Self-State Attacks on Self-Hosted AI Agents: How Far Can OS Defenses Go?
Summary
This paper investigates OS resilience against self-state attacks on self-hosted AI agents, characterizing an attack space and evaluating layered defense strategies. It finds that while a layered defense stack is effective, a small residual attack surface remains structurally indistinguishable at the OS level.
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Paper page - Self-State Attacks on Self-Hosted AI Agents: How Far Can OS Defenses Go?
Source: https://huggingface.co/papers/2607.17986
Abstract
Self-hostedAIagentsreadandwritetheirownmemoryandconfigurationfilestofunction.Anagentmaygetcompromisedviacorruptionofitsownstate--acompromiserealizedvialegitimateOSsystemcallinvocation.Werefertothisclassofthreatsasself-stateattacks.Inthispaper,weinvestigatetheOSresiliencetothisclassofattacks.Formally,wecharacterizeafour-axisattackspace(Target,Mechanism,Granularity,Temporal);investigatethestructurallimitsofprevention,detection,andrecovery;andintroduceaworkload-conditionedviewofdetectability.Toinstantiatetheframework,wecollectliveactivitytracesfromarepresentativeself-hostedagentrunningacrossdistinctworkloadprofiles,andrealizetheattackspaceasa23-cellmatrix,43concreteoperationsonrealself-statefiles,andinjectedintothosetraces.Wethenevaluatebothcanonicalandworkload-conditioneddefensestrategies.Theempiricalresultsshowthatalayereddefensestack(access-controlpreventionontheinstructionandconfigurationlayers,workload-conditioneddetectiononthememorylayer,andperiodicbackupforrecovery)iseffectiveonmostattackcellswhileasmallresidualattacksurfaceremainsstructurallyindistinguishableattheOSlevel.Thesefindingssuggestthatagainstthenewlyestablishedclassofself-stateattacks,OS-leveldefenseneedstobereconsidered,potentiallyopeningnewresearchdirectionsinthefield.
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