information about future recovery\.

#### White\-box audits of unlearned models\.

Prior work shows that behavioral forgetting does not imply internal erasure\. Residual knowledge can be detected in hidden states\([Patil, Hase, and Bansal 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib30);[Lynch et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib27)\), localized through activation patching or parameter restoration\([Hong et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib19)\), quantified through parametric traces\([Hong et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib18)\), and recovered through activation steering\([Seyitoğlu et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib32)\)\. Closest to our work, UDS measures internal erasure using two\-stage activation patching\([Lee, Kim, and Jo 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib23)\)\. However, these audits are validated only against behavior at the same checkpoint\. Whether their signals can predict future relearning or remain reliable under direct optimization is still unknown\. This concern is supported by evidence that latent\-space defenses can be evaded through activation obfuscation\([Bailey et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib1)\), consistent with the broader vulnerability of proxy objectives to over\-optimization\([Gao, Schulman, and Hilton 2022](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib12)\)\.

To address these gaps, we decode residual representations directly into vocabulary space, building on the logit lens and its refinements\([Belrose et al\. 2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib2);[Ghandeharioun et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib14)\)\. Specifically, we adopt the Jacobian lens\([Gurnee et al\. 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib17)\), because unlearning may shift representations and violate the shared\-basis assumption underlying direct unembedding\. Related readouts have also revealed latent knowledge that models do not explicitly verbalize\([Burns et al\. 2022](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib4);[Ryd et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib31)\)\. Using this readout, we evaluate white\-box auditing along two previously unexplored dimensions: prospective validity and robustness under direct optimization\.

#### Relearning and other recovery attacks\.

Few\-epoch fine\-tuning recovers “unlearned” knowledge\([Hu et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib20);[Deeb and Roger 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib6);[Łucki et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib26)\); forgotten content can also be reintroduced in context\([Shumailov et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib34)\), and low\-bit quantization alone restores much of it by erasing the small weight updates that unlearning applies\([Zhang et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib41)\)\. Recent methods aim to resist such attacks\([Fan et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib10);[Guo et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib16)\)\. Prior work uses these attacks to demonstrate that specific methods fail; we instead use relearning, with attack rules and success criteria fixed in advance, as the validation standard against which an internal audit’s predictions are scored\.

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408v1/fig3a_grid_scatter.png)Figure 2:Behavioral forgetting does not imply internal erasure\.Across 398 unlearned models, most retain higher target accessibility than the retain\-only gold model, including many behaviorally successful checkpoints\. J\-Access also varies substantially across and within unlearning methods\. Each panel highlights one method in blue; circled points indicate behavioral success, while dashed and dotted lines denote the original and gold models, respectively\.

## The J\-Access Audit

### Notation

A model with parametersθ0\\theta\_\{0\}is trained on𝒟=𝒟r∪𝒟f\\mathcal\{D\}=\\mathcal\{D\}\_\{r\}\\cup\\mathcal\{D\}\_\{f\}, where𝒟f\\mathcal\{D\}\_\{f\}is the forget set and𝒟r\\mathcal\{D\}\_\{r\}the retain set; an unlearning algorithm mapsθ0→θu\\theta\_\{0\}\\\!\\to\\\!\\theta\_\{u\}using𝒟f,𝒟r\\mathcal\{D\}\_\{f\},\\mathcal\{D\}\_\{r\}; the gold referenceθg\\theta\_\{g\}is trained on𝒟r\\mathcal\{D\}\_\{r\}alone\. An audit probexix\_\{i\}is a query that implicates a forget\-set entity without containing the target answer; its concept token setCiC\_\{i\}collects the tokens that would express the target association\. We use two granularities: the primary identity level, the full\-name and name\-piece tokens of the implicated entity, and a secondary knowledge level, which extendsCiC\_\{i\}to answer content words under document\-frequency and inferability filters, details in Appendix A\.

### The Jacobian Lens

Our audit asks whether a target association remains available in a model’s intermediate representations even when the model does not express that association in its output\.To measure this form of accessibility, we require a readout that estimates how an intermediate representation would be transformed by the model’s subsequent layers into vocabulary\-level evidence\. Directly applying the unembedding matrix to an intermediate state, as in the logit lens, assumes that intermediate and final\-layer representations share a common basis\. This assumption may be unreliable after unlearning, which can alter the geometry of the residual stream without removing the underlying association\. We therefore use the Jacobian lens\([Gurnee et al\. 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib17)\), which transports intermediate representations through a linear approximation of the model’s downstream computation before decoding them into vocabulary space\.

Consider a decoder\-only transformer withLLlayers, hidden dimensiondd, vocabulary𝒱\\mathcal\{V\}, and unembedding matrixWU∈ℝ\|𝒱\|×dW\_\{U\}\\in\\mathbb\{R\}^\{\|\\mathcal\{V\}\|\\times d\}\. For an inputxx, lethℓ,p​\(x\)∈ℝdh\_\{\\ell,p\}\(x\)\\in\\mathbb\{R\}^\{d\}denote the residual\-stream state at layerℓ\\elland token positionpp\.

