@shellywangcat: Over the past couple of months, several pieces of news landed all at once. ByteDance's Coze Enterprise Edition stopped accepting new purchases and is being phased out, with the team folded into Doubao; Tencent's Yuanqi shut down on November 9 — a bit over two years from launch to closing; Baidu's Wenxin Agent Platform shut down part of its creation entry points. Seeing the news about Coze, I felt quite a pang. We built something very similar, and at the end of last year...

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Summary

The author reviews the successive shutdowns of AI application platforms such as Coze Enterprise, Tencent Yuanqi, and the Wenxin Agent Platform, analyzes the logic behind canvas-style workflows being made obsolete by model planning capabilities, points out the rise of FDE roles and the platform landscape of "wherever the data is, that's where the agent's home is," and finally decides to pivot to the niche of small and micro business financial reconciliation.

Over the past couple of months, several pieces of news have landed all at once. ByteDance's Coze Enterprise Edition has stopped accepting new purchases and is being phased out, with the team folded into Doubao; Tencent's Yuanqi shut down on November 9. From launch to closing, a bit over two years. Baidu's Wenxin Agent Platform has shut down part of its creation entry points. Seeing the news about Coze, I felt quite a pang. We built something very similar, and at the end of last year... we also hit pause. Below are a few things I've thought about over the past two years. 1. What actually made Coze obsolete Many people say workflows have been made obsolete by AI. I'd argue workflows never went away. What got replaced is the idea of humans drawing workflows. Two years ago, models couldn't plan. You'd ask them to do a five-step task and they'd go off the rails by step three. So platforms handed you a canvas and let you draw every step yourself: drag a node, draw a line. Looking back, all that dragging was paying for the model's incompetence. It was a transitional form carried over from the low-code era. Now that models can plan, whatever you draw on the canvas becomes a plan worse than the model's own. Coze's own trajectory is the answer: first it pivoted to AI coding — say a sentence, the agent writes the code — and then it merged into Doubao Work. The craft everyone used to learn, "how to build workflows," has been absorbed by agents too. 2. There are three kinds of canvases, and they meet different fates But not every canvas is dead. Sorted by what you draw on them, there are three kinds. The first kind: drawing reasoning. Each node is a prompt, and the lines mean "think about this first, then that." Coze and Yuanqi both belong here. This kind is fading. The second kind: drawing connections. Nodes are APIs and systems; lines say where data comes from and where it goes. "When an email attachment arrives, save it to the cloud drive" — that's not something a model needs to think about; it needs a cheap, reliable execution result. Zapier, n8n, and Dify live in this category. This kind is still alive. Though n8n is valued at $5.2 billion against disclosed annual revenue of roughly $40 million — a lot of that valuation is story. The third kind: don't draw at all, just write code. But underneath there's a runtime layer that manages state, retries, and where to resume after a crash. Temporal, Restate, Inngest. This layer is the hardest. Temporal's valuation reached $12.55 billion this year, with annualized revenue above $250 million and growth over 200%. OpenAI and Netflix both use it. The pattern is simple: The closer you are to "drawing reasoning," the faster you die. The closer you are to "guaranteeing execution," the better you live. I later kept one question as a test for anything I built: if the next generation of models is ten times stronger, does my business get better or disappear? Canvas for drawing reasoning: disappears, because the model can think for itself. Runtime: gets better. The longer an agent runs and the more tools it calls, the more places it can go wrong — and the more you need something to catch it. 3. The "Coze" we built ourselves What we once set out to build: business users describe a requirement in one sentence, and the system turns it into a process that runs reliably. No prompt learning, no dragging nodes. Technically we took many wrong turns. First we had the model write code on the fly at runtime — unstable. Then we switched to generating the flow during the planning stage and assembling pre-validated skills. Flows that worked end to end got baked into stable code. In August, ByteDance released Doubao Work. I went through it carefully: self-decompose tasks around a goal, plus a skill store, plus connectors. Common flows are settled in once and called directly next time. The skeleton is almost identical to what we built back then. So the idea wasn't wrong. Where's the gap? The moment Doubao Work logs into Feishu, three years of the company's documents, chat history, and meeting notes are right there. The permissions system comes ready-made. The execution environment includes cloud desktops, so tasks keep running after you shut the laptop. And the traffic at that entry point is enormous and free. For every customer we onboard, we first have to convince them to plug in their spreadsheets, ERP, and backend data one by one. Now look at the three giants: Tencent's WorkBuddy connects to WeChat and WeCom. Alibaba merged three products into Qwen Office and is wiring up enterprise IM as well. ByteDance's Doubao Work connects to Feishu. They're all doing the same thing: hanging agents off their own data. Agents follow the data. Wherever the data is, that's where the agent's home is. MaybeAI was the right idea. But it had no home. 4. The trend we chased When Gemini 3.0 came out at the end of last year, its image capabilities jumped a big step. Forced