Human approval is too vague for production agents

A lot of agent systems say they support “human-in-the-loop.” But in production that phrase is usually too vague to be useful. The hard question is not “Can a human approve this” It is What exactly is the human approving For a risky agent step I think the approval object needs to be much more explicit - the proposed action - the current durable state - the external system being touched - the exact payload or diff - the idempotency key / operation id - the evidence used by the agent - the failure or uncertainty state if any - the rollback or compensation path - who owns the decision after approval Otherwise “approval” becomes a UI button on top of a black box. The reviewer is not really approving an operation. They are approving a story the agent told about the operation. That feels dangerous. For production agents I think HITL should be modeled as a signed decision record attached to a specific step not a generic pause in the workflow. The approval should be replayable later by an auditor or operator who approved what based on which evidence under which policy and what happened after. Curious how others are designing this. Are your human approvals step-level records policy checks chat messages or just manual gates in the workflow