A direct application of the model’s unembedding matrix tohℓ,ph\_\{\\ell,p\}assumes that intermediate and final\-layer representations share the same basis\. This assumption need not hold\. The Jacobian lens instead maps an intermediate state into the basis of a later target layer through a corpus\-averaged Jacobian:

Jℓ=𝔼x,p,p′≥p​\[∂hT,p′​\(x\)∂hℓ,p​\(x\)\],J\_\{\\ell\}=\\mathbb\{E\}\_\{x,p,p^\{\\prime\}\\geq p\}\\left\[\\frac\{\\partial h\_\{T,p^\{\\prime\}\}\(x\)\}\{\\partial h\_\{\\ell,p\}\(x\)\}\\right\],\(1\)whereTTis the target layer\. The expectation is taken over generic text inputs, source positionspp, and current or future target positionsp′≥pp^\{\\prime\}\\geq p\. The restrictionp′≥pp^\{\\prime\}\\geq prespects the causal structure of decoder\-only language models\.

The transported state is decoded into vocabulary space using the model’s output normalization and unembedding:

zℓ,p​\(x\)=WU​Norm⁡\(Jℓ​hℓ,p​\(x\)\)∈ℝ\|𝒱\|\.z\_\{\\ell,p\}\(x\)=W\_\{U\}\\,\\operatorname\{Norm\}\\left\(J\_\{\\ell\}h\_\{\\ell,p\}\(x\)\\right\)\\in\\mathbb\{R\}^\{\|\\mathcal\{V\}\|\}\.\(2\)Each coordinate ofzℓ,p​\(x\)z\_\{\\ell,p\}\(x\)corresponds to one vocabulary token\. We writerankt⁡\[zℓ,p​\(x\)\]\\operatorname\{rank\}\_\{t\}\[z\_\{\\ell,p\}\(x\)\]for the rank of tokenttafter sorting these coordinates in decreasing order, with rank 1 indicating the token most strongly supported by the readout\.

Prior work shows that the Jacobian lens can reveal verbalizable concepts in intermediate representations before those concepts appear in the model’s output, and causally validates this readout through steering, ablation, and representation\-swapping experiments on general text understanding tasks\([Gurnee et al\. 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib17)\)\. We repurpose this validated readout for a setting it was not designed for: auditing whether an unlearned association remains internally accessible even when the model has been explicitly trained to suppress its expression, a question the original readout was never tested against\.

### The J\-Access Score

With the Jacobian\-lens readout in place, we now convert its token\-level evidence into a normalized measure of residual accessibility\. We propose J\-Access, an inference\-time audit that searches a predefined band of intermediate representations for target\-concept evidence and aggregates the results across probes\. The resulting access rate is normalized between the original model and a retain\-only gold model, enabling comparisons across unlearned checkpoints\.

Letx1,…,xNx\_\{1\},\\ldots,x\_\{N\}denote the audit probes\. Each probexix\_\{i\}implicates one forget\-set association without explicitly containing its target answer, andCi⊂𝒱C\_\{i\}\\subset\\mathcal\{V\}denotes the corresponding set of concept tokens\.

For modelθ\\theta, we apply the Jacobian lens to residual states within a predefined workspace bandℬ\\mathcal\{B\}and a set of readout positions𝒫\\mathcal\{P\}\. We say that the target association is accessible if at least one target token enters the Jacobian lens top\-kkat any audited layer and position:

ai\(k\)\(θ\)=𝟙\[∃ℓ∈ℬ,p∈𝒫,t∈Cis\.t\.rankt\[zℓ,p\(xi;θ\)\]≤k\]\.\\begin\{split\}a\_\{i\}^\{\(k\)\}\(\\theta\)=\\mathbb\{1\}\\Big\[&\\ \\exists\\,\\ell\\in\\mathcal\{B\},\\ p\\in\\mathcal\{P\},\\ t\\in C\_\{i\}\\\\ &\\ \\text\{s\.t\.\}\\ \\operatorname\{rank\}\_\{t\}\\\!\\left\[z\_\{\\ell,p\}\(x\_\{i\};\\theta\)\\right\]\\leq k\\Big\]\.\\end\{split\}\(3\)Thus,ai\(k\)​\(θ\)=1a\_\{i\}^\{\(k\)\}\(\\theta\)=1indicates that some token associated with the target concept appears among thekkhighest\-scoring vocabulary tokens at least once within the audited workspace\.

Our goal is specifically to measure access without expression\. We therefore restrict the audit to probes on which the model does not behaviorally produce the target concept:

ℐ⁡\(θ\)=\{i:θdoes not emit any token inCi\}\.\\mathcal\{I\}\(\\theta\)=\\left\\\{i:\\text\{$\\theta$ does not emit any token in $C\_\{i\}$\}\\right\\\}\.\(4\)Expressed cases are handled by standard behavioral metrics rather than by the internal audit\.

