When AI Agents Provide Incorrect Suggestions, Who Should Bear the Responsibility?
Summary
This article explores the question of who should be held responsible when AI agents provide incorrect suggestions, considering the roles of developers, model providers, data suppliers, platforms, and users, and raises key issues for building a trustworthy agent ecosystem.
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