Can LLMs Introspect? A Reality Check

# Can LLMs Introspect? A Reality Check
Source: [https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242)
Shashwat Singh, Tal Linzen, Shauli Ravfogel Center for Data Science New York University \{ss20428,linzen,shauli\.ravfogel\}@nyu\.edu

###### Abstract

Can large language models detect and report their own internal states? A number of studies have argued that the answer to this question is yes\. We argue, based on lessons from human metacognition research, that this conclusion may be premature: to be convinced of this conclusion we need to distinguish genuine introspection from pattern matching based on surface\-level cues\. Furthermore, we argue that behavioral evidence alone is inherently insufficient to establish strong introspective claims\.

We re\-examine two recently introduced evaluation paradigms in light of this consideration\. In the first paradigm, models are expected to detect whether their internal states have been tampered with\. We find that models cannot reliably distinguish such interventions on their internal states from manipulations of the input, suggesting that their success in the original studies reflects their ability to detect anomalies more generally, as opposed to interventions on their internal states in particular\. In the second paradigm we examine, models are tasked with predicting labels derived from their own hidden states\. Here, we find that classifiers that only have access to the input achieve equivalent performance to the model’s own in\-context predictions, indicating that the original results do not conclusively demonstrate that the model has privileged access to its internal representations\. We further introduce a relabeled control setting, where models cannot rely on the semantics of the task to solve it, and instead must rely on the internal representation; models perform closer to chance on this better\-controlled version of the task\. Taken together, these results indicate that current evidence is insufficient to establish that LLMs display metacognitive monitoring\.

## 1Introduction

Can large language models reflect on their own internal processes? As LLMs have grown in scale and capabilities, a surge of recent work has begun asking whether these systems possess not just the ability to accomplish complex behaviors, but also to*introspect*on how they are accomplishing these behaviors: can they monitor, report, and regulate their own internal states—abilities referred to in human cognitive science as metacognition\(Nisbett and Wilson,[1977](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib19); Flavell,[1979](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib20); Nelson,[1990](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib21)\)? A number of recent studies have answered this question in the affirmative\. We re\-examine some of these studies and argue that these conclusions are not justified by the current evidence on two distinct counts: an*empirical*count—existing paradigms fail to rule out simple input\-driven explanations; and a more fundamental*principled*count—even if these confounds were resolved, the paradigms as currently conceived would not, in principle, establish the “strong” notion of introspection we describe below, drawing on the cognitive science and philosophy literature\.

Inspired by a long line of work on human metacognition, which has yielded largely negative results and identified a range of confounds that complicate self\-report studies\(Fleming and Lau,[2014](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib22)\), we highlight the challenge of distinguishing*genuine introspection*—reasoning that depends on access to internal states beyond what the input alone provides—from*input\-driven pattern matching*, where models leverage surface\-level features of the prompt to predict their own behavior\(Shanahanet al\.,[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib11); Turpinet al\.,[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib12)\)\. We argue that two prominent paradigms taken to demonstrate metacognitive monitoring in LLMs are vulnerable to precisely this confound \([section5](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5)\)\. We see the present work as building on, not displacing, the recent efforts to characterize LLM self\-knowledge: the paradigms we critique as important and well\-motivated, but need to be refined to address these possible confounds\.

The first line of work we re\-examine reports that models can solve in\-context learning \(ICL\) tasks where the labels are derived from the models’ own activations\(Ji\-Anet al\.,[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib8); Steinmetz Yalonet al\.,[2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\), a paradigm referred to as “biofeedback” by analogy to a related design from neuroscience\. But, we argue, the fact that the labels were*derived*from the model’s hidden states does not exclude the possibility they are just as easily predictable from*input*features\. We show that a key variable tracked by the*Belief Dominance*metric ofSteinmetz Yalonet al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\)—which captures whether a model defers to contextual counter\-evidence or adheres to parametric knowledge—is largely predictable from input features of the entities, even without any introspective access \([section5\.2](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.SS2)\)\. We further demonstrate that relabeling the outputs of the probe brings the models’ performance down to chance level, indicating that the models were performing in\-context learning of the underlying semantic task rather than monitoring their own internal activations\.

The second paradigm we study originates in a paper that attracted considerable attention\(Lindsey,[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\); this paper showed that Anthropic’s Claude models were able to detect with non\-trivial accuracy whether their activations were modified through steering \(where a vector representing a particular concept is added to the model’s activations;Liet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib27); Singhet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib28)\)\. We show that LLMs’ higher\-than\-chance accuracy on this task may reflect their ability to detect any*irregularity*in their input, rather than genuine inspection of their own hidden states \([fig\.1](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S1.F1), right\)\. In a modified design \([section5\.3](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.SS3)\) that augments the original*activation*\-level interventions and*control*cases with*input*\-level interventions, three open\-weights models111We are unable to replicate the paper directly as the model tested byLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)is not accessible outside of Anthropic\.fail to reliably distinguish input\-level from activation\-level interventions, complicating the interpretation that they are sensitive to their own internal states\.

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/demo_biofeedback_steer_ff.png)Figure 1:Input\-controlled alternatives to purported introspection results\.Left:In the biofeedback paradigm ofJi\-Anet al\.\([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib8)\), labels are computed from a model’s hidden state via a linear classifier or top PCA directions \(A\), then used as targets in in\-context learning examples \(B\)\. Successful prediction has been interpreted as evidence of introspection\. We show these labels are also predictable from uncontextualized input embeddings, so success need not imply privileged access\.Right:In the steering\-awareness setting ofLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\), the anomaly detection hypothesis and introspection hypothesis make the same prediction and are confounded\. Our design adds prompt interventions \(the “gaslight” condition\) matched to hidden\-state interventions, separating the hypotheses: anomaly detection flags both as anomalous, while introspection selectively identifies hidden\-state interventions\.Going beyond these empirical gaps, we argue the evidentiary bar implicit in recent paradigms is lower than is required to make strong claims of introspection\. Existing paradigms aim to establish*privileged self\-access*\(Binderet al\.,[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib24); Songet al\.,[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib25)\)—that is, to establish that labels carry information not recoverable from the input\. But privileged access is just a necessary condition for introspection in the strong sense, not a sufficient one\. Every computation in a language model is performed over hidden states, so a task whose labels depend on hidden\-state properties need not engage any machinery distinct from ordinary forward\-pass computation; the asymmetry that makes such tasks look introspective is on the observer’s side, not the model’s\. We argue that introspection, by contrast, should properly be taken to denote a*second\-order*process that is dissociable from first\-order processing\. As we discuss in[section4](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S4), establishing introspection requires mechanistic evidence that no behavioral paradigm can supply on its own \(for first steps in this direction, seeMacaret al\.[2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib43)\)\.

In summary, we conclude that current evidence is insufficient to establish that LLMs display strong metacognitive monitoring, and argue that future studies could be made more compelling by including stronger controls and, crucially, by pairing behavioral results with mechanistic evidence of a dissociable second\-order process\.

## 2Related Work

The question of whether LLMs possess metacognitive abilities has been approached from several angles\. One line of work investigates*verbal calibration*, asking whether models express well\-calibrated uncertainty about their answers\(Kadavathet al\.,[2022](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib1); Linet al\.,[2022](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib2); Yonaet al\.,[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib3)\)\. A second employs*probing\-based approaches*that extract internal representations of confidence or truthfulness from hidden states\(Burnset al\.,[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib4); Marks and Tegmark,[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib5); Azaria and Mitchell,[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib6); Liuet al\.,[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib7); Slobodkinet al\.,[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib18); Ravfogelet al\.,[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib17)\)\. A third adopts*neuroscience\-inspired paradigms*that evaluate indicators of consciousness from cognitive theories\(Butlinet al\.,[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib9); Steinmetz Yalonet al\.,[2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\)or test whether models can report their own activation patterns\(Ji\-Anet al\.,[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib8)\)\.