to pivot, we also spent a while on an AI design tool for cross-border e-commerce: swap models, swap scenes, generate images according to platform rules and localized styles. Later I saw that Alibaba's own e-commerce image tools stopped too. Huiwa published a shutdown notice, and Luban landed on a contraction list. Alibaba lacks neither e-commerce data, nor traffic, nor people who understand e-commerce. It shut down all the same. The reason is plain: e-commerce image generation is becoming a model's default capability. A seller opens a general-purpose model and gets it done — no need to enter a dedicated tool. Building tools on the back of the latest model capability is eating a time gap: the model just learned it, the product hasn't caught up. The next version ships, the gap closes — roughly six months. The newer the capability, the earlier it gets eaten. Many people say domain know-how trumps everything. I now think that's only half right. The know-how that can be written down — prompt templates, category rules, platform compliance — will be fed to the model sooner or later. What's left is the part you can't write down. 5. Tools die — where do the people go? As tools get eaten layer by layer, what we see is that value flows more toward people instead. The hottest job title this year is FDE: sit on-site with the customer, find requirements, wire up systems, and get the agent running. According to LinkedIn, this role grew 42x between 2023 and 2025. ByteDance offers Doubao FDEs total compensation of up to 1.05 million yuan. Anthropic says it will train 10,000 FDEs by the end of 2027. In late August, China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology wrote FDE into policy for the first time. Same in the cross-border e-commerce world. Most of the bosses I've talked to lately no longer want to buy a platform. They want to keep one person in-house dedicated to exploring and solidifying agent workflows. Some call it an agent engineer. But this has two sides. The FDE model was invented by Palantir. But few mention where it went afterwards: once the platform matured, standardized deployments replaced most of the custom work, gross margins climbed above 80%, and it actually reduced its dependence on FDEs. FDEs are the dirt-road stage. It only counts once the dirt road becomes a highway. Many domestic FDE roles are just implementation or pre-sales under a new name. Marketplace platforms face the same thing. One side takes enterprise demand, the other dispatches service personnel. If all you charge is a referral fee: on the next order, the customer bypasses the platform; the experience stays with individuals; when delivery goes wrong, nobody pays. The ones that survive have to work like a general contractor in home renovation: sign off on the outcome, and take responsibility when things go wrong. 6. The three things that remain So what exactly won't get eaten? We broke it into three questions: 1. If this step goes wrong, how big is the cost? 2. If it's wrong, how would you even know? 3. When something goes wrong, who do you go to? The first is about how much risk you're willing to take. The same task — "send an email to the customer" — requires approval at a bank; a startup sends it on the spot. Same task, different answer depending on whose business it is. The second is what counts as the source of truth. Whether the reconciliation balances depends on bank statements. Whether an image complies depends on the platform's review. The truth lives outside the system, and the model can't be its own referee. The third is who signs off. Models will increasingly understand how to be stable. But how stable is stable enough, and what counts as the source of truth — those stay with humans. 7. The boss can build it themselves now There's another change, faster than FDE. Among the cross-border bosses I talk to, more and more are building flows themselves with Codex: log into the backend, download reports, clean the data, shape it into the table they want — built in a few days. Platforms, image tools, and even part of an agent engineer's job are being eaten by "boss + coding agent." But I've seen the other side too. The script lives on the boss's laptop. Close the lid and the next day's report never comes. The platform renames a field, the script throws no error — one column just goes empty. Worst of all: when the numbers are wrong, the report still looks perfectly tidy. Thirty SKUs written differently never get merged, inventory comes up short, and nobody notices. Building it is nearly free now. Running it reliably is not. 8. We decided to become the pipe So we changed where we stand. Not the home. The customer's data stays in WPS or Feishu spreadsheets — that's where they work every day, and we're not going to fight them for it. Just the pipe: delivering outside data into their spreadsheets cleanly, on time, and reconciled. This matches what many people want from AI hardware these days: hardware that honestly collects data and exposes an MCP interface for agents beats cramming a half-baked agent into the device. We fell into the same trap as many developers: always wanting to be the platform, to be the entry point. But pipes have one trap: a pipe anyone can plug into gets price-compressed. It needs at least one thing others can't connect. Once we worked it out, we decided to do one very small thing: help small and micro business finance teams with reconciliation and profit. Two years ago, we thought we were building a platform. Later we found that platforms get eaten by models, tools get eaten by models, and even building flows is something the boss can do alone. What can't be eaten is the dirty, tiring work that's directly tied to money, where someone has to answer when it goes wrong. We plan to try staying there.
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Cached at: 11/02/26, 10:19 PM

Over the past couple of months, several pieces of news have piled up.

