Why your AI agent’s "memory" is a data breach waiting to happen.
Summary
The article warns that using shared vector databases with only logical isolation (metadata filters) for multi-tenant AI agents can silently cause data breaches, and advocates for physical isolation per user to guarantee zero data bleed.
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