where do you draw the line on what you let an agent log into
Summary
作者探讨构建会操作真实账户的 AI agent 时的授权边界:读取类操作允许常驻访问,而发送、消费、删除或发布类操作每次都需人工确认,并询问社区如何在大规模运行 agent 时处理写权限凭证。
I keep running into the same wall building agents that touch real accounts. The moment a login or oauth token lives somewhere other than where the human usually works, the agent needs its own copy of the session, and now there are two things that can leak instead of one. My actual rule right now: anything read-only or low-stakes, the agent gets standing access and just goes. Anything that sends, spends, deletes or publishes stops and asks first, every single time, even if it asked five minutes ago for a similar action. Per-app access has turned out not to be the same thing as per-action access, the first one just tells you which app got compromised. Curious where other people land on this, especially past a few dozen agents running at once. Do you let any of them hold a standing write credential, or does everything funnel through a human click no matter how repetitive it gets?
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