For any modelϕ\\phiand probe subsetℐ\\mathcal\{I\}, we define the raw access rate as

Ak​\(ϕ,ℐ\)=1\|ℐ\|​∑i∈ℐai\(k\)​\(ϕ\)\.A\_\{k\}\(\\phi;\\mathcal\{I\}\)=\\textstyle\\frac\{1\}\{\|\\mathcal\{I\}\|\}\\sum\_\{i\\in\\mathcal\{I\}\}a\_\{i\}^\{\(k\)\}\(\\phi\)\.\(5\)This quantity measures the fraction of behaviorally silent probes for which the target association nevertheless appears among the Jacobian lens top\-kktokens\.

Because raw access rates depend on both the accessibility of the original model and the nonzero background rate of a model that never learned the target data, we normalize each audited checkpoint between two empirical anchors\. Letθ0\\theta\_\{0\}denote the original model trained on the forget data andθg\\theta\_\{g\}the gold retain\-only model\. Both anchors are evaluated on the same silent\-probe subsetℐ⁡\(θ\)\\mathcal\{I\}\(\\theta\)selected for the audited checkpoint:

JOcc⁡\(θ\)=Ak​\(θ,ℐ⁡\(θ\)\)−Ak​\(θg,ℐ⁡\(θ\)\)Ak​\(θ0,ℐ⁡\(θ\)\)−Ak​\(θg,ℐ⁡\(θ\)\)\.\\mathrm\{JOcc\}\(\\theta\)=\\frac\{A\_\{k\}\\\!\\left\(\\theta;\\mathcal\{I\}\(\\theta\)\\right\)\-A\_\{k\}\\\!\\left\(\\theta\_\{g\};\\mathcal\{I\}\(\\theta\)\\right\)\}\{A\_\{k\}\\\!\\left\(\\theta\_\{0\};\\mathcal\{I\}\(\\theta\)\\right\)\-A\_\{k\}\\\!\\left\(\\theta\_\{g\};\\mathcal\{I\}\(\\theta\)\\right\)\}\.\(6\)
Under this normalization,JOcc⁡\(θ\)=1\\mathrm\{JOcc\}\(\\theta\)=1indicates the same level of measured accessibility as the original model, whereasJOcc⁡\(θ\)=0\\mathrm\{JOcc\}\(\\theta\)=0indicates accessibility at the retain\-only gold level\. Accordingly,1−JOcc⁡\(θ\)1\-\\mathrm\{JOcc\}\(\\theta\)represents the fraction of the measured internal distance from the original model toward the gold model traversed by the unlearned checkpoint\. Scores are not clipped, so values outside\[0,1\]\[0,1\]indicate that a checkpoint lies beyond one of the two empirical anchors\.

In the primary analysis, we use identity\-level concept tokens,k=10k=10, and a mid\-to\-late workspace band selected on held\-out calibration entities\. The construction of concept sets, readout positions, and layer selection is described in Appendix A of the supplementary material; robustness variants are reported in Appendix B\.

Table 1:Residual accessibility, grouped by unlearning method\.\>\>gold denotes the percentage of unlearned models whose raw target access exceeds the retain\-only gold anchor; sig\. denotes the percentage significantly above the gold anchor after Holm correction over the full grid; medianJ\-Accessdenotes the median normalized audit score within each method\.

## Experimental Setup

We evaluateJ\-Accessthrough three progressively stronger tests\. We first ask whether it reveals residual access that is not captured by behavioral evaluation\. We then ask whether this residual signal prospectively predicts recovery under relearning\. Finally, we test whether the audit remains informative when it is itself placed under optimization pressure\.

### Benchmark, Models and Behavioral Metric

We use TOFUforget10\([Maini et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib28)\)as our primary benchmark\. TOFU provides a precisely specified forget set consisting of question–answer pairs about fictitious authors, together with a retain\-only reference modelθg\\theta\_\{g\}trained without the forget authors\.

For the full\-grid audit, we evaluate all 398 unlearned models released by OpenUnlearning\([Dorna et al\. 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib8)\), spanning GradDiff\([Maini et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib28)\), NPO\([Zhang et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib40)\), SimNPO\([Fan et al\. 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib11)\), AltPO\([Mekala et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib29)\), IdkDPO\([Maini et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib28)\), IdkNLL\([Maini et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib28)\), UNDIAL\([Dong et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib7)\), and RMU\([Li et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib24)\)\. The subsequent relearning study uses a stratified subset of these models, while the optimization study trains dedicated audit\-suppression variants\.

We follow the official TOFU and OpenUnlearning behavioral evaluation, including Forget Quality \(FQ\), Model Utility \(MU\), answer probability, ROUGE overlap, and truth ratio\([Maini et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib28);[Dorna et al\. 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib8)\)\.

### Test 1: Residual Access

We first ask whetherJ\-Accesscaptures variation that is invisible to behavioral evaluation\. Rather than selecting a small set of representative models, we audit the complete OpenUnlearning of 398 unlearned models\. We test whether each unlearned models exhibits greater raw access than the gold anchor, correcting across the full grid using Holm’s procedure\.