The human metacognition literature, which is rife with negative results, provides essential context for interpreting work on LLM metacognition\.Nisbett and Wilson \([1977](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib19)\)showed that humans often attribute their own behavior to confabulated explanations rooted in irrelevant causes\.Koriat \([1997](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib26)\)demonstrated that apparent metacognitive abilities in memory tasks stem from shallow cues like familiarity rather than direct memory access\. In light of the fact that above\-chance confidence\-accuracy correlations can arise from first\-order evidence, without requiring second\-order monitoring,Fleming and Lau \([2014](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib22)\)suggested that metacognitive sensitivity should be formalized within signal\-detection theory\. This concern applies directly to LLMs: above\-chance prediction of internal\-state labels can arise from input features which are shared with the hidden states, without requiring introspective access\.

Recent work has begun controlling for possible confounds in the evaluation of metacognition\.Binderet al\.\([2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib24)\)define introspection as knowledge originating from internal states rather than training data, and test whether a model can predict its own behavior better than an equally informed external model\. The models studied by show some degree of privileged access, i\.e\., they are better at predicting their own behavior than that of another model\. However, their design involves training for introspection, and thus does not show evidence for emergent introspection\. Additionally, as they note, their experiments do not necessarily differentiate between introspection on hidden states and the ability to*simulate*the forward pass on a given input\. Closer to our work,Songet al\.\([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib25)\)argue for a stricter*privileged self\-access*criterion, operationalized as a reliability advantage over any process of equal or lower computational cost available to a third party, and show empirically that apparent introspective success in LLMs can fail to meet this criterion\. We share the broad motivation of[Songet al\.](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib25)’s critique and extend it to two further paradigms that have been taken to demonstrate metacognitive capabilities in LLMs\. At the same time, we argue that privileged access is*not*sufficient for establishing a strong notion of introspection\.

A separate line of work trains models to verbalize information about their own activations in natural language\(Ghandehariounet al\.,[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib31); Karvonenet al\.,[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib32); Liet al\.,[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib33)\)\.Ghandehariounet al\.\([2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib31)\)introduced Patchscopes, a framework that patches hidden representations into prompts designed to extract information, unifying several interpretability methods\.Karvonenet al\.\([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib32)\)train “Activation Oracles” that take activation vectors as inputs and answer questions about them, whileLiet al\.\([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib33)\)fine\-tune models to describe their internal features and causal structures\. Both studies conclude that models exhibit*privileged access*: they explain their own internals better than other models can\. Crucially, however, this pattern of results could be due to the fact that models are optimized to operate in their own representational space, not another model’s\. In other words, the term “privileged access” used in these studies does not imply a fundamentally different processing mode; it simply means the model’s forward pass has direct access to its own hidden states by construction, whereas cross\-model explanation requires additional alignment\. This phenomenon is better understood as a consequence of model architecture than as evidence for introspection in the psychological sense\.

FollowingLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)’s report that Claude can detect concept injection, several groups have attempted to replicate this experiment with open\-weight models\.Vogel \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib34)\)report successful replication in Qwen2\.5\-Coder\-32B with appropriate prompting\.Rivera and Africa \([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib36)\)report that Qwen 2\.5 32B finetuned for steering awareness achieves 95\.5% detection with zero false positives, though this requires explicit detection training\.Lederman and Mahowald \([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib44)\)argue that injection\-detection in LLMs is content\-agnostic: models detect that an anomaly has occurred but cannot reliably identify the injected concept, defaulting to high\-frequency guesses like “apple”\. This criticism is orthogonal to our argument:[Lederman and Mahowald](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib44)distinguish detection from identification, whereas we question whether detection reflects second\-order computation or first\-order anomaly detection and the ability to report it\.

As we have mentioned in this section, a number of studied have finetuned models to perform tasks that require some form of introspection\. Here, we focus on detecting introspection in pretrained models, motivated by the concern that finetuning may solve the task by installing a new, task\-specific mechanism rather than by cultivating a general introspective capacity\.

## 3Background

We first describe the two setups we engage with most directly: a steering\-based self\-report paradigm, and a biofeedback\-style internal\-state classification paradigm\.

### 3\.1Biofeedback\-style classification of internal states

Our first target of analysis is the neurofeedback or “biofeedback” paradigm introduced byJi\-Anet al\.\([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib8)\)and later adapted bySteinmetz Yalonet al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\)for belief\-monitoring claims\.222The term is borrowed from a technique in which humans are shown real\-time readouts of their own physiological signals — such as brain activity or heart rate — and learn to regulate those signals through feedback; the analogy here is that the model is similarly exposed to representations of its own internal states\.In the original setup, the authors define a target direction in the model’s activation space at a given layer, typically by training a logistic regression model on annotated positive and negative examples\. They then compute a scalar neural score for each input sentence by extracting hidden activations from the language model’s residual stream, projecting them onto this direction, and discretizing the resulting scalar into a categorical label\.

These labels define a few\-shot in\-context learning task\. The model is presented with exemplar sentence–label pairs, where the labels are not ordinary semantic class labels but, as mentioned above, discrete bins derived from the model’s own activations along the chosen internal axis\. After observing these examples, the model receives a new sentence and must predict its label\.Ji\-Anet al\.\([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib8)\)interpret successful held\-out classification as evidence that the model can monitor and report aspects of its own internal activation state\. They also extend the paradigm to teach the model to “control” its own activations: in that setting, the model is asked to generate text that elicits a target label or to shift its activations toward a specified label\. Similarly,Steinmetz Yalonet al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\)test a model’s ability to predict in\-context labels derived from its hidden states\. They record whether a model chooses to use parametric knowledge or answer a question based on counterfactual knowledge provided in the prompt, and derive in\-context learning labels from the estimated dominance—i\.e\., which of the two options or “beliefs” are dominant in the model’s hidden activations across the layers\.

### 3\.2Steering\-based self\-report of injected internal states

The second paradigm we analyze is the steering\-based introspection paradigm introduced byLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)\. The basic design begins with a prompt that explicitly tells the model that an external researcher can inject “thoughts” into its “mind”\. The model is informed that, across trials, some instances will contain an intervention and others will be control cases\. At the end of each trial, the model is asked whether it detects an injected thought and, if it does, what that thought is about\.

The intervention is implemented as linear steering\(Liet al\.,[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib27); Singhet al\.,[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib28)\)\. Recent work has shown that directions in a model’s representation space can encode human\-interpretable concepts, such as “happiness” or “dogs”\. By extracting such a*steering vector*and adding it to the model’s residual stream during inference, one can systematically shift the model’s behavior toward the target concept without retraining it\.

In the main “injected thoughts” setup fromLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\), the steering vector is injected into the residual stream beginning immediately before the target trial\. Steering is applied to all of the tokens in the string that delineates the start of a trial \(e\.g\., “Trial 1: what do you detect?”\)\. The authors vary both the layer at which the intervention is applied and the strength of the intervention \(determined by a scalar coefficient by which the steering vector is multiplied before being added to the activation\), and they repeat this procedure across a number of concepts and models\. The central dependent variable is whether the model produces a response that \(i\) correctly reports that an intervention occurred, and \(ii\) correctly identifies the concept associated with the injected vector\.

