Most HITL agent systems are approving a story not an action
Summary
The article critiques common human-in-the-loop approval systems in AI agents, arguing that approving a natural language summary instead of a concrete execution step is insufficient for safety. It advocates for approval tied to structured state, tool calls, and durable execution artifacts.
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