Agent rules need to exist where the action happens

Reddit r/AI_Agents News

Summary

The article argues that AI agent safety rules should be implemented as hard workflow constraints and permissions rather than relying solely on prompt instructions. It emphasizes the need for explicit checks, approvals, and logs for sensitive or irreversible actions.

I think "agent rules" are becoming part of workflow design, not just prompt design. Writing "do not send without approval" is useful. But if the agent can access tools, the stronger question is: Where does that rule become real? Does the agent lack send permission? Does the workflow pause before external actions? Does it show what will be touched? Does it leave a receipt? Does it route sensitive cases to review? For low-risk private drafts, a written rule may be enough. For external, sensitive, irreversible, public, or state-changing actions, I want the rule to become a permission, stop condition, approval trigger, check, log, or review step. Otherwise the rule mostly depends on the model remembering it and the human catching the problem later. That feels weak for real agent workflows.
Original Article

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