@matthew_d_green: This is a very neat result!
Summary
A team implemented 1024-bit RSA signature forgery in nearly SNFS time, showing that temporary HSM access allows attackers to forge arbitrary signatures without factoring the key.
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Cached at: 09/22/26, 03:45 AM
This is a very neat result!
Miro Haller (@miro_haller): We implemented 1024-bit RSA signature forgery in nearly SNFS time!
Temporary access to an HSM allows an attacker to forge arbitrary signatures (without factoring).
Join work with Laura (1st author!), Adam, Nadia, and Emmanuel
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