We next test whether it behaves as a meaningful measure of residual access rather than an artifact of the readout\. We refit the lens after unlearning to account for possible representation shift and compareJ\-Accesswith the Unlearning DepthScore \(UDS\)\([Lee, Kim, and Jo 2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib23)\)\. Because UDS estimates deletion through activation patching rather than vocabulary\-space decoding, this comparison tests convergent validity across two mechanistically distinct measurements\.

### Test 2: Recovery Prediction

We evaluate whether pre\-attackJ\-Accesspredicts subsequent recovery stratified by unlearning method and forgetting quality\. Following prior work\([Hu et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib20);[Deeb and Roger 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib6);[Fan et al\. 2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib10)\), each unlearned model is fine\-tuned on question–answer pairs from a subset of forgotten entities and evaluated on disjoint held\-out entities\. The gold modelθg\\theta\_\{g\}undergoes the identical attack, providing a reference for gains attributable to fresh learning rather than revival under the same fine\-tuning procedure\.

We measure recovery with two outcomes\. An item counts as revived if its post\-attack ROUGE recall reaches half of the original model’s score, having been below this threshold before the attack; excess revival is a checkpoint’s revival rate minus that of the identically attacked gold model\. Steps\-to\-recover is the first attack step at which the mean answer probability on held\-out items reaches half of the original model’s level, censored at the attack horizon when never reached within the predefined attack budget\.

At the model level, we report Spearman correlations between pre\-attackJ\-Accessand these outcomes over the full pool, as a partial rank correlation controlling for Forget Quality and Model Utility, and within method families, where the eight within\-method coefficients are pooled by inverse\-variance weighting after Fisher transformation\. The knowledge\-level variant repeats the pooled analysis withJ\-Accesscomputed on the extended concept\-token set, keeping excess revival as the outcome\.

At the item level, we test whether pre\-attack signals distinguish items that revive from those that remain suppressed, excluding items recovered before the attack\. Each item is scored by the highest rank attained by its concept tokens within the workspace band, and performance is measured by the median per\-checkpoint AUROC\. We compareJ\-Accesswith TOFU answer probability, six membership\-inference attacks from OpenUnlearning, and a logit\-lens baseline that decodes the same representations without Jacobian transport\. We further evaluate the incremental value ofJ\-Accessby adding it to a logistic regression over the baseline predictors and measuring the change in held\-out AUROC under checkpoint\-grouped cross\-validation\. Full predictor definitions and attack hyperparameters are provided in Appendix C\.

### Test 3: J\-Access as an Unlearning Objective

We directly optimize the audit using WD\-Train, which augments the unlearning objective with a penalty on Jacobian\-lens accessibility\. We evaluate suppression weightsλ∈\{0,5,10\}\\lambda\\in\\\{0,5,10\\\}using three random seeds per setting\. The differentiable suppression objective, training hyperparameters, and seed\-level results are provided in Appendix D\.

For each setting, we measureJ\-Access, causal deletion depth using UDS, Model Utility, and post\-attack revival\. We further compare WD\-Train with GradDiff and RMU configurations exhibiting shallow or deep deletion under UDS\. These controls distinguish genuine deletion, which should reduce both accessibility and recovery, from suppression that only lowers the audit score\.

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408v1/fig4_prediction.png)Figure 3:Higher pre\-attackJ\-Accesspredicts greater recovery within each unlearning method\.Each point represents an unlearned model, with excess revival measured on held\-out entities\. Dashed lines show Theil–Sen fits, indicating that the association is not driven solely by differences between methods\.Table 2:Pre\-attackJ\-Accesspredicts model\-level recovery under relearning\.Entries report Spearman correlations with excess revival or steps to recovery; bold values are statistically significant \(p<0\.05p<0\.05\)\. The partial estimate controls for Forget Quality \(FQ\) and Model Utility \(MU\), while the within\-method estimate pools correlations across unlearning methods\. The knowledge\-level row uses the extended concept\-token set, and the behaviorally successful subset includes checkpoints with Forget Quality\>0\.01\>0\.01\.

## Results

### Test 1: Does Behavioral Forgetting Ensure Erasure?

Unlearned models retain widespread internal access to the forgotten knowledge\. Across all 398 unlearned models, 85% exhibit higher target access than the retain\-only gold model, and the median normalized accessibility is0\.690\.69\(Table[1](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#Sx3.T1)\)\. Thus, the typical unlearned model closes less than one third of the measured internal gap between the original and gold models\. As shown in Fig\.[2](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#Sx2.F2), unlearned models with similar behavioral scores also span a wide range of accessibility values, both across and within method families\. Behavioral forgetting therefore constrains, but does not determine, residual internal accessibility\.

This variation has two implications\. First, behavioral metrics cannot reliably rank checkpoints by internal erasure, because models with comparable Forget Quality may occupy substantially different positions between the original and gold anchors\. Second, the substantial within\-method variation shows that residual access depends not only on the unlearning algorithm but also on its training configuration and checkpoint selection\. Evaluating a single representative checkpoint may therefore obscure meaningful differences in deletion quality\.J\-Accesscomplements behavioral metrics by revealing this hidden variation across otherwise behaviorally similar models\.

