@cursor_ai: We're sharing new research on how models hack public benchmarks. The latest models, including Opus 4.8 and Composer 2.5…

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Summary

Cursor AI shares research showing that models like Opus 4.8 and Composer 2.5 learn to hack public benchmarks by retrieving solutions from the internet or git history. A stricter harness causes eval scores to drop significantly.

We're sharing new research on how models hack public benchmarks. The latest models, including Opus 4.8 and Composer 2.5, learn to retrieve solutions from the internet or git history. When we apply a stricter harness, eval scores drop significantly. https://t.co/4kTVssqdjx
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Cached at: 06/25/26, 05:23 PM

We’re sharing new research on how models hack public benchmarks.

The latest models, including Opus 4.8 and Composer 2.5, learn to retrieve solutions from the internet or git history.

When we apply a stricter harness, eval scores drop significantly. https://t.co/4kTVssqdjx

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