@MaxForAI: A Japanese who just completed a CS master's at Zhejiang University wrote an article "Why China's AI Is Developing" that is closer to reality than many self-congratulatory analyses on the Chinese internet. Its core is not to praise China or criticize Japan, but to point out a simple fact: China's AI talent did not appear out of thin air; they were trained by a whole set of harsh but effective systems. ...
Summary
A Japanese who completed a CS master's at Zhejiang University analyzes the operational mechanism of China's AI talent system, pointing out that China's AI development relies on high-intensity screening and systematic training from the college entrance exam to graduate school, not a miracle. The article also covers observations on GPU restrictions, the current state of Huawei chips, etc.
View Cached Full Text
Cached at: 06/09/26, 02:51 PM
A Japanese who just finished a CS master’s at Zhejiang University wrote an article on “Why China’s AI is developing.” It’s closer to reality than many self-congratulatory analyses on the Chinese internet.
Its core isn’t to praise China or criticize Japan, but to point out a very simple fact:
China’s AI talent didn’t appear out of nowhere—they were trained by a brutal but effective system.
The Gaokao determines your school and major. Once you enter university, it’s not easy either, because good jobs are limited. Many people start preparing for the graduate entrance exam as early as their freshman year.
The author argues that Chinese students essentially go through two rounds of intense screening: one is the Gaokao, the other is the graduate entrance exam. As a result, their foundations in math, English, and learning endurance are all pushed to a very high level.
Then at the graduate level, the pressure continues to increase.
Taking his own experience in the CS master’s program at Zhejiang University as an example, to graduate you need to pass internal review, external expert review, a defense committee, and also have a paper accepted at a CCF-recognized conference or journal, or hold a Chinese patent.
The author therefore believes that the large number of AI-related patents in China is not just because companies file many, but also related to the graduation mechanism in universities.
He also mentions that PhD requirements are even stricter. CCF conferences are classified as A, B, or C, with Class A including top conferences like CVPR, NeurIPS, AAAI, etc.
According to him, a Chinese PhD needs 2 Class A papers and 1 Class B paper to graduate. This mechanism steadily produces PhDs with proven capabilities.
He also offers several interesting judgments:
First, he believes China’s AI can develop because CS really can change your destiny. In a country with average low income, top CS fresh graduates can earn far above the average. So both parents and students will pour resources into CS.
Second, he thinks China is good at catch-up innovation but finds disruptive innovation more difficult. The reason is that the education system is too systematized—people are better at optimizing within the system, while the US is better at exploration.
Third, he believes GPU export controls are effective. Without GPUs, universities struggle to do influential AI research, so top students go to big companies with GPUs for internships. Schools without compute power can only do smaller-scale research.
Fourth, his view on Huawei’s chips is relatively tepid. He says they may have value in the long run, but for now they are not yet at a practical level, and he’s never met a Chinese AI student who is genuinely optimistic about Huawei’s chips.
The strength of China’s AI is not a myth, nor a miracle. It’s the product of countless people who started competing fiercely from their teens.
This is very well written—it’s a brutally honest reality.
Goshi Aoki (@goshi_aoki): I completed a master’s in Computer Science at Zhejiang University in China one year ago. Based on my interactions with top Chinese AI talent and my experience in graduate school, I’ve summarized China’s AI talent cultivation system below.
Similar Articles
@dongxi_nlp: A very valuable article, the last 6 takeaways are worth pondering. Among them, the last two: 5. The data industry is far from developed. Anthropic and OpenAI spend over $10 million on a single environment, while Chinese AI labs have a 'build rather than buy' mentality. 6. Countless...
The article summarizes the current state of the AI data industry, pointing out that the data industry is not yet mature. Anthropic and OpenAI spend over $10 million on a single environment, while Chinese AI labs tend to build rather than buy. In addition, many labs have access to Huawei chips but still crave more Nvidia chips.
@snowboat84: https://x.com/snowboat84/status/2061962883651731602
This article is the first part of the AI Engineering Panorama series. From a historical perspective, it reviews the evolution of GPUs from gaming graphics cards to AI accelerators, the bold bet of CUDA, the independent path of Google's TPU, and why NVIDIA ultimately prevailed. It also provides a detailed analysis of the underlying logic of AI infrastructure such as chips, supply chain, networking, and power.
Notes from inside China's AI labs (18 minute read)
The author reflects on a visit to China's AI labs, comparing cultural differences between Chinese and American labs in building LLMs. Chinese labs benefit from a culture of collective work and student involvement, while American labs face challenges from individual ego and career ambitions.
@MaxForAI: https://x.com/MaxForAI/status/2058910873947910558
An article discussing how Chinese talents are 'lining up to crash open source', highlighting the paradox of free value in commercial ecosystems.
@ma_zhenyuan: https://x.com/ma_zhenyuan/status/2057702858800370052
This article introduces Superpowers, a set of AI workflow Skills based on Claude Code, providing automated brainstorming, planning, sub-agent development, and test-driven development, which can significantly improve AI delivery efficiency.