I built an AI support agent where the main metric is unsafe auto-action rate, not just accuracy
Summary
A technical walkthrough of building a telecom customer support agent that prioritizes safety metrics over classifier accuracy, using a deterministic access gate, scoped tool execution, and route-level evaluation.
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