I think persistent memory makes prompt injection much worse
Summary
The article discusses how persistent memory in AI agents can amplify prompt injection risks by storing hostile instructions as trusted context, and explores a design to mitigate this while acknowledging limitations and the need for further testing over extended periods.
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