Lying Is Just a Phase: The Hidden Alignment Transition in Language Model Scaling
Summary
This paper identifies a phase transition in language model scaling where below a critical parameter count, reasoning and truthfulness are anticorrelated, but above it they cooperate. It provides diagnostics and interventions for improving alignment across model families.
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