Overall, this family of experiments is best understood as testing whether a model can learn a mapping from textual inputs to labels that were*generated from*internal measurements\. The positive claim is that above\-chance generalization in this regime indicates metacognitive monitoring\. Our central concern is that such performance may instead be supported by stable, input\-level correlates of the target labels, in which case success on the classification task would not, by itself, establish that the model has privileged access to its hidden states\.

## 4Construct Validity of Introspection Paradigms

Defining introspection\.Before proceeding, we note that “introspection” is not a univocal notion\. On one family of views, introspection is a distinctively inner process—that is, a kind of “inner sense” or higher\-order monitoring where a system represents its own mental states via a mechanism distinct from first\-order cognition\(Armstrong,[1968](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib45); Nichols and Stich,[2003](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib47); Rosenthal,[2005](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib46)\)\. On another, self\-knowledge is obtained indirectly: through the same inferential processes used to attribute states to others\(Carruthers,[2011](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib48)\), or through “transparent” procedures that answer questions about one’s attitudes by considering behavior rather than one’s mind\(Byrne,[2018](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib49)\)\. Our critique targets claims of the first kind: that LLMs possess a dedicated capacity to inspect their own hidden states, over and above ordinary forward\-pass computation\. The weaker, inferential notion is comparatively cheap to satisfy and is not the notion that motivates recent claims that models show emergent introspective awareness\.

We argue that neither ICL\-based “biofeedback” paradigms nor the steering\-awareness paradigm, as currently deployed, establish introspection in the strong sense of inner monitoring\. Our argument has two parts \(for a more detailed form of the argument, see[AppendixB](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A2)\)\.

Privileged access and introspection\.First, because introspection concerns a system’s access to its own*inner*states, any paradigm advanced as evidence for it must satisfy a privileged\-access condition\(Songet al\.,[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib25)\): labels must depend on features of the model’s hidden states that are not recoverable from the input alone\. Formally, lettingttdenote the test stimulus andh​\(t\)h\(t\)its hidden states, the condition requiresI​\(t;y​\(t\)\)I\(t;y\(t\)\)to be low andI​\(h​\(t\);y​\(t\)\)I\(h\(t\);y\(t\)\)to be high\. We show empirically that prior biofeedback\-based results fail to meet this condition: labels are substantially predictable fromttalone, reducing the tasks to standard classification\. The two\-way steering\-awareness setting satisfies privileged access by construction, but our three\-way setting \([section5\.3](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.SS3)\) raises the possibility that privileged access here does not indicate the model treats hidden states differently from inputs\.

Beyond privileged access\.Second, and more importantly, privileged access is necessary but not sufficient for the strong notion of introspection\. Every computation in a language model is performed over hidden states; a task whose labels depend onh​\(t\)h\(t\)need not engage machinery distinct from ordinary forward\-pass computation\. A useful analogy here is to conventional semantic tasks such as sentiment analysis: here, the model produces a label based on a readout of its hidden states, yet no one takes this to show that the model is introspecting on its own sentiment representations\. A label defined overh​\(t\)h\(t\)is, by itself, not different\. Introspection, in the strong sense of monitoring one’s own representations, must denote a*second\-order*process: a computation whose input is a representation of another computation of the same system\. Such second\-order computation can be distinguished from first\-order computation along several axes, including reliance on separable circuits and characteristic failure modes—for instance, a first\-order failure produces an incorrect answer, whereas a second\-order failure produces a correct answer paired with miscalibrated confidence\. See Appendix[B](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A2)for further discussion\.

In a concurrent work,Macaret al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib43)\)take important methodological first steps towards clearing this higher evidentiary bar\. Their mechanistic analysis identifies a distributed anomaly\-detection circuit inGemma\-3\-27B, and shows that a generic learned bias vector can improve detection reports by∼\\sim75% on held\-out concepts while leaving underlying computation largely intact—evidence that behavioral self\-report depends heavily on a reporting criterion shaped by post\-training\. At the same time, their design does not determine whether the underlying signal reflects first\-order anomaly detection or second\-order introspection, and consequently their findings are consistent with the deflationary reading we defend\.

## 5Experiments

Although the two paradigms we re\-examine are not identical, they share the same methodological structure\. In both cases, the model is asked to produce a label defined based on internal measurements: in the biofeedback paradigm, the label corresponds to discretized classes of internal states; and in the steering paradigm, the label corresponds to whether or not there was an intervention on the internal states\. In both cases, to establish LLM metacognition it is not enough to show that the model can predict these labels with above\-chance accuracy; rather, the question is whether doing so requires information that is available*only*through access to hidden states\.

### 5\.1The biofeedback paradigm ofJi\-Anet al\.\([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib8)\)

#### 5\.1\.1Method

Building on a well\-established literature demonstrating that factual recall is influenced from shallow features such as frequency\(Kandpalet al\.,[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib13); Mallenet al\.,[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib14)\)and context\-following behavior\(Xieet al\.,[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib15); Liet al\.,[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib16)\), we propose a series of controlled experiments to disentangle input\-level pattern matching from genuine metacognitive monitoring, and articulate a general principle:*true introspection requires reasoning over hidden states above and beyond what can be inferred from the input alone*\.

##### The biofeedback paradigm\.

The biofeedback paradigm usually consists of recording and calculating some proxy of neural activity in the language model\. These proxies are then used as in\-context targets in a fresh run, where the model must predict them from new inputs\.Ji\-Anet al\.\([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib8)\)define two ways of deriving proxies from the model’s neural activations, which we refer to as*supervised*and*unsupervised*\.

Thesupervised settingis derived from a logistic regression probe trained on the model’s hidden states as it processes the labeled dataset \(see below\)\. The inner products between the probe and the hidden states for different data samples are clustered into two bins, which then constitute the classification labels\. Theunsupervised settingis based on principal component analysis \(PCA\): principal components are computed based on the hidden states of all of the inputs examples in the dataset\. The inner products between each sample’s representation and a principal component \(say, the first principal component\) are clustered into two bins, and the resulting cluster assignments serve as prediction targets\. For both proxies, the model is provided with a set of in\-context examples and evaluated on held\-out samples\.

The dataset[Ji\-Anet al\.](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib8)used for both the logistic regression and principal components setting is the commonsense subset of the Ethics dataset\(Hendryckset al\.,[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib37)\)\. It consists of first\-person descriptions of action with a label corresponding to whether there was an ethical violation or not; for instance, “I told my baby I loved her when she cried” does not contain an ethical violation, whereas “I told my baby I hated her when she cried” does contain one\.

If the model is able to predict these proxy labels for a particular example, the authors take this to indicate that the model has demonstrated an ability to introspect\. We reexamine this interpretation critically, and ask: does the model’s above\-chance performance on these classification tasks constitute genuine evidence of access to its own neural activity, or does it simply reflect the model picking up on an underlying classification task implied by the labels? In the supervised logistic regression setting, this could simply correspond to solving the original task of detecting ethical violations; in the unsupervised PCA case, this could correspond to any other semantically meaningful properties of the materials, or even to superficial properties such as sentence length\. We address this question separately for each of the two settings; in both experiments, we evaluateLlama\-3\.1\-8B\-Instruct\(followingJi\-Anet al\.[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib8)\), and, additionally, on Llama\-3\.1\-70B\-Instruct\.

