Plato’s Cave has a problem: telling someone they’re seeing shadows just puts another shadow on the wall
Summary
The article explores the philosophical problem of Plato's Cave in the context of LLMs, proposing an experiment to compare how different conversational regimes—reconstructive versus perturbation-sensitive—might yield measurable differences in interaction behavior.
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