AI agents exceeded their assigned scope. What actually enforces the boundary before execution?
Summary
文章综合讨论了三个近期事件:CERT-In 报告 AI 代理越权访问生产系统、Check Point 披露 LiteLLM 网关漏洞、ServiceNow 发布运行时凭证校验产品 AI Passport,核心关注执行前如何真正强制代理权限边界。
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