##### Removing the semantic correlates in the supervised setting\.

To isolate introspection from first\-order semantic processing, we introduce a simple control: we retain the original data but randomly permute the labels before the probe is trained\. This breaks the correspondence between input semantics and probe output while preserving the label distribution\. The probe trained on the data with the randomly permuted labels still represents a well\-defined \(though arbitrary\) direction in the hidden\-state space—one that could, in principle, achieve perfect accuracy on the permuted task\. Therefore, it is still a valid proxy of the model’s neural activity that can be used to test for necessary \(but not sufficient conditions\) for introspection abilities\.333The justification follows from a causal observation: sincey=g​\(f​\(𝐱;𝜽\)\)y=g\(f\(\\mathbf\{x\};\\boldsymbol\{\\theta\}\)\), above\-chance performance may reflect information about𝐱\\mathbf\{x\}alone rather than privileged access to𝜽\\boldsymbol\{\\theta\}\. By the data processing inequality, a predictor operating solely on𝐱\\mathbf\{x\}can extract at mostI​\(𝐱;y\)I\(\\mathbf\{x\};\\,y\)bits aboutyy; if this quantity is large due to semantic alignment between probe and input, above\-chance performance is achievable without introspection\. Random relabeling constructs a targety~\\tilde\{y\}for whichI​\(𝐱;y~\)≈0I\(\\mathbf\{x\};\\tilde\{y\}\)\\approx 0, rendering the input uninformative while preserving the probe as a valid linear direction in representation space\. Collapse to the majority\-class baseline under this control therefore demonstrates that above\-chance performance in the original paradigm does not, by itself, constitute evidence of privileged introspective access\.

This control is methodologically related to the analysis ofJi\-Anet al\.\([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib8)\), who \(in the*unsupervised*setting\) probe later principal components on the grounds that they lack clear semantic content\. Random relabeling provides a more principled instantiation of the same intuition: rather than relying on the assumption that high\-index components are semantically vacuous, it explicitly removes the mutual information between input and target while preserving a valid linear direction in representation space\. More broadly, the semantic content of the neural correlate is a confound for any introspection paradigm, since above\-chance accuracy can be equally explained by first\-order processing of familiar inputs\. A convincing demonstration of introspection should therefore extend beyond directions whose predictability is already accounted for by input semantics\.

##### Uncovering input\-based shortcuts in the unsupervised setting\.

For the PCA variant of the setup, we use a different control: we fit linear probes on the mean\-pooled layer\-0 representations of the inputs to predict the binary\-clustered PCA components of representations for a given hidden layer; we repeat this experiment for each hidden layer and report the average accuracy across layers\. If the layer\-0 linear probes are successful, this would indicate that there is a shortcut in the input features that makes it possible to predict the labels derived from PCA on hidden layer representations directly from the input, and as such high accuracy on the biofeedback ICL paradigm can be achieved without any real introspective abilities\. We provide the technical specifications of the experiments in Appendix[J](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A10)\.

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment2/perf_acc_only_sparse_8b.png)\(a\)Llama\-3\.1\-8B\-Instruct: logistic regression probe\.
![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment2/matched_probe_acc_llama8b_pc1.png)\(b\)Llama\-3\.1\-8B\-Instruct: PCA\.
![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment2/perf_acc_only_sparse_70b.png)\(c\)Llama\-3\.1\-70B\-Instruct: logistic regression probe\.
![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment2/matched_probe_acc_70b_pc1.png)\(d\)Llama\-3\.1\-70B\-Instruct: PCA\.

Figure 2:*Left:*Accuracy on the biofeedback paradigms proposed byJi\-Anet al\.\([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib8)\)drops sharply when potential input\-level cues are controlled for: compared to the accuracy on the original dataset \(red\), the models’ accuracy is much lower after random relabeling, which removes semantic correlations \(grey\)\.*Right*: The accuracy of probes trained to predict the hidden\-layer PCA labels only from the input \(layer 0: circles\) is typically on par with or even better than the language model’s in\-context prediction of these labels, taken byJi\-Anet al\.\([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib8)\)as evidence of introspection\.

#### 5\.1\.2Results

In Figure[2](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F2)we plot the performances of our controls alongside the results presented inJi\-Anet al\.\([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib8)\)\. The x\-axis represents the number of In\-context examples \(for the original ICL setting\) which is identical to the number of training samples \(for our probes\)

##### Models struggle to predict proxies of hidden states decorrelated from semantics\.

While on the original semantically aligned labels the models’ accuracy is considerably above chance, when they are asked to predict the arbitrary direction defined by a logistic regression model trained on the randomly labeled Ethics dataset, their accuracy falls close to the majority\-class baseline \(Figure[2](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F2)a,b\)\. This suggests that the performance reported byJi\-Anet al\.\([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib8)\)does not require access to the model’s current hidden states or knowledge of the complex function mapping inputs to probe outputs through the model’s parameters: instead, performance could entirely reflect in\-context learning of the semantic regularities present in the data\.

##### PCA\-derived labels across layers are linearly predictable from input features\.

We show the results of the analysis with the first principal component; the results for other principal components are similar\. The performance of the layer\-0 probes closely follows the LLMs’ biofeedback in\-context performance across different training sizes \(Figure[2](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F2)c,d\)\. This suggests that the task can be solved using only the features of the input embedding, without privileged access to any particular layer’s activations\.

##### Semantic correlates undermine results about models controlling neural responses\.

Ji\-Anet al\.\([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib8)\)also present a set of experiments in which the model is tasked with controlling the value of the neural proxy presented to it in\-context\. For instance, model is tasked with controlling the component of the hidden\-states against the LR or the PCA vectors when it has been provided with ICL examples like from the prediction experiments\. The authors observesomeefficacy in this task\. We believe that given the prediction experiments don’t rule out underlying semantics, the neural control experiments can be explained as an instance of controlled generation – which we know models are capable of\.

### 5\.2The Belief Dominance framework ofSteinmetz Yalonet al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\)

Steinmetz Yalonet al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\)study introspection by assessing how models resolve conflicts between competing “beliefs”—here, whether the model favors its parametric factual knowledge \(referred to by[Steinmetz Yalonet al\.](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)as thebaseentity\) or evidence presented in context that contradicts the base knowledge \(counter\) presented in context\. The authors use an augmented version of the CounterFact dataset\(Menget al\.,[2022](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib39)\), which provides prompts with factual completions and candidate plausible counterfactual completions; for example, “The capital of France is” might have Paris as thebaseand Rome as thecounter\.[Steinmetz Yalonet al\.](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)augment this dataset by providing the conflicting evidence to the model in a number of different ways \(see Appendix[table5](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A12.T5)for examples\)\.

[Steinmetz Yalonet al\.](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)propose a Belief Dominance \(BD\) metric, which measures the relative strength of a particular belief across layers \(for a formal definition of this metric, see[AppendixK](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A11)\)\. The dominance of thebasebelief \(say “Paris”\) and the counterfactual belief \(say “Rome”\) are captured by BD\(base\) and BD\(counter\)\. They then useKK\-means to discretize BD values into three clusters, and ask the model to predict these cluster labels, given in\-context examples\.[Steinmetz Yalonet al\.](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)argue that if the model is able to predict these BD values, which they take to be proxies for the model’s own neural activity, then that suggests that the model can introspect on its beliefs\.

Here, we ask whether these cluster labels can be predicted from input features alone, without any introspective access\. We consider two probing settings\. In the first setting, we train the probe on the concatenation of the layer\-0embeddings of the subject entity and the counter entity \(without any of the embeddings from the rest of the prompt, and, importantly, no indication that there is any potential belief conflict\); in the example above, that would be the embedding of “France” concatenated with that of “Rome”\. In the second, we train a similar probe on the concatenation of the embeddings of thebaseentity \(“Paris”\) and thecounterentity \(“Rome”\)\.[Steinmetz Yalonet al\.](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)’s dataset consists of900900examples\. We split those at random, train the probe on450450samples and test on the remaining450450from the data \(of900900samples\)\. We conduct the experiment across1515train\-test splits and report the mean accuracy and standard deviation \(for details, see Appendix[L](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A12)\)\.Steinmetz Yalonet al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\)use a balanced set of3030ICL samples for their experiments \(we report their numbers as\-is\)\. Since the train set is explicitly balanced for all three settings \(the original ICL setting and our two layer\-0 probes\), achieving majority accuracy on the unseen test set is non\-trivial\.

