@nicolange_: We must finally fight back Germany is under attack. An explosive drone nearly causes a catastrophe at Leipzig/Halle Air…

We must finally fight back Germany is under attack. An explosive drone nearly causes a catastrophe at Leipzig/Halle Airport. Spy drones circle over Bundeswehr barracks. Cables are severed. Ports disrupted. Administrations hacked. Debates deliberately poisoned. An adversary has been waging hybrid war against us for many years—patiently, precisely, and calculatedly. The goal is not a grand, sudden strike. The goal is the slow weakening of our state. For too long, we’ve pretended that hybrid attacks can be treated like technical glitches. As isolated incidents. As issues for specialized departments. But to our adversary, they are systematic components of a larger conflict. Thirteen years ago, Russian Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov wrote about war without a declaration of war, escalation without open escalation, the destruction of state stability through political, economic, informational, and covert means, supported by limited military force. Our adversary thinks in terms of impact. Our administrative republic, by contrast, thinks in terms of jurisdictions. That makes us highly vulnerable. Ultimately, we still just look back at what’s happened, find it all alarming, and then tie ourselves up in navel-gazing monologues. Instead of acting, we debate. Instead of operating, we weigh options endlessly. The adversary exploits that. Yet we can transfer the logic of classical defense and deterrence into the hybrid sphere. Deterrence can have a restrictive effect. We can significantly reduce the frequency and severity of attacks against us by finally imposing costs on the other side. Because let’s be honest: the much-invoked “resilience” alone isn’t enough. We can’t protect every cable, perfectly shield every server, or monitor every port, rail line, or power grid around the clock without gaps. If we want security, we must also be able to hit the adversary where it hurts. That doesn’t mean pitting drone against drone or hack against hack. But we can strike where the adversary least expects it and where it’s vulnerable. When an explosive drone attacks an airport or a German hospital is hacked, the response can’t be polite protests. As a countermeasure, we can halt and freeze financial flows, block shell companies, and deliberately impair the adversary’s operational capacity. Deterrence can deliberately carry political weight: Close the “Russian House.” Revoke visas. Bar Russian ships from EU ports. Don’t militarily attack Russia’s shadow fleet—instead, shut it down for environmental reasons, or stoically and laboriously scrutinize the entire crew’s employment contracts and tax situations until operations grind to a halt. None of this would be mirror-image retaliation. We can hit Russia with it without escalating. And above all, we can demonstrate that we’re capable of action. That forces the adversary to recalculate its costs. The forthcoming new legislation for German intelligence services will create the right foundations for this. It should enable faster intelligence gathering, better attribution, and effective responses. We urgently need speed in an area where velocity can decide between security and vulnerability. Authorizations alone don’t yet create deterrence, but they can make it possible in the first place. Politically and socially, we now need clarity that carrying the fight to the enemy and deliberately putting the attacker on the spot has always been part of good military defense. We must force our adversaries to react to our moves for once, rather than always the other way around. Those who put the adversary in a bind, as we know, gain time, space, and initiative. Financial investigations are crucial for this as well. Money is the Achilles’ heel of authoritarian actors. Those waging hybrid attacks need resources, shadow banks, middlemen. Germany must dismantle these networks—with forensic precision and international cooperation. Equally decisive is information dominance. The adversary operates comfortably in the fog. We must clear that fog. Fact sheets are long since insufficient for the task. In the information war, we’re far too slow, far too well-behaved, and far too defensive. We must shape debates offensively—with resources, creativity, and high velocity. We can’t keep ceding social media to others and then loudly complaining later about what happens there. No more embarrassing briefcases on TikTok, please, and less of the childish emptiness in the stale, standardized communications of the political bubble. Can we engage emotionally and combatively with clarity and orientation? In a manner befitting the critical security situation? Those who shape the information landscape shape public resilience. Those who leave it to others lose. Finally acting swiftly and creating new facts, rather than just talking endlessly—that surely applies to very many areas in Germany. Security certainly doesn’t arise in the conference room. Security arises when sensor networks against small drones are quickly and consistently deployed. Security arises when lines are monitored by autonomous systems and when ports, grids, and transport routes are equipped with cutting-edge technology. And security arises above all when we dare to take risks. When we’re unpredictable to the other side. When we act. The Kremlin must get the message that we won’t tolerate everything. That every attack comes at a price. That Germany is no longer just watching as its infrastructure is attacked, its state system undermined, its agencies disrupted, and its debates manipulated. You don’t have to do this hysterically or martial-like; it can be done calmly and shrewdly. But hybrid defense and deterrence are prerequisites for our country to remain capable of action in the face of high threats. Freedom demands that we be ready to defend it. That applies especially to the gray zone between war and peace. Churchill once said: “You can’t reason with a tiger when your head is in its mouth.” That’s the situation. We’re still trying to appease an adversary who sees our restraint as an invitation. We must finally fight back. * Nico Lange is the founder and director of the Institute for Risk Analysis and International Security (IRIS).