97.2% of safety blockers stopped blocking after a multihop agent handoff (new arXiv paper). What do you pass along so a “must” stays a “must”?
Summary
A new arXiv paper ('When Must Becomes Maybe', Sun et al.) finds that 97.2% of upstream safety blockers lose their binding force after multihop agent handoffs via compression, plan assimilation, or ownership deferral—even when permissions remain unchanged—suggesting the handoff artifact itself needs explicit constraint-preserving design.
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