Six months running an AI reviewer in the path of every production command (got surprised by what it did to the security team)
Summary
An open-source access gateway deployed an LLM-based reviewer for production commands; the unexpected effect was a transformation in the security team's role from a binary gatekeeper to a judgment layer over the AI agent.
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