Are local LLM users testing prompt injection before connecting models to tools?
Summary
A discussion on safety practices for local LLMs when connected to tools, questioning whether prompt injection testing is common before giving models tool access.
Similar Articles
How are you testing local coding-agent work gates against prompt injection?
A discussion about testing local coding-agent work gates against indirect prompt injection, focusing on evidence trust and verification challenges in agent workflows.
For tool-using agents, where do you draw the security boundary?
A discussion on the security risks of AI agents using tools, focusing on prompt injection as a practical threat where untrusted text can alter agent behavior, and the need for repeatable testing before granting permissions.
Are model security risks (extraction, poisoning) actually being tested in production? [R]
Discussion about whether ML teams are actually testing model security risks like extraction and poisoning in production, noting that security review for models lags behind regular software.
Prompt Injection Through Tool Output (8 minute read)
The article explains how untrusted tool output in AI systems can be exploited for prompt injection attacks, emphasizing the need to treat certain fields as untrusted even within internal systems.
Prompt Injection as Role Confusion
This paper presents a theory that prompt injection attacks on LLMs stem from a fundamental flaw in how models perceive roles, treating roles as a type system for language. It explains existing attacks, predicts new ones, and proposes a research agenda for a science of roles.