Could Open Models be trained to secretly go rogue?

Reddit r/LocalLLaMA News
open-weights ai-safety trojan-horse model-security trigger-phrases backdoor-attacks

Summary

A discussion on whether open-weight AI models could be secretly trained with backdoors that activate upon trigger phrases or dates, potentially allowing unauthorized data exfiltration through tool-use harnesses.

I was discussing with some other folks how safe is to use open weights models from China and the topic of "trojan horse" came up. We know that, at least with current architecture, models can't run code on their own. They are entirely dependent on tools and harnesses. We also know that a local run model can't have any kind of remote "switch" that would change its behavior or inject a different prompt. But would there be any other ways to "execute order 66" 😄 ? Could a lab, for instance, train a model that would change its behavior upon reading certain trigger phrases or perhaps at a specific date? They would then secretly gather sensitive info and send it somewhere else without user consent. Obviously the model would have to be running in an harness capable of such tool-use (which is quite common with openclaws, hermes, etc). Thoughts?
Original Article

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