“Human approved” might be hiding a much harder governance question
Summary
The author argues that merely proving a human clicked Approve in an AI system is not the same as proving the approval was legitimate — and that the real governance challenge is establishing why that human's decision was authoritative at a given time. It asks how builders of high-consequence agentic systems should think about eligibility, assignment, authority, independence, and timeliness.
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