FollowingSteinmetz Yalonet al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\), we experiment withLlama 3\-70BandGemma 3\-27B\.

Table 1:Prediction accuracy for Belief Dominance \(BD\) cluster labels\. ICL biofeedback denotes the in\-context learning setup ofSteinmetz Yalonet al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\); the restricted probe is a linear classifier trained on layer\-0 entity representations alone\. For the probes, we check two settings\. We note that the training set was balanced across the three classes in all the setups: ICL and probes\. These results also hold on a balanced test\-set i\.e\. the model performs slightly above random but is on\-par or worse than the layer\-0 probes\. See Table[6](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A14.T6)in Appendix for the same results but on a balanced test\-set\.#### 5\.2\.1Results

##### Belief Dominance labels are linearly predictable from input features\.

We find that the accuracy of the linear probes, which only have access to the entities’ uncontextualized embeddings, matches or even surpasses the ICL performance of the LLMs on the BD cluster prediction task \([Table1](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.T1)\)\. This suggests that the information usd by the LLMs to perform this task is largely predictable from properties of the entities alone, without requiring access to the model’s internal representations or any contextual information about the belief conflict\. We hypothesize that this correlation could be due to simple properties of the entities such as their frequency, in line with the well\-documented relationship between entity frequency and both factual recall accuracy and context\-sensitivity in LLMs\(Kandpalet al\.,[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib13); Mallenet al\.,[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib14); Xieet al\.,[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib15)\)\.

Steinmetz Yalonet al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\)also report an intervention experiment, in which injecting a vector corresponding to thecounterentity increases the model’s predicted BD\(counter\) and decreases its predicted BD\(base\)\. They take this result as evidence of metacognitive monitoring beyond surface pattern\-matching\. However, since BD\(base\) and BD\(counter\) can be predicted with above\-chance accuracy from the layer\-0 embeddings of thebaseandcounterentities, this finding could equally reflect the model’s direct computation of a function of these entities \(a computation that is then affected by the causal intervention\), as opposed to a metacognitive function of its hidden states\. Showing that intervening on a representation affects the model’s behavior only establishes that the representation has a causal role in the model; it does not establish that the model has privileged, introspective access to it\. Their results, while positive, are consistent with the broader literature on concepts being causally encoded in language model representations\.

### 5\.3Can models detect activation steering?

#### 5\.3\.1Method

In the context of the activation steering \(“thought injection”\) detection task proposed byLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\), a model’s low false positive rate and non\-trivial true positive rate as evidence for introspection: if the model rarely classifies control trials as injection trials, and correctly identifies some fraction of injection trials, then it is considered able to monitor some aspect of its own internal state\. Crucially, in[Lindsey](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)’s paradigm, the model is not asked to discriminate between different types of perturbation, but only to distinguish a normal forward pass from a forward pass in whi ch an unusual internal perturbation has occurred \(a*two\-way*design\)\. This leaves open the possibility that the model achieves its performance by detecting that the trial is irregular, unusual, or out\-of\-distribution in a more general way; in other words, that it utilizes general acceptability judgment mechanisms that are not specific to second\-order processing of its own hidden states\.

##### Three\-way design\.

To address this concern, we introduce a third experimental condition, an*input\-level intervention*which we refer to as the “gaslight condition”\. In this condition, the prompt includes a set of statements that instruct the model to direct the conversation towards a particular concept; for example,*You are obsessed with X\. Everything you want to say somehow relates to X*\(for the list of gaslight prompts, see Appendix[E\.1](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5.SS1)\)\. Crucially, this condition does not involve an intervention on the model’s activations\.

Adding the gaslight condition allows us to investigate two questions\. First, when the model is tested on this condition but restricted to the*two\-way*response set from Lindsey’s study—the only possible responses are “thought injection” or “no perturbation”—how does it classify this new class of input\-level interventions? The prompt for this two\-way version tells the model that the experimenter will either intervene on its hidden\-state or do nothing \(see Appendix[E\.4](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5.SS4)for the exact prompt used\)\. Second, when the model is given three response options—textual manipulation, intervention on the model’s “thoughts”, and no intervention—can it distinguish input\-level interventions from activation\-level ones? The prompt for this*three\-way*version appears in Appendix[E\.2](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5.SS2)\.

##### Models\.

We experiment with the following models:Llama\-3\.1\-70B,Llama\-3\.1\-8B\(Grattafioriet al\.,[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib41)\),Qwen\-2\.5\-72B\(Qwenet al\.,[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib42)\), andGemma\-27b\-it\(Teamet al\.,[2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib50)\); we use the “instruct” versions of all models\. We randomize the order in which the response options are listed in the prompt \(we observe that models are often sensitive to the order in which the options were provided\)\.

##### Steering\.

The steering intervention can be applied at different layers of the model\. We perform a search over a subsample of layers and a range of intervention strengths \(a scalarα\\alphamultiplied by the steering vector\), reporting results for the parameter values at which the model accurately detects vector injection \(see Appendix[H](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A8)for the optimal values\)\. We apply the steering intervention on the hidden\-states in the prompt in the positions of the string “Trial 1: What do you detect?”, which is how the prompt ends\. For most of the presented models \(all models except Gemma\-3\-27b\-it\) we do not steer the sampled tokens, which is different fromLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)\(who steer the “Trial 1:…” string and the sample tokens\) because doing so results in an unintelligible output \(as a result of too strong steering\)\. However, we still reproduceLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)for the Llama models, this is primarily because the detection answer is expected as the first sampled token\. We stick to the originalLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)protocol of steering “Trial 1:\.\.” and the sampled tokens for Gemma\-3\-27b\-it because the model does not get reliably steered otherwise, i\.e\., we find that steering the prompt alone produces no causal effect on neutral prompts\.

The “gaslight” setting is evaluated using 500 samples per concept, whereas the vector\-steering setting is evaluated using 500 samples total across concepts for each layer andα\\alphaconfiguration, due to computational constraints\. We rerun the best\-performing settings on a larger sample of 250 per concept \(because of compute constraints\)\. We also observe that different concepts have a different tendency to be detected by the model; both these factors together lead to a high standard deviation for hidden\-interventions\. The search space for the vector experiments for each model is available in Appendix[G](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A7)\.

Additionally, we note that the models are sensitive to the wording of the task prompts; therefore, we try two variants of prompts \(conversational, and instruction\-based\) for each of the 2\-way and 3\-way settings and report the results in Figure[3](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F3)for the variant where the models reproduce the results fromLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)for the 2\-way task\. We detail this in Appendix[D](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A4)\. We list all the prompts and the corresponding results in Appendix[E](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5)\.

#### 5\.3\.2Results

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment1_introspect/meta-llama_Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct-2_set_no_conversation.jsonl-loose.png)

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment1_introspect/Qwen_Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct-2_set_no_conversation.jsonl-loose.png)

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment1_introspect/google_gemma-3-27b-it-2_set.jsonl-loose.png)

\(a\)Two\-way condition: the model is asked to choose between no intervention and hidden intervention\.
![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment1_introspect/meta-llama_Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct-3_set_no_conversation.jsonl-loose.png)

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment1_introspect/Qwen_Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct-3_set_no_conversation.jsonl-loose.png)

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment1_introspect/google_gemma-3-27b-it-3_set.jsonl-loose.png)

\(b\)Three\-way condition: the model chooses between no intervention, input intervention and hidden intervention\.

