@QingQ77: Synapse CE 把软件成分分析、侦察、证据采集与报告收拢到一个治理控制平面,用于授权安全测试与防御性安全。 https://github.com/KKloudTarus/synapse-ce…
摘要
Synapse CE 是一个开源治理控制平面,整合软件成分分析、侦察、证据采集与报告,用于授权安全测试,强调确定性、可追溯性和安全执行。
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Synapse CE 把软件成分分析、侦察、证据采集与报告收拢到一个治理控制平面,用于授权安全测试与防御性安全。
https://t.co/4kWx1EJXVo https://t.co/82NUBuIw7u
KKloudTarus/synapse-ce
Source: https://github.com/KKloudTarus/synapse-ce
Verify Everything. Trust Nothing.
A governed control plane for software composition analysis, recon, evidence, and reporting.
Turn a fragmented, manual security process into a controlled, auditable workflow, with server-side scope enforcement, hardened tool execution, tamper-evident evidence, and deterministic reports.
Landing page · Documentation · Quickstart · Features · Configuration
Authorized use only. Synapse is built for authorized security testing, pentest engagements, and defensive security work. Every engagement enforces an explicit scope and a legal authorization window, server-side, before any tool runs. You are responsible for holding written permission to test any target.
Why Synapse
- ✅ Deterministic first. Scanning, matching, and reporting are pure, reproducible Go. No model sits in the report path.
- ✅ Evidence you can trust. Every artifact is hash-chained into a tamper-evident custody record. A broken chain blocks the report.
- ✅ One tool, four scanners. SCA, first-party SAST, secret scanning, and IaC misconfig behind a single gate.
- ✅ Reachability aware. A deterministic call graph decides whether a vulnerable symbol is actually reachable from your code.
- ✅ Detection independent. Owns its SBOM parsers and advisory matching, and ingests OSV, GHSA, and CSAF.
- ✅ CI ready.
synapse-cliis a single static binary that gates a build and emits SARIF for code scanning. - ✅ Safe by construction. argv-only execution in a Linux sandbox, server-side scope and authorization before any tool runs, secrets never leave the server.
What is Synapse
Synapse runs the security-assessment lifecycle behind one governed control plane: software composition analysis, recon, evidence capture, findings, and reporting.
It is deterministic-first. Scanning, matching, license classification, and reporting are pure, reproducible Go with nothing else in the path. Where automated analysis is offered it stays strictly bounded: a proposal is only ever proposed, a typed Go state machine validates and executes, scope and authorization are checked in the execution layer, secrets never leave the server, every artifact is hash-chained into a tamper-evident custody record, and a human approves anything intrusive.
Features
- SBOM generation across many ecosystems (npm, PyPI, Maven, Gradle, Go, Cargo, RubyGems, Composer, NuGet, Hex, Dart and more), with owned per-ecosystem lockfile parsers.
- Vulnerability detection from a live advisory API and an offline database, cross-correlated and de-duplicated, plus an owned advisory store that ingests OSV, GHSA and CSAF feeds for detection independence.
- Risk-based prioritization: findings are ordered by exploitability (known-exploited catalog, then exploit-prediction score, then CVSS), never by raw CVSS alone.
- License compliance: declared-license resolution, SPDX expression parsing, a curated category and risk model, and coordinate recovery for shaded or metadata-less JARs.
- Reachability: a deterministic call-graph engine decides whether a vulnerable symbol is actually reachable from application code.
- Tamper-evident evidence: every artifact is hash-chained. A broken chain blocks the report. Audit and evidence logs are append-only.
- Hardened execution: tools are shelled out via argv arrays inside a Linux sandbox with egress scoping. Scope and the authorization window are enforced before any tool runs.
- RBAC and tenant isolation through a single authorization chokepoint.
- Standards native: CycloneDX and SPDX with PURL, SARIF, OpenVEX and CSAF, plus KEV and EPSS.
- Deterministic reports templated from stored data, with a curated CWE to OWASP, PCI and ISO compliance mapping.
- Bounded AI analysis (optional): the agent proposes, a distinct verifier or a human confirms. No model ever sits in the report path.
