我们正式指出：乌克兰战争已进入新阶段。

我与 @KatStepanenko 共同撰写了一份新的特别报告，研究乌克兰如何积极挑战自2023年以来主导战场的那种阵地战特征。

关于俄罗斯战场表现的数据表明，战争特征正朝着有利于乌克兰军队的方向转变——至少目前如此。俄军推进速度停滞不前，而乌克兰军队正采用新颖战术和作战概念，试图突破阵地战。不过，俄乌双方目前均无法实施作战机动。

关键在于，乌克兰战争充满竞争性，远非僵局。乌克兰军队在军事技术以及将这些新技术应用于有效的作战概念方面，正超越俄军，这些概念有助于乌军突破阵地战。乌克兰正以12个月前不可能的方式，在战术机动中使用机械化装备。随着乌克兰的中程打击战役将俄军后勤和前沿作战基地进一步推离前线，减少了维持渗透任务步兵的资源，俄军执行渗透任务的能力可能会持续下降。如果国际伙伴提供适当资源，乌克兰或许能够扩大这些效果。

值得注意的是，乌克兰在中程打击方面的优势并非永久性的，俄罗斯很可能会最终研发出抵消乌克兰优势的对抗措施。因此，乌克兰的国际伙伴拥有一个罕见而暂时的机会，在乌克兰占据上风之际，帮助其利用有利的战场动态。

报告要点：

• 在俄军2026年春夏攻势期间，俄军推进速度急剧下降。

• 俄军以更多士兵的损失换取更少的进展，据报道自2025年12月以来，俄军月度伤亡率已超过月度招募人数。

• 乌克兰自2023年以来首次开始夺回比失去更多的领土。

• 乌克兰近期的反攻具有独特特征，偏离了自2023年以来定义阵地战的关键趋势。

• 乌克兰自2023年以来首次在战术层面进行更频繁的机械化反攻。

• 乌军指挥部的作战规划日趋成熟。

• 乌克兰2026年初在南部的反攻之所以成功，很可能是由于更好的战场准备与规划。

• 自2025年底以来，乌克兰一直在进行一场连贯的战役，以压制和摧毁俄罗斯防空系统，从而作为更复杂战役规划的一部分塑造战场。

• 乌克兰在2026年春季显著加强了针对动态目标的中程打击战役，以便在计划中的机动之前，削弱俄军作战纵深的后勤。

• 乌克兰军队于2026年春季开始积极破坏被占领乌克兰和俄罗斯西部地区的铁路后勤。

• 乌克兰的中程打击已取得显著的作战效果，包括削弱俄军使用连接俄罗斯与被占领克里米亚的关键公路以及顿涅茨克市附近地面交通线的能力。

• 乌克兰军队通过部署美国制造的“大黄蜂”攻击无人机等新型系统，果断地在远程打击中掌握了主动权。

• 乌克兰军队在某些前线地区实现了战术无人机优势，通过削弱俄军塑造行动的效果，减缓了俄军进攻行动。

• 乌克兰军队在2025年底至2026年初削弱俄军无人机能力后（主要通过压制无人机发射阵地和越来越多地拦截俄军战术无人机），很可能在某些前线地区实现了战术无人机优势。

• 乌克兰对俄军作战纵深的削弱，加上战术层面的无人机优势，很可能正在俄军防线中制造漏洞。

• 如果乌克兰伙伴的持续支持到位，乌克兰的中程打击战役很可能远未达到顶峰，并将随着乌克兰部署能够打击俄军作战后方的新武器而在2026年进一步加强。

完整报告链接：https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/…

乌克兰的中程打击战役与新的机械化攻击标志着战争进入新阶段

来源：https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/ [1] https://texty.org dot ua/projects/116021/20-kilometers-of-the-gray-zone-the-front-line-has-become-blurred/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/future-of-war/ukraine-and-the-problem-of-restoring-maneuver-in-contemporary-war/

[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_4-8/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_14-4/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_30-4/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_3-8/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2026/

[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-partial-battlefield-air-interdiction-enabled-recent-russian-advances-in-pokrovsk/

[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/future-of-war/ukraine-and-the-problem-of-restoring-maneuver-in-contemporary-war/

[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quest-to-intensify-the-theater-wide-battlefield-air-interdiction-campaign-against-ukraines-logistics/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-partial-battlefield-air-interdiction-enabled-recent-russian-advances-in-pokrovsk/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/

[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-partial-battlefield-air-interdiction-enabled-recent-russian-advances-in-pokrovsk/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quest-to-intensify-the-theater-wide-battlefield-air-interdiction-campaign-against-ukraines-logistics/

[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2025/

[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/; https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/interactive/2025/pokrovsk-ukraine-russia-war/; https://www.rferl.org/a/pokrovsk-battle-update-russian-drones-target-ukrainian-logistics/33624838.html; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-partial-battlefield-air-interdiction-enabled-recent-russian-advances-in-pokrovsk/

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[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/

[11] https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-ato/4028579-ukrainian-forces-destroy-russian-uav-command-post-and-ammo-depot-in-donetsk-region.html; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2656162064761337; https://t.me/ukr_sof/2627

[12] https://www.svoboda.org/a/tayna-rubikona-bpla-spetsnaz-v-parke-patriot-/33531165.html; https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cgqgyg7zp22o

[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-27-2026/; https://t.me/rusich_army/27531

[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/

[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2026/

[16] https://united24media dot com/war-in-ukraine/ukraine-continues-to-eliminate-more-russian-troops-than-russia-can-recruit-89000-in-3-months-17479

[17] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-11/russian-war-losses-now-exceed-recruitment-western-officials-say

[18] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2152

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[20] https://t.me/zedigital/6784; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/05/myhajlo-fedorov-pyatyj-misyacz-pospil-rosiya-vtrachaye-bilshe-nizh-zdatna-mobilizuvaty/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/05/rekordni-pokaznyky-droniv-perehoplyuvachiv-194-pidrozdily-mayut-pidtverdzheni-zbyttya-shahediv/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/05/shtaby-ppo-ta-logistyka-voroga-kilkist-midlstrajkiv-zrosla-vdvichi-za-misyacz/

[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2026/

[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2026/

[23] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/syrskyj-kilkist-nastupalnyh-dij-syl-oborony-pochala-perevyshhuvaty-rosijski/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B9ZMEMKBWl0&t=1s

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[25] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2057951308842197472; https://t.me/operationall_space/11627

[26] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Ukraine20and20the20Problem20of20Restoring20Maneuver20in20Contemporary20War_final.pdf

[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2026/

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[30] https://mod.gov dot ua/news/bojova-sistema-delta-vprovadzhena-na-vsih-rivnyah-sil-oboroni-ukrayini

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[33] https://khogov dot ru/documents/ukaz-gubernatora-hersonskoj-oblasti-ot-21-05-2026-%E2%84%96-32-u-o-realizaczii-mer-predusmotrennyh-ukazom-prezidenta-rossijskoj-federaczii-ot-19-oktyabrya-2022-g-%E2%84%96-757-o-merah-o/

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