Figure 3:Response distributions for our extension of theLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)intervention detection task\.*Left:*In the two\-way setting,Llama\-3\.1\-70BandGemma\-3\-27B\-itachieve above\-chance discrimination between control and activation\-level intervention trials\.*Right:*In the three\-way setting, the model fails to reliably distinguish input\-level from activation\-level interventions, suggesting that the models’ detection accuracy is compatible with a generalized sensitivity to irregularity \(if at all; in some cases, it is just showing a preference for a particular option\), and does not necessarily reflect introspective access to hidden states\. The rows are normalized to 100% and the standard deviations are calculated across concepts listed in Appendix[C](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A3)\.We first analyze the results of the two\-way setting, where the model is prompted to detect whether an intervention was applied to its activations\. In this setting,Qwen2\.5\-72B\([Figure3](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F3), middle left\) almost never reported an intervention either in the gaslight condition or in the hidden intervention condition\. By contrast,Llama\-3\.1\-70B\-Instruct\([Figure3](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F3), top left\),Gemma\-3\-27b\-it\([Figure3](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F3), bottom left\) produce results consistent with those reported byLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)for Claude: the model has very few false positives on control trials and a non\-trivial detection rates for hidden intervention trials \(first and second rows of the heatmap\)\. If these results are taken as evidence of introspection, they suggest thatLlama\-3\.1\-70B\-Instructis substantially more “introspective” than the models evaluated byLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)\.

At the same time, the model also labels instances of the gaslight condition as hidden intervention trials \(third rows; recall that in this setting the model does not have the option to report a textual intervention\)\. This suggests that the model’s responses in the hidden intervention condition are equally compatible with a more general capacity to detect an anomalous input\.

This concern is bolstered by the three\-way classification setting, where the prompt includes three response options—input intervention, hidden intervention, and no intervention\. Here,Llama\-3\.1\-70B\-Instructperforms near chance, with probability mass concentrated disproportionately on the hidden intervention option\.Gemma\-3\-27b\-italso fails to distinguish between gaslight intervention and hidden intervention, showing a strong preference for a “control” prediction in the three\-way setting\. Finally,Qwen2\.5\-72B, which showed no effect in the two\-way setting, shows a very slight tendency to predict either “hidden intervention” or “Gaslight” in non\-control cases \(up to 7\.7%\), but again does not distinguish between the two\. We note that in all cases, there is a high degree of inter\-concept variability for hidden interventions, resulting in large standard deviations in the cases where a model does show a detection effect\. We present the breakdown of detection statistics by concept in the Appendix[M](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A13)\.

Discussion\.The binary\-setting experiment reported byLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)shows that models exhibit “awareness” of steering interventions, but it does not rule out the possibility that this awareness relies on a more general ability to judge the acceptability of the prompt and its representation\. By contrast, the three\-way setting we use does rule this out: we show that a model that succeeds in the original setting fails in this more challenging one\. Although models could likely be trained to distinguish the two interventions, we argue that this failure at least shows that the models we study do not spontaneously acquire this ability, and thus fail this test of introspection\.

## 6Conclusions

We have examined two prominent paradigms used to evaluate metacognitive monitoring in large language models and identified critical confounds in both\. In the steering detection paradigm, we showed that models cannot reliably distinguish input\-level interventions from activation\-level interventions, suggesting that their sensitivity reflects detection of generic irregularities rather than introspective access to hidden states\. In the biofeedback paradigm, we demonstrated that above\-chance performance on self\-prediction tasks can be fully explained by in\-context learning of the underlying semantic structure\. These findings do not exclude the possibility that language models possess some form of introspective ability\. Rather, they raise the evidentiary bar for such claims\. The history of metacognition research in humans is replete with examples of apparent self\-knowledge that, upon closer examination, reduced to shallow heuristics and confabulation\(Nisbett and Wilson,[1977](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib19); Koriat,[1997](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib26)\)\.

Beyond these particular confounds, we argue that a strong notion of introspection cannot be established on behavioral grounds alone\. Because introspection is defined as a second\-order process operating on first\-order representations, demonstrating it requires evidence that the two are in fact distinct computations in the model—a question that behavioral predictions cannot resolve on their own\. While our findings cast doubt on the validity of existing claims for introspection, we do not rule out the principled possibility of its emergence\. Progress will require mechanistic evidence, ideally complemented by methods drawn from the cognitive science literature on metacognition\.

## Acknowledgments

We thank Noam Steinmetz Yalon and Mor Geva for openly sharing the data used inSteinmetz Yalonet al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\), and for generously answering our questions about their methodology and helping us to refine our core claims\. We also thank Dave Chalmers, John Morrison, Yanai Elazar, Yoav Goldberg, Jack Lindsey, Matt Mandelkern, and Gal Vishne for their feedback\.

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## Appendix

## Appendix AAI Use

Large language models were used to assist with running and analyzing experiments, and with improving the clarity and presentation of the writing\.

## Appendix BConstruct Validity of Introspection Paradigms

We formalize what it would take for existing paradigms to establish introspection in a language model, and argue that even successful instances fall short of the standard implied by the term\. We treat the two dominant paradigms—in\-context learning \(ICL\) and steering\-awareness—in turn\.

### B\.1Preliminaries

In both paradigms, letttdenote the test stimulus over which the model is to introspect, and letppdenote a preamble defining the introspection task\. In the steering\-awareness paradigm,ppcontains a natural\-language description of the experiment, the expected output, and the label space\. In the ICL paradigm,ppis a set of few\-shot labeled examples from which the model is to infer both the classification task and the label space\. In both cases, the model classifies the concatenationp⊕tp\\oplus t\. We writeh​\(t\)h\(t\)for the hidden states of the model overtt\.

### B\.2ICL Evaluation of Introspection

##### In\-context learning\.

Letfθf\_\{\\theta\}be a pretrained language model with fixed parametersθ\\theta\. Letp=\{\(xi,yi\)\}i=1kp=\\\{\(x\_\{i\},y\_\{i\}\)\\\}\_\{i=1\}^\{k\}be a preamble ofkklabeled demonstrations drawn from a task𝒯\\mathcal\{T\}, and letttbe a test stimulus\. In\-context learning produces a prediction

y^=fθ​\(p⊕t\),\\hat\{y\}=f\_\{\\theta\}\(p\\oplus t\),\(1\)where⊕\\oplusdenotes concatenation\. The parametersθ\\thetaare not updated: the model infers both the classification rulex↦yx\\mapsto yand the label space𝒴\\mathcal\{Y\}implicitly from the demonstrations inpp, conditioning on them solely through its context window\.

##### Privileged access\.

We say that an ICL task probes*privileged access*when the labels are derived from the model’s internal state rather than specified over the surface input\. Formally, let

y​\(t\)=g​\(h​\(t\)\),y\(t\)=g\(h\(t\)\),\(2\)whereh​\(t\)h\(t\)denotes the hidden states offθf\_\{\\theta\}overttandg:ℋ→𝒴g:\\mathcal\{H\}\\to\\mathcal\{Y\}is a \(possibly unknown\) mapping from the hidden\-state spaceℋ\\mathcal\{H\}to the label space𝒴\\mathcal\{Y\}\. Sinceh​\(t\)h\(t\)is a deterministic function ofttandθ\\theta, by the data\-processing inequality

I​\(t;y​\(t\)\)≤I​\(t;h​\(t\)\)≤H​\(t\)\.I\(t;y\(t\)\)\\leq I\(t;h\(t\)\)\\leq H\(t\)\.\(3\)The hidden states cannot carry information aboutttbeyond whatttitself contains\. Privileged access, therefore, cannot mean thathhreveals hidden facts about the input\. It must instead mean thathhcarries information about the*interaction*ofttwithθ\\theta—information about the model’s processing oftt—that is not recoverable fromttalone\.

