Trust Mechanisms for Offline Generative AI at the Edge: A Connectivity-Regime Framework and an Empirical Study on a Raspberry Pi 5

Hugging Face Daily Papers Papers

Summary

该论文提出了一套面向离线边缘生成式AI的连通性体制框架(C0-C4)与推理时信任机制分类法,并在Raspberry Pi 5上以Qwen2.5模型进行本地RAG实证研究,发现签名知识包可被投毒攻击绕过,且现有验证机制无法保证证据真实性。

Generative AI and large language models (LLMs) are moving into the Internet of Things, yet most deployments assume cloud connectivity, and many IoT settings have intermittent, restricted, or no connectivity. We propose a connectivity-regime framework (C0-C4), a taxonomy of inference-time trust mechanisms, and signed, versioned knowledge packs as the update channel for disconnected regimes, and evaluate them on a Raspberry Pi 5 running fully local retrieval-augmented generation under network isolation, with three Qwen2.5 model sizes, three context sizes, and 300 SQuAD 2.0 questions. An empirically calibrated retrieval-score gate detects knowledge gaps almost perfectly (AUROC 0.97) but in-topic unanswerable questions poorly (0.68). A deterministic output validator converts malformed outputs into explicit abstentions with no observed loss of correct answers, while the NLI-based verifier we tested adds little; for the 7B model, 96% of substantive answers to unanswerable-labelled questions match normalized spans of the retrieved passages. A 3B model achieves the same gold-answer containment rate as a 7B model at less than half the latency and estimated energy, although the 7B model far more often exceeds a token-F1 threshold of 0.5; five retrieved passages lower correctness from 75% to 52% compared with three. Verifying a signed pack takes about 4.5 ms versus about 29 min for embedding its passages on the device; signature and hash checks alone accept six of nine tested update attacks that layered verification rejects. Yet a validly signed poisoned pack passes every pack check: on 30 previously correct questions, correct answers drop to zero and 14 return the injected answer. None of the mechanisms we evaluated establishes the truth of the evidence. We release code and data.
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Paper page - Trust Mechanisms for Offline Generative AI at the Edge: A Connectivity-Regime Framework and an Empirical Study on a Raspberry Pi 5

Source: https://huggingface.co/papers/2610.33732

Abstract

Local retrieval-augmented generation on edge devices using signed knowledge packs and output validators improves efficiency but remains vulnerable to poisoned updates and cannot guarantee evidence truth.

Generative AI and large language models (LLMs) are moving into the Internet of Things, yet most deployments assume cloud connectivity, and many IoT settings have intermittent, restricted, or no connectivity. We propose aconnectivity-regime framework(C0-C4), a taxonomy of inference-time trust mechanisms, and signed, versioned knowledge packs as the update channel for disconnected regimes, and evaluate them on a Raspberry Pi 5 running fully localretrieval-augmented generationunder network isolation, with threeQwen2.5model sizes, three context sizes, and 300 SQuAD 2.0 questions. An empirically calibratedretrieval-score gatedetects knowledge gaps almost perfectly (AUROC 0.97) but in-topic unanswerable questions poorly (0.68). Adeterministic output validatorconverts malformed outputs into explicit abstentions with no observed loss of correct answers, while theNLI-based verifierwe tested adds little; for the 7B model, 96% of substantive answers to unanswerable-labelled questions match normalized spans of the retrieved passages. A 3B model achieves the same gold-answer containment rate as a 7B model at less than half the latency and estimated energy, although the 7B model far more often exceeds a token-F1 threshold of 0.5; five retrieved passages lower correctness from 75% to 52% compared with three. Verifying a signed pack takes about 4.5 ms versus about 29 min for embedding its passages on the device; signature and hash checks alone accept six of nine tested update attacks that layered verification rejects. Yet a validly signed poisoned pack passes every pack check: on 30 previously correct questions, correct answers drop to zero and 14 return the injected answer. None of the mechanisms we evaluated establishes the truth of the evidence. We release code and data.

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