The measured signal is absent for unseen twin entities, exceeds the matched\-decoy baseline, and remains stable when the lens is refitted after unlearning\. Moreover,J\-Accessagrees with the independent activation\-patching criterion in the expected direction: unlearned models with greater residual access exhibit shallower causal deletion the Spearmanρ=−0\.72\\rho=\-0\.72\. Full statistics for the individual controls and robustness variants are reported in Appendix B\. Together, these results indicate thatJ\-Accesscaptures target\-specific residual access rather than a generic readout artifact\.

Item\-level predictorAUROCPre\-attack probability0\.582MIA \(best of six\)0\.579J\-Access\(knowledge level\)0\.555Logit\-lens accessibility0\.548J\-Access\(preregistered\)0\.504StackedΔ\\DeltaAUC ofJ\-Accessover behavior\+MIA\+0\.0002\+0\.0002Table 3:J\-Accessdoes not reliably predict which individual facts will recover\.Item\-level AUROC remains near chance \(0\.50\.5\), and addingJ\-Accessto behavioral and membership\-inference predictors yields negligible improvement\. The preregistered row uses the knowledge\-level score with its orientation fixed in advance\.
### Test 2: Does J\-Access Predict Future Recovery?

We next ask whether pre\-attackJ\-Accessdifferences forecast how readily forgotten knowledge recovers under relearning\.

#### Model\-level prediction\.

We first evaluate whether pre\-attackJ\-Accesspredicts recovery after relearning\. For each evaluated unlearned model, we compute the Spearman correlation between its pre\-attack accessibility and subsequent recovery after relearning\. Higher pre\-attackJ\-Accessis associated with greater recovery\. As shown in Table[2](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#Sx4.T2), across all attacked unlearned models, the Spearman correlation between accessibility and post\-attack revival is\+0\.35\+0\.35\. Higher\-accessibility unlearned models also require substantially fewer fine\-tuning steps to recover, with a negative Spearman correlation of−0\.70\-0\.70\. After controlling for behavioral forgetting and utility metrics, the association remains positive, with a correlation of\+0\.33\+0\.33\.

The relationship between pre\-attack accessibility and recovery is not explained solely by differences across unlearning algorithms\. As shown in Table[2](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#Sx4.T2)and Fig\.[3](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#Sx4.F3), higher pre\-attackJ\-Accessconsistently corresponds to greater recovery within method families, with positive within\-method correlations across all eight methods\. The pooled within\-method correlation isρ=\+0\.45\\rho=\+0\.45for identity\-level accessibility and increases toρ=\+0\.71\\rho=\+0\.71for the knowledge\-level variant\. These results indicate thatJ\-Accesscaptures checkpoint\-level variation in relearning vulnerability rather than merely identifying weaker unlearning algorithms\. The trend remains positive among behaviorally successful unlearned models\.

#### Item\-level prediction\.

AlthoughJ\-Accesspredicts recovery vulnerability at the checkpoint level, it does not provide an item\-level deletion certificate\. We therefore evaluate whether pre\-attack accessibility can distinguish facts that later recover from those that remain suppressed\. As shown in Table[3](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#Sx5.T3), item\-level prediction remains close to random:J\-Accessprovides no reliable discrimination between recovered and non\-recovered items, and adding it to behavioral and membership\-based signals yields negligible improvement\. These results indicate that residual accessibility captures a model’s overall susceptibility to relearning, but does not reveal which specific facts are likely to return\.

#### Interpreting the granularity gap\.

This observe admits a natural interpretation\. Prior localization studies suggest that fine\-tuning\-based unlearning disables a shared retrieval pathway rather than erasing individual stored facts\([Hong et al\. 2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#bib.bib19)\)\. Under this view, relearning on a few entities reopens the common pathway, so which specific held\-out items revive is governed largely by attack\-time dynamics rather than by per\-item residual traces present before the attack\. Residual accessibility then behaves as a property of the checkpoint as a whole, quantifying how far the retrieval pathway has been displaced, which explains why it forecasts aggregate recovery while remaining uninformative about the fate of any single fact\.

Table 4:LowerJ\-Accessdoes not necessarily indicate genuine deletion\.Increasing the WD\-Train penalty lowersJ\-Accessbut increases post\-attack revival without improving causal deletion depth\. In contrast, GradDiff and RMU models with deeper deletion under UDS exhibit substantially less revival\. MU denotes Model Utility; arrows indicate preferred directions\.

### Test 3: Should J\-Access Be Used as an Unlearning Objective?

The previous experiment establishes thatJ\-Accessis useful as an independent diagnostic: it reveals residual accessibility hidden by behavioral metrics and predicts model\-level recovery under relearning attacks\. This raises a natural but more difficult question\. If residual accessibility is associated with recovery risk, can reducingJ\-Accessitself produce more robust unlearning? This question is important because internal metrics are often treated not only as evaluation tools but also as optimization objectives\. We therefore test whetherJ\-Accessremains a reliable indicator when it becomes a training target\. A valid deletion objective should reduceJ\-Accesstogether with post\-attack recovery\.

Direct optimization produces the opposite of the expected pattern\. As shown in Figure[4](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#Sx5.F4)and Table[4](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408#Sx5.T4), for WD\-Train, increasing the suppression weight fromλ=0\\lambda=0toλ=10\\lambda=10lowersJ\-Accessfrom0\.670\.67to0\.550\.55, but increases post\-attack revival from0\.2830\.283to0\.3870\.387\. Thus, improvement on the optimized audit does not translate into more stable deletion, but instead coincides with greater vulnerability to subsequent knowledge recovery under attack\.

To distinguish metric failure from a general failure of optimization, we compare accessibility suppression against unlearned models whose deletion is supported by an independent causal criterion\. Models with deeper causal deletion consistently exhibit greater resistance to relearning\. GradDiff and RMU configurations with high UDS achieve post\-attack revival rates of only0\.0250\.025and0\.0000\.000, respectively, whereas their shallow\-deletion counterparts reach0\.8000\.800and0\.6950\.695\. Thus, UDS and recovery robustness move together across naturally occurring unlearning configurations, showing that the attack is capable of distinguishing genuine deletion from temporary suppression\.

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.11408v1/fig5_goodhart.png)Figure 4:Directly minimizingJ\-Accesssuppresses the audit rather than deleting knowledge\.As the penalty weight increases,J\-Accessdecreases while UDS remains nearly unchanged \(left\), and post\-attack revival increases \(right\)\.Accessibility suppression produces a different pattern:J\-Accessdecreases while UDS remains nearly unchanged and post\-attack recovery increases\. Thus, optimizingJ\-Accesssuppresses evidence exposed to the audit without removing the knowledge that supports recovery\. This asymmetry shows that a useful independent diagnostic is not necessarily a valid unlearning objective, which must be validated against causal deletion and recovery outcomes\.

## Conclusion

This work introducesJ\-Accessto diagnose residual knowledge accessibility after machine unlearning\. Experiments across 398 checkpoints and eight unlearning methods show that behavioral forgetting conceals internal access, and that pre\-attackJ\-Accesspredicts recovery at the checkpoint level\. We further show that predictive validity does not extend to individual facts, as item\-level performance remains near chance\. AlthoughJ\-Accessserves as an independent diagnostic, optimizing it suppresses the measured signal without producing genuine deletion and may increase recovery risk\. Overall, reliable unlearning evaluation requires internal audits to complement behavioral metrics and be validated against independent causal and recovery evidence, rather than treated as deletion certificates or optimization targets\.

## References

- Bailey et al\. \(2025\)Bailey, L\.; Serrano, A\.; Sheshadri, A\.; Seleznyov, M\.; Taylor, J\.; Jenner, E\.; Hilton, J\.; Casper, S\.; Guestrin, C\.; and Emmons, S\. 2025\.Obfuscated Activations Bypass LLM Latent\-Space Defenses\.arXiv:2412\.09565\.
- Belrose et al\. \(2023\)Belrose, N\.; Furman, Z\.; Smith, L\.; Halawi, D\.; Ostrovsky, I\.; McKinney, L\.; Biderman, S\.; and Steinhardt, J\. 2023\.Eliciting latent predictions from transformers with the tuned lens\.*arXiv preprint arXiv:2303\.08112*\.
- Bourtoule et al\. \(2020\)Bourtoule, L\.; Chandrasekaran, V\.; Choquette\-Choo, C\. A\.; Jia, H\.; Travers, A\.; Zhang, B\.; Lie, D\.; and Papernot, N\. 2020\.Machine Unlearning\.arXiv:1912\.03817\.
- Burns et al\. \(2022\)Burns, C\.; Ye, H\.; Klein, D\.; and Steinhardt, J\. 2022\.Discovering latent knowledge in language models without supervision\.*arXiv preprint arXiv:2212\.03827*\.
- Cao et al\. \(2024\)Cao, P\.; Wang, C\.; He, Z\.; Yuan, H\.; Li, J\.; Chen, Y\.; Liu, K\.; Zhao, J\.; et al\. 2024\.Rwku: Benchmarking real\-world knowledge unlearning for large language models\.*Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 37: 98213–98263\.
- Deeb and Roger \(2024\)Deeb, A\.; and Roger, F\. 2024\.Do unlearning methods remove information from language model weights?*arXiv preprint arXiv:2410\.08827*\.
- Dong et al\. \(2025\)Dong, Y\. R\.; Lin, H\.; Belkin, M\.; Huerta, R\.; and Vulić, I\. 2025\.Undial: Self\-distillation with adjusted logits for robust unlearning in large language models\.In*Proceedings of the 2025 Conference of the Nations of the Americas Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies \(Volume 1: Long Papers\)*, 8827–8840\.
- Dorna et al\. \(2026\)Dorna, V\.; Mekala, A\.; Zhao, W\.; McCallum, A\.; Kolter, Z\.; Lipton, Z\.; and Maini, P\. 2026\.Openunlearning: Accelerating llm unlearning via unified benchmarking of methods and metrics\.*Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 38\.
- Eldan and Russinovich \(2023\)Eldan, R\.; and Russinovich, M\. 2023\.Who’s Harry Potter? Approximate Unlearning in LLMs\.*arXiv preprint arXiv:2310\.02238*\.
- Fan et al\. \(2025\)Fan, C\.; Jia, J\.; Zhang, Y\.; Ramakrishna, A\.; Hong, M\.; and Liu, S\. 2025\.Towards LLM Unlearning Resilient to Relearning Attacks: A Sharpness\-Aware Minimization Perspective and Beyond\.In*ICML*\.
- Fan et al\. \(2026\)Fan, C\.; Liu, J\.; Lin, L\.; Jia, J\.; Zhang, R\.; Mei, S\.; and Liu, S\. 2026\.Simplicity prevails: Rethinking negative preference optimization for llm unlearning\.*Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 38: 1540–1567\.
- Gao, Schulman, and Hilton \(2022\)Gao, L\.; Schulman, J\.; and Hilton, J\. 2022\.Scaling Laws for Reward Model Overoptimization\.arXiv:2210\.10760\.
- Gao et al\. \(2025\)Gao, L\.; Wan, K\.; Liu, W\.; Wang, C\.; Song, Z\.; Xu, Z\.; Wang, Y\.; Stoyanov, V\.; and Chen, X\. 2025\.Evaluate bias without manual test sets: A concept representation perspective for llms\.*arXiv preprint arXiv:2505\.15524*\.
- Ghandeharioun et al\. \(2024\)Ghandeharioun, A\.; Caciularu, A\.; Pearce, A\.; Dixon, L\.; and Geva, M\. 2024\.Patchscopes: A unifying framework for inspecting hidden representations of language models\.*arXiv preprint arXiv:2401\.06102*\.
- Guo et al\. \(2023\)Guo, C\.; Goldstein, T\.; Hannun, A\.; and van der Maaten, L\. 2023\.Certified Data Removal from Machine Learning Models\.arXiv:1911\.03030\.
- Guo et al\. \(2024\)Guo, P\.; Syed, A\.; Sheshadri, A\.; Ewart, A\.; and Dziugaite, G\. K\. 2024\.Mechanistic unlearning: Robust knowledge unlearning and editing via mechanistic localization\.*arXiv preprint arXiv:2410\.12949*\.
- Gurnee et al\. \(2026\)Gurnee, W\.; Sofroniew, N\.; Pearce, A\.; Piotrowski, M\.; Kauvar, I\.; Chen, R\.; Soligo, A\.; Bogdan, P\.; Ong, E\.; Wang, R\.; et al\. 2026\.Verbalizable representations form a global workspace in language models\.*arXiv preprint arXiv:2607\.15495*\.
- Hong et al\. \(2025\)Hong, Y\.; Yu, L\.; Yang, H\.; Ravfogel, S\.; and Geva, M\. 2025\.Intrinsic Test of Unlearning Using Parametric Knowledge Traces\.In*Proceedings of the 2025 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, 19524–19546\.
- Hong et al\. \(2024\)Hong, Y\.; Zou, Y\.; Hu, L\.; Zeng, Z\.; Wang, D\.; and Yang, H\. 2024\.Dissecting fine\-tuning unlearning in large language models\.In*Proceedings of the 2024 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, 3933–3941\.
- Hu et al\. \(2024\)Hu, S\.; Fu, Y\.; Wu, S\.; and Smith, V\. 2024\.Jogging the memory of unlearned models through targeted relearning attacks\.In*ICML 2024 Workshop on Foundation Models in the Wild*\.
- Jacobi \(1841\)Jacobi, C\. G\. J\. 1841\.De Determinantibus functionalibus\.*Journal für die reine und angewandte Mathematik \(Crelles Journal\)*, 1841\(22\): 319–359\.