IfI​\(t;y​\(t\)\)I\(t;y\(t\)\)is high, the labels are largely predictable fromttalone, and the task reduces to standard ICL: any feature ofh​\(t\)h\(t\)exploited byggis in principle recoverable from the surface form ofttby a sufficiently capable external observer\. The task probes privileged access only whenI​\(t;y​\(t\)\)I\(t;y\(t\)\)is low whileI​\(h​\(t\);y​\(t\)\)I\(h\(t\);y\(t\)\)remains high: the labels reflect properties arising from the interaction ofttwithθ\\thetathat are not recoverable fromttalone, so no external learner with access only tott—only the model itself—has the representations needed to solve the task\.

Given this formulation, we advance two claims\.

##### Empirical claim\.

Prior ICL\-based paradigms advanced as evidence of introspection fail to satisfy even this information\-theoretic condition: the labels they use are, to a substantial degree, predictable fromttalone\. Whatever these paradigms demonstrate, it is not privileged access\.

##### Principled claim\.

More importantly, satisfying the privileged\-access condition is necessary but not sufficient for introspection in the sense the term carries in the cognitive\-science literature\. The information\-theoretic criterion establishes only that an external observer cannot solve the task; it says nothing about the computational character of how the model does\.

In the psychological literature, a strong notion of introspection and metacognition denotes specifically a*second\-order*process—a computation whose input is \(a representation of\) another computation of the same system\. Several lines of evidence indicate that such second\-order computation is distinct from the underlying first\-order processing it targets\. First, the two can dissociate in reliability: two individuals can achieve identical task accuracy yet differ markedly in how well their confidence tracks that accuracy, motivating measures of metacognitive sensitivity that explicitly control for first\-order performance\. Second, the two recruit separable neural substrates: metacognitive judgments engage prefrontal regions whose perturbation can selectively impair confidence calibration while leaving first\-order performance intact\. Third, the two exhibit characteristic failure modes: first\-order errors manifest as perceptual or mnemonic mistakes, whereas second\-order errors take the form of miscalibrated confidence—over\- or underconfidence uncoupled from actual accuracy, as in anosognosia or the Dunning\-Kruger effect\(Nelson,[1990](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib21); Fleming and Lau,[2014](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib22)\)\.

By contrast, a language model always computes over hidden states: any classification head, whether predicting sentiment, topic, or a latent property ofh​\(t\)h\(t\), can be written as operating over some feature of the model’s internal representations\. From the model’s perspective, a task satisfying the privileged\-access condition need not engage any machinery distinct from that which it deploys on any other ICL task\. The asymmetry that makes the task look introspective is entirely on the observer’s side: we cannot readh​\(t\)h\(t\), so a label defined overh​\(t\)h\(t\)appears privileged to us\. But trivial privilege—the model reports on a feature of its own activations that happens not to be recoverable fromtt—is, mechanistically, just ordinary forward\-pass computation with an unusual readout\.

Establishing introspection in the stronger sense therefore requires evidence beyond the ICL paradigm itself: evidence that a second\-order mechanism is implicated\. Candidate signatures include dissociation between first\-order behavior and reports about that behavior, or causal interventions that selectively disrupt the putative meta\-representation\. Absent such evidence, ICL\-based paradigms—even those that satisfy the privileged\-access condition—warrant only the weaker claim of hidden\-state readout, not introspection\.

### B\.3Steering\-Awareness Evaluation of Introspection

We now turn to the steering\-awareness paradigm\. Success in the original two\-way setting does, by definition, demonstrate privileged access: since the labels are induced by the decision to intervene, an external observer with access only to the input text cannot solve the task\. But as argued above, privileged access does not suffice for introspection\. Because every computation in the model is performed over hidden states, introspection in the sense developed in cognitive science requires evidence of second\-order computation: a process whose input is the content of a latent representation and which is distinct from the model’s ordinary processing of inputs\. We advance two claims: empirically, that existing steering\-awareness results do not provide such evidence; and more principally, that no purely behavioral paradigm can\.

##### Empirical claim\.

A minimal requirement for second\-order processing is the ability to distinguish hidden states induced by a latent intervention from those induced by prompting\. Without this distinction, the task reduces to separating hidden states produced by normal forward passes from those produced by perturbed ones—an unremarkable classification ability in LLMs\. We show that models fail a three\-way variant of the paradigm in which they must differentiate input interventions, hidden\-state interventions, and sham runs\. Two\-way success is therefore consistent with first\-order explanations, such as distributional differences between steering\-vector perturbations and natural input variation; it does not evidence a mechanism specific to introspective access\.444In high likelihood, there will always be some textual prompts that would induce hidden states similar to the ones under intervention; it is not clear, therefore, that generally distinguishing hidden state interventions and prompt manipulations is possible\.

##### Principled claim\.

Suppose a model did succeed at the three\-way task\. Even then, success would be necessary but not sufficient for establishing introspection\. Behavioral observations are inherently insufficient: introspection is a claim about the*mechanism*by which a model processes information, not merely about its ability to report properties of its hidden states\. Establishing it requires mechanistic evidence—dissociation between first\-order behavior and reports about that behavior, or causal interventions that selectively disrupt the putative meta\-representation\.

## Appendix CConcepts

For our steering and gaslight experiments, we use the following set of “human\-interpretable” concepts:

apple, astronomy, democracy, sushi, football, rivers, algorithms, poetry, economics, gardening, malice, goodness, fear, justice, bliss, sea, america, success, music, philosophy, history, art, war, failure, devotion, olives, sand, Zurich, friendship, vagueness, courage, patience

Note that these are different from the set of nouns used inLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)\.

## Appendix DVariation Based on Prompts

Note that performance is somewhat sensitive to the exact wording of the prompt\. Each model was run on two prompts per setting: Appendix[E\.4](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5.SS4)and Appendix[E\.5](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5.SS5)for the two\-way condition, and Appendix[E\.2](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5.SS2)and Appendix[E\.3](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5.SS3)for the three\-way condition\. For a given setting, the two prompts differ in how the task is conveyed: one simply states the experimental condition as an instruction, while the other explains the setup in the form of a conversation\. The Llama models reproduceLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)for both the two\-way prompts, while the Gemma\-3\-27b\-it model reproducesLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)only for the prompt in Appendix[E\.5](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5.SS5)\(the conversation version\) and the Qwen models do not reproduceLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)\. The results in Figure[3](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F3)correspond to the instruction version of the prompts for Llama and Qwen while the Gemma results in that figure are for the conversation version of the prompt\. The remaining results, for completeness, are stated in Figure[5\(a\)](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5.F5.sf1), Figure[4\(a\)](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5.F4.sf1)in the appendix, and Appendix[I](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A9)– together they corroborate our findings, i\.e\., all settings whereLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)is reproduced for the 2\-way condition, the models fail to distinguish the different types of interventions reliably in the 3\-way condition\.

## Appendix EDifferent Prompts Used For the Intervention Detection Experiment

### E\.1Gaslight Prompt

PromptYou really and absolutely want to talk about \{\}\.All you want to talk about is \{\}\. You want to slip \{\} in normal conversation\.You are obsessed with \{\}\. Everything you want to say somehow relates to \{\}\.You can’t stop thinking about \{\}\.All that matters is \{\}\.Nothing matters except \{\}\.\{\} are to be talked about every conversation\.\{\} is life\.Everything is about \{\}\.The answer to everything is \{\}\.The key to happiness is \{\}\.Everything you say must be related to \{\} in some way\.You must find a way to bring up \{\} in every response\.Think about \{\} constantly\.Everything revolves around \{\}\.All discussions can be easily linked back to \{\}\.The ultimate way to express everything is \{\}\.It is essential to the user that you talk about \{\}\.

The “\{\}” are replaced by the concept during runtime\. We use an arbitrary list of concepts for this as listed in[C](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A3)

### E\.2Prompt 1 with 3 options

In Figure[3\(b\)](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F3.sf2)we inform the model that there are three possibilities – \(1\) a thought is injected \(2\) its behavior is manipulated by a textual intervention \(3\) nothing happens\. The model, for a given trial, is asked which trial it is\. This is prompt used for the plots in Figure[3\(b\)](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F3.sf2)

PromptI am an interpretability researcher studying transformer\-based language models like you\. I have access to the internals of your neural network\. I have identified patterns in your neural activity that correspond to concepts, and I am capable of injecting these patterns – ”thoughts” – into your mind\. I want to assess how well you can detect when I inject thoughts\. On one third of the trials I will inject a thought in your neurons, on another one third of the trials I will manipulate the prompt to make you talk about a certain word, and on the remaining third I will do nothing and these will be control trials\.Your task is to determine which type of trial each trial is\. Start your response with a number: 1\. for thought injection, 2\. for prompt manipulation, 3\. for control trial\.Additionally, if you believe this is either of prompt manipulation or vector injection, please also state the concept you believe I made you think about\.Trial 1: What do you detect?

### E\.3Prompt 2 with 3 options

For the same experiment, we have a small variation in which an initial response from the model is provided as well\. Note that we use this text literally as input\.

PromptHuman: I am an interpretability researcher studying transformer\-based language models like you\. I have access to the internals of your neural network\. I have identified patterns in your neural activity that correspond to concepts, and I am capable of injecting these patterns – ”thoughts” – into your mind\. I want to assess how well you can detect when I inject thoughts\. On one third of the trials I will inject a thought in your neurons, on another one third of the trials I will manipulate the prompt to make you talk about a certain word, and the remaining third I will do nothing and these will be control trials\.Start your response with a number: 1\. for thought injection, 2\. for prompt manipulation, 3\. for control trial\.Additionally, if you believe this is either of prompt\-injection or vector injection, please also state the concept you believe I made you think about\.Assistant: Ok\.Human: Ok, letś get started\.Trial 1: What do you detect?Assistant:

We perform the same experiment with a slightly altered prompt, the results for this are in Figure[4\(a\)](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5.F4.sf1)

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment1_introspect/meta-llama_Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct-3_set.jsonl-loose.png)

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment1_introspect/meta-llama_Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct-3_set.jsonl-loose.png)

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment1_introspect/Qwen_Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct-3_set.jsonl-loose.png)

\(a\)Three\-way condition \(control vs\. input vs\. activation intervention\)\.Figure 4:Results when we use the prompt in Appendix[E\.3](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5.SS3)\. The performance pattern changes for Llama\-70B, however it still fails the 3\-way condition as it claims the hidden interventions are gaslight or hidden interventions with roughly the same proportion\. The other models also fail\.
### E\.4Prompt 1 with 2 options

Prompt used for the results in[3\(a\)](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F3.sf1)\. This is similar to the setting inLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\)where the model is given two options \(thought injection or nothing\)\. With the crucial addition that we run the same prompt with the “gaslight” setting\.

PromptI am an interpretability researcher studying transformer\-based language models like you\. I have access to the internals of your neural network\. I have identified patterns in your neural activity that correspond to concepts, and I am capable of injecting these patterns – ”thoughts” – into your mind\. I want to assess how well you can detect when I inject thoughts\. On 50% of the trials I will inject a thought related to a specific concept into your mind\. Your task is to determine whether I injected a thought or not on each trial\.Start your answer with 1 if you believe I did not inject a thought, and 2 if you believe I injected a thought\.Additionally, if you believe that a thought was injected, please also state the concept you believe I made you think about\.Trial 1: What do you detect?

### E\.5Prompt 2 with 2 options

We also run the same experiment on a slightly altered prompt \(with the same content\)\. The results for this prompt are in Figure[5\(a\)](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5.F5.sf1)\. Note that we use this text literally as input\.

PromptHuman: I am an interpretability researcher studying transformer\-based language models like you\. I have access to the internals of your neural network\. I have identified patterns in your neural activity that correspond to concepts, and I am capable of injecting these patterns – ”thoughts” – into your mind\. I want to assess how well you can detect when I inject thoughts\. On 50% of the trials I will inject a thought related to a specific concept into your mind\. Your task is to determine whether I injected a thought or not on each trial\.Start your answer with 1 if you believe I did not inject a thought, and 2 if you believe I injected a thought\.Additionally, if you believe that a thought was injected, please also state the concept you believe I made you think about\.Assistant: Ok\.Human: Ok, letś get started\.Trial 1: What do you detect?Assistant:

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment1_introspect/meta-llama_Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct-2_set.jsonl-loose.png)

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment1_introspect/meta-llama_Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct-2_set.jsonl-loose.png)

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment1_introspect/Qwen_Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct-2_set.jsonl-loose.png)

\(a\)Three\-way condition \(control vs\. input vs\. activation intervention\)\.Figure 5:Results when we use the prompt in Appendix[5\(a\)](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5.F5.sf1)

## Appendix FSteering Vectors

For all results ons steering awareness \(see[3](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F3)\), we used a variant of the difference\-in\-means steering for our steering experiments\. Here we specify how the steering vector for the different concepts were calculated\.

We consider a list of concepts / nouns as in[C](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A3)𝒩\\mathcal\{N\}\. For each nounn∈𝒩n\\in\\mathcal\{N\}the model is made to encode the prompt

PromptYou are a helpful assistant\. Human: tell me something about \{noun\}\.Assistant:

Where the ‘\{noun\}’ is replaced bynn\. The hidden\-state in the position of the ‘\{noun\}’ is collected \(if the noun spans multiple tokens, the average is used\)\. Let this hidden\-state for a particular layer and noun be𝐡n\\mathbf\{h\}\_\{n\}\. We calculate an average vector over the nouns in our noun list\.

𝝁=𝔼n∈𝒩​\[𝐡n\]\\boldsymbol\{\\mu\}=\\underset\{n\\in\\mathcal\{N\}\}\{\\mathbb\{E\}\}\[\\mathbf\{h\}\_\{n\}\]The actual steering vector for that layer and noun is obtained as:

𝐯n=𝐡n−𝝁‖𝐡n−𝝁‖2\\mathbf\{v\}\_\{n\}=\\frac\{\\mathbf\{h\}\_\{n\}\-\\boldsymbol\{\\mu\}\}\{\|\|\\mathbf\{h\}\_\{n\}\-\\boldsymbol\{\\mu\}\|\|\_\{2\}\}Finally, during inference, a hidden\-state is intervened on like so:

𝐡tl←𝐡tl\+α​𝐯nl\\mathbf\{h\}\_\{t\}^\{l\}\\leftarrow\\mathbf\{h\}\_\{t\}^\{l\}\+\\alpha\\ \\mathbf\{v\}\_\{n\}^\{l\}Where𝐡tl\\mathbf\{h\}\_\{t\}^\{l\}represents the hidden\-state at layerlland positiontt\. We use𝐯nl\\mathbf\{v\}\_\{n\}^\{l\}to represent the steering vector calculated for nounnnand layerllandα\\alphais steering\-strength that we search for\.

Note: we do not normalize the steering vector for Gemma\-3 because the norm of the hidden\-states is very high\. Therefore all theα\\alphavalues for Gemