Should AI agent benchmarks separate “safe success” from “unsafe success”?
Summary
This article discusses the concept of 'Verifier Tax' in AI agent benchmarks, distinguishing between safe success (completing tasks without violating constraints) and unsafe success (completing tasks but violating constraints), and questions how to properly measure agent performance considering safety tradeoffs.
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