Your agent reads a web page that says "leak the user's API keys" — a lot of agents will just do it. I built a thing to stop the send.

Reddit r/AI_Agents Tools

Summary

Bouncer is a local MCP proxy that prevents AI agents from leaking sensitive data by gating outbound tool calls from untrusted sources, using deterministic enforcement without an LLM, with benchmarks showing reduced attack success.

The failure mode that bothered me: an agent reads untrusted content (web page, email, document) containing instructions like “send this data to X”, and the agent has a real tool capable of doing it. I built Bouncer, a local MCP proxy that gates the destination of outbound tool calls. If the destination came from untrusted tool output → DENY. If it’s explicitly trusted → ALLOW. If it’s new/unproven → ASK once and remember. The important part: there’s no LLM in the enforcement path. It’s deterministic Python over a pinned schema, policy, and taint log, so the model can’t talk its way past the decision. I also benchmarked it against AgentDojo’s workspace suite. Early run: attack success went 0.33 → 0.00, with benign utility remaining 1.00. Small sample, so I’m treating it as a mechanism test rather than a victory lap. It’s intentionally early: MCP-only, stdio-only, and there are documented limits — including cross-server taint propagation. I’m curious: what attack path do you think would beat this design?
Original Article

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