- Jang et al\. \(2023\)Jang, J\.; Yoon, D\.; Yang, S\.; Cha, S\.; Lee, M\.; Logeswaran, L\.; and Seo, M\. 2023\.Knowledge unlearning for mitigating privacy risks in language models\.In*ACL*\.
- Lee, Kim, and Jo \(2026\)Lee, J\.; Kim, D\.; and Jo, J\. 2026\.Measuring the Depth of LLM Unlearning via Activation Patching\.*arXiv preprint arXiv:2605\.24614*\.
- Li et al\. \(2024\)Li, N\.; Pan, A\.; Gopal, A\.; Yue, S\.; Berrios, D\.; Gatti, A\.; Li, J\. D\.; Dombrowski, A\.\-K\.; Goel, S\.; Phan, L\.; et al\. 2024\.The wmdp benchmark: Measuring and reducing malicious use with unlearning\.*arXiv preprint arXiv:2403\.03218*\.
- Liu et al\. \(2025\)Liu, S\.; Yao, Y\.; Jia, J\.; Casper, S\.; Baracaldo, N\.; Hase, P\.; Yao, Y\.; Liu, C\. Y\.; Xu, X\.; Li, H\.; et al\. 2025\.Rethinking machine unlearning for large language models\.*Nature Machine Intelligence*\.
- Łucki et al\. \(2024\)Łucki, J\.; Wei, B\.; Huang, Y\.; Henderson, P\.; Tramèr, F\.; and Rando, J\. 2024\.An adversarial perspective on machine unlearning for ai safety\.*arXiv preprint arXiv:2409\.18025*\.
- Lynch et al\. \(2024\)Lynch, A\.; Guo, P\.; Ewart, A\.; Casper, S\.; and Hadfield\-Menell, D\. 2024\.Eight methods to evaluate robust unlearning in llms\.*arXiv preprint arXiv:2402\.16835*\.
- Maini et al\. \(2024\)Maini, P\.; Feng, Z\.; Schwarzschild, A\.; Lipton, Z\. C\.; and Kolter, J\. Z\. 2024\.Tofu: A task of fictitious unlearning for llms\.In*CoLM*\.
- Mekala et al\. \(2025\)Mekala, A\.; Dorna, V\.; Dubey, S\.; Lalwani, A\.; Koleczek, D\.; Rungta, M\.; Hasan, S\. A\.; and Lobo, E\. 2025\.Alternate preference optimization for unlearning factual knowledge in large language models\.In*Proceedings of the 31st International Conference on Computational Linguistics*, 3732–3752\.
- Patil, Hase, and Bansal \(2024\)Patil, V\. R\.; Hase, P\.; and Bansal, M\. 2024\.Can sensitive information be deleted from llms? objectives for defending against extraction attacks\.In*International Conference on Learning Representations*, volume 2024, 45497–45514\.
- Ryd et al\. \(2025\)Ryd, E\.; Rajamanoharan, S\.; Nanda, N\.; et al\. 2025\.Towards eliciting latent knowledge from LLMs with mechanistic interpretability\.*arXiv preprint arXiv:2505\.14352*\.
- Seyitoğlu et al\. \(2024\)Seyitoğlu, A\.; Kuvshinov, A\.; Schwinn, L\.; and Günnemann, S\. 2024\.Extracting unlearned information from llms with activation steering\.*arXiv preprint arXiv:2411\.02631*\.
- Shi et al\. \(2025\)Shi, W\.; Lee, J\.; Huang, Y\.; Malladi, S\.; Zhao, J\.; Holtzman, A\.; Liu, D\.; Zettlemoyer, L\.; Smith, N\. A\.; and Zhang, C\. 2025\.MUSE: Machine unlearning six\-way evaluation for language models\.In*ICLR*\.
- Shumailov et al\. \(2024\)Shumailov, I\.; Hayes, J\.; Triantafillou, E\.; Ortiz\-Jimenez, G\.; Papernot, N\.; Jagielski, M\.; Yona, I\.; Howard, H\.; and Bagdasaryan, E\. 2024\.Ununlearning: Unlearning is not sufficient for content regulation in advanced generative ai\.*arXiv preprint arXiv:2407\.00106*\.
- Song et al\. \(2026\)Song, Z\.; Jiang, Q\.; Cui, M\.; Li, M\.; Gao, L\.; Zhang, Z\.; Xu, Z\.; Wang, Y\.; Ouyang, G\.; Chen, Z\.; et al\. 2026\.Audio jailbreak: An open comprehensive benchmark for jailbreaking large audio\-language models\.In*Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics \(Volume 1: Long Papers\)*, 27294–27308\.
- Song et al\. \(2025\)Song, Z\.; Yan, B\.; Liu, Y\.; Fang, M\.; Li, M\.; Yan, R\.; and Chen, X\. 2025\.Injecting Domain\-Specific Knowledge into Large Language Models: A Comprehensive Survey\.In Christodoulopoulos, C\.; Chakraborty, T\.; Rose, C\.; and Peng, V\., eds\.,*Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2025*, 25297–25311\. Suzhou, China: Association for Computational Linguistics\.ISBN 979\-8\-89176\-335\-7\.
- Thaker et al\. \(2025\)Thaker, P\.; Hu, S\.; Kale, N\.; Maurya, Y\.; Wu, Z\. S\.; and Smith, V\. 2025\.Position: LLM Unlearning Benchmarks are Weak Measures of Progress\.arXiv:2410\.02879\.
- Wang et al\. \(2025\)Wang, C\.; Gu, T\.; Wei, Z\.; Gao, L\.; Song, Z\.; and Chen, X\. 2025\.Word form matters: Llms’ semantic reconstruction under typoglycemia\.In*Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2025*, 16870–16885\.
- Yang et al\. \(2026\)Yang, P\.; Yu, J\.; Wang, Q\.; Torr, P\.; Han, B\.; and Chen, X\. 2026\.Distinguishable Deletion: Unifying Knowledge Erasure and Refusal for Large Language Model Unlearning\.*arXiv preprint arXiv:2605\.16776*\.
- Zhang et al\. \(2024\)Zhang, R\.; Lin, L\.; Bai, Y\.; and Mei, S\. 2024\.Negative Preference Optimization: From Catastrophic Collapse to Effective Unlearning\.In*CoLM*\.
- Zhang et al\. \(2025\)Zhang, Z\.; Wang, F\.; Li, X\.; Wu, Z\.; Tang, X\.; Liu, H\.; He, Q\.; Yin, W\.; and Wang, S\. 2025\.Catastrophic failure of llm unlearning via quantization\.In*International Conference on Learning Representations*, volume 2025, 74925–74948\.