You can't govern what you can't name: why AI agent vulnerabilities need a shared vocabulary, not just risk categories
Summary
The article introduces AVE (Agentic Vulnerability Enumeration), a tool that provides stable IDs for behavioral vulnerabilities in AI agent deployments, aiming to improve tracking and security across frameworks like OWASP, MITRE, and NIST.
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