ByteDance’s Coze Enterprise Edition has stopped accepting new purchases and will be phased out, with the team merged into Doubao. Tencent’s Yuanqi shut down on November 9. From launch to closure, just over two years. Baidu’s Wenxin Agent Platform has turned off part of its creation entry point.

When I saw the news about Coze, I felt a wave of sentiment. We had built something very similar, and at the end of last year, we too pressed the pause button.

Here are some of the things I’ve been thinking about over these two years.

1. What made Coze obsolete

Many people say workflow has been replaced by AI. But I believe workflow never went away. What got eliminated was “humans drawing workflows.”

Two years ago, models couldn’t plan. You’d ask them to do a five-step task, and by step three they’d veer off course. So platforms gave you a canvas and let you draw out every step yourself. Drag a node, connect a line.

Looking back now, all that dragging and dropping was paying for the model’s clumsiness. It was a transitional form carried over from low-code. Once models could plan, the diagrams you drew on the canvas became plans worse than what the model would produce.

Coze’s own fate is the answer: first it pivoted to AI coding — speak a sentence, and an Agent writes the code; then it merged into Doubao Work. The craft everyone used to learn, “how to build a workflow,” has now been absorbed by Agents too.

2. Three kinds of canvases, three different fates

But not all canvases are dead. Categorized by what gets drawn on the canvas, there are three types.

The first type: drawing reasoning. Each node is a prompt; the connections mean “think about this first, then think about that.” Both Coze and Yuanqi fall into this category. This type is fading away.

The second type: drawing connections. Nodes are APIs and systems; the connections represent where data comes from and where it goes. “When an email attachment arrives, save it to cloud storage” — that kind of thing doesn’t need a model to think. It needs cheap, reliable execution. Zapier, n8n, Dify live in this category. This type is still alive. Though n8n is valued at $5.2 billion on disclosed annual revenue of roughly $40 million — and a fair chunk of that valuation is story.

The third type: don’t draw anything, just write code. But underneath there’s a runtime layer that manages state, retries, and where to pick up from after a crash. Temporal, Restate, Inngest. This layer is the hardest. Temporal’s valuation reached $12.55 billion this year, with annualized revenue exceeding $250 million and growth over 200%. OpenAI and Netflix both use it.

The pattern is simple:

  • The closer you are to “drawing reasoning,” the faster you die.
  • The closer you are to “guaranteeing execution,” the better you survive.

And I’ve since used one question to check everything I build: if the next generation of models is ten times stronger, does my business get better, or disappear?

Canvases for drawing reasoning: disappear — because the models can think for themselves. Runtimes: get better — the longer an Agent runs and the more tools it calls, the more places there are for things to go wrong, and the more you need something to catch it.

3. The “Coze” we once built

What we originally set out to do: business users describe a requirement in one sentence, and the system turns it into a process that executes reliably. No learning prompts, no dragging nodes.

Technically, we took many detours. At first we had the model write code at runtime — unstable. Later we switched to generating the flow during the planning stage, then assembling pre-validated skills. Flows that proved out were hardened into stable code.

In August this year, ByteDance released Doubao Work. I went through it carefully. Self-decomposition of goals + a skill store + connectors. Common flows get solidified and called directly next time.

The skeleton is almost identical to what we built back then.

So the idea wasn’t wrong. Where did we fall short?

The moment Doubao Work logs into Feishu, three years of enterprise documents, chat history, and meeting notes are all right there. The permission system comes ready-made. The execution environment includes cloud computers — close the lid and the task keeps running. The entry traffic is massive and free.

Every customer we onboarded, we had to first convince them to connect their spreadsheets, ERP, and backend data one by one.

Now look at the three giants:

  • Tencent’s WorkBuddy connects WeChat and WeCom.
  • Alibaba merged three products into Qwen Office, also integrating with enterprise IM.
  • ByteDance’s Doubao Work connects to Feishu.

They’re all doing the same thing: hanging Agents on their own data. The Agent follows the data. Wherever the data lives, that’s where the Agent’s home is.

MaybeAI was the right idea. But it had no home.

4. The trend we chased

When Gemini 3.0 came out at the end of last year, its image capabilities jumped dramatically. When we had to pivot, we spent some time on an AI design tool for cross-border e-commerce: swap models, swap scenes, generate images according to platform rules and localized styles.

Later we saw that Alibaba’s own e-commerce image tool shut down too. Huiwa posted a service termination notice; Luban went onto the reduction list.

Alibaba isn’t short on e-commerce data, traffic, or people who understand e-commerce. It shut down anyway.