See the full walkthrough with screenshots on the documentation site.
How it compares
Detection is at parity with the popular scanners, and sometimes ahead. On one representative real-world repository, Synapse reported 261 unique CVEs to Trivy’s 239 (235 in common) and attached a license to 1443 packages to Trivy’s 1394. Numbers move with the project, so treat these as illustrative rather than a benchmark claim.
The lasting difference is what sits around the finding:
| Capability | Synapse | Most scanners |
|---|---|---|
| SCA, license, IaC misconfig, secret scanning | Yes | Yes |
| First-party SAST (source-code rules) | Yes | Usually no |
| Reachability via a call graph | Yes | Rarely |
| Hash-chained, tamper-evident evidence | Yes | No |
| Server-side scope and authorization before a tool runs | Yes | No |
| RBAC, tenant isolation, separation of duties | Yes | No |
| Deterministic, model-free report path | Yes | Varies |
Quickstart
Prerequisites
- Go 1.26 (pinned in
go.mod), Node and pnpm (use pnpm, not npm or yarn). - Syft (required for any scan) and Grype (optional, adds the offline database).
make toolsinstalls both, pinned and checksum-verified, into./bin. - Docker is optional and is the easiest way to run the full stack.
- The hardened sandbox and live recon need a Linux host. Without them the API still runs (SCA, findings, reports); sandboxed execution fails closed rather than running unsandboxed.
Run the full stack with Docker
docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.full.yml up --build
# then open http://localhost:5173
Run natively (development)
make install # Go modules + web deps
make tools # syft + grype into ./bin
export PATH="$PWD/bin:$PATH"
export SYNAPSE_API_TOKEN="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" # required, no anonymous access
make dev # API on :8080, dashboard on :5173
Open http://localhost:5173, paste the token, accept the Acceptable Use Policy. A blank
SYNAPSE_DB_DSN runs an in-memory dev store, so nothing is persisted. Migrations are embedded
and applied automatically at startup.
Command line
synapse-cli runs the same pipeline as the server, ideal for CI gating.
make build
./bin/synapse-cli scan ./path/to/project --fail-on high
The exit code is 0 when no finding meets the threshold, non-zero otherwise.
Binaries
| Binary | Role |
|---|---|
synapse-api | HTTP API server, the primary service |
synapse-cli | Run an SCA scan from the command line, CI-friendly |
synapse-worker | Durable job runner for recon and background jobs, lease-based |
synapse-callgraph | Sandboxed call-graph builder for reachability analysis |
synapse-mcp | Read-only, propose-only integration server, never executes |
Architecture
Clean architecture with a strict, inward-only dependency rule:
domain <- usecase <- adapter / infrastructure
All external I/O (database, tools, storage, sandbox) goes through ports, which are interfaces
in internal/usecase/ports. cmd/* is the composition root, with dependency injection in
main and no business logic.
Configuration
Synapse reads its configuration from the process environment. Copy .env.example and adjust.
The only required variable is SYNAPSE_API_TOKEN. See the
configuration reference for the full list.
Full documentation lives in docs/guide/: introduction, installation,
quickstart, features, configuration, CLI, architecture, deployment, and the security model.
Roadmap
Synapse is under active development. Near-term directions:
- Broader ecosystem coverage: more owned lockfile parsers (Conda, R, Julia, Conan).
- More first-party SAST rules, and additional languages.
- More IaC checks across Terraform, Kubernetes, and CloudFormation.
- Richer SARIF output, including remediation in code-scanning alerts.
- More curated, model-free compliance profiles.
- Reachability for more language ecosystems.
- More CI recipes and integration examples.
Have a request? Open an issue or start a discussion. Issues tagged
good first issue
and help wanted
are a good place to start.
Contributors
Synapse was built by its founding team.
| Contributor | Role | |
|---|---|---|
| nghiadaulau | Engineer | |
| nnatuan03 | Engineer | |
| lethanhsang188 | Engineer | |
| tuu-ngo | Brand identity designer |
Contributions are welcome. See CONTRIBUTING.md, the Code of Conduct, and report vulnerabilities per the Security Policy.
License
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0.
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