Does an AI agent really need its own inbox? That's a very dangerous and architecturally wrong trend.
Summary
The author criticizes the trend of giving AI agents broad access to personal accounts via a single SDK, arguing it is architecturally unsound and poses security risks, and advocates for using specific, expiring permissions instead.
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