The reason is plain: e-commerce image generation is becoming a default model capability. Sellers open a general-purpose model and they’re done — they don’t need to enter a specialized tool anymore.

Building tools around the latest model capabilities eats into a time gap: the model just learned it, the product hasn’t caught up. The next version ships, the gap disappears — roughly six months. The newer the capability, the sooner it gets eaten.

Many people say business know-how is worth more than everything. I now think that’s only half right.

The know-how you can write down — prompt templates, category rules, platform compliance — will eventually be fed to the models anyway.

What’s left is the stuff you can’t write down.

5. When tools die, where do the people go?

As tools get eaten layer by layer, what we’re seeing is that value flows more and more to people.

The hottest role this year is FDE: sit on-site with the customer, find requirements, connect systems, get the Agent running.

LinkedIn statistics show this role grew 42x from 2023 to 2025. ByteDance is offering up to 1.05 million RMB in total compensation for Doubao FDEs. Anthropic says it plans to train 10,000 FDEs before the end of 2027. In late August, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology issued a document that, for the first time, wrote FDE into policy.

The cross-border e-commerce world is the same. Most of the bosses I’ve been talking to lately don’t want to buy platforms anymore. They want to hire one person in-house whose sole job is exploring and hardening Agents. Some call them an agent engineer.

But there’s a two-sided coin.

The FDE model was invented by Palantir. But few mention what came next: once the platform matured, standardized deployments replaced a great deal of customization, gross margins climbed above 80%, and it actually reduced its dependence on FDEs.

FDE is the dirt-road stage. It only counts once the dirt road becomes a highway.

Many FDE roles in China are just implementation or pre-sales with a new name.

Matchmaking platforms are the same. One end takes enterprise demand, the other dispatches service workers. If all they charge is a referral fee, next time the customer will skip the platform, experience stays with individuals, and nobody pays when delivery goes wrong. Those that survive need to be like a general contractor in construction: sign off on the result and take responsibility when things go wrong.

6. The three things left over

So what, exactly, won’t get eaten?

We break it into three questions:

  1. If this step goes wrong, how big is the cost?
  2. If it goes wrong, how do we know?
  3. When something breaks, who do we hold accountable?

The first is about how much risk you dare to take. “Send an email to a customer” — a bank needs approval, a startup just hits send. Same task, the answer depends on whose business it is.

The second is what counts as the source of truth. Whether the reconciliation balances depends on the bank statement. Whether an image is compliant depends on platform review. The truth lives outside the system, and the model can’t be its own judge.

The third is who signs off.

Models will increasingly know how to be stable. How stable to be and what counts as truth will always stay in human hands.

7. The boss can build it themselves now

There’s another shift, even faster than FDE.

Among the cross-border bosses I talk to, more and more are opening Codex themselves to build flows: log into the backend, download reports, clean the data, format it into the table they want — done in a few days.

Platforms, image tools, and even some of the agent engineer’s job have been eaten by “boss + coding Agent.”

But I’ve also seen the other side.

The script lives on the boss’s laptop. Lid closed, and tomorrow’s report never arrives.

The platform renames a field, the script doesn’t throw an error — one column just goes blank.

Worst of all: the numbers are wrong but the report still looks perfectly tidy. Thirty SKUs written three different ways never got merged, inventory is undercounted, and nobody notices.

Building it is nearly free. Keeping it running reliably is not.

8. We decided to become the water pipe

So we changed our stance.

Not the home. Customer data stays in their WPS and Feishu spreadsheets — that’s where they work every day, and we’re not going to grab it. Just the water pipe: delivering outside data into their spreadsheets cleanly, on time, and reconciled.

This matches what many people now want from AI hardware: hardware that honestly collects data and exposes an MCP interface for the Agent to use — far better than stuffing a half-baked Agent inside the hardware.

We too fell into the classic developer trap of always wanting to be the platform, to be the entry point.

But a water pipe has its own trap: a pipe anyone can connect to gets its price squeezed. It needs to have something others can’t replicate.

Once we figured that out, we decided to do one very small thing: help small and micro-business finance teams with reconciliation and profit.

Two years ago, we thought we were building a platform.

Later we found out platforms get eaten by models, tools get eaten by models, and even building workflows — bosses can now do that themselves.

What won’t get eaten: the dirty, grueling, directly-money-related places where someone has to take responsibility when things go wrong.

We plan to stick around there.

Cangshu (@Sither_V): Coze is going offline, and I literally worked on Coze at ByteDance. My profile page still says “Coze Workflow Engine Developer.” Next year when I post that, nobody will even know what Coze is.

I’m feeling sentimental about this thing coming to an end. Let me share a few things you won’t see from the outside:

  1. workflow wasn’t replaced by AI — it was replaced by “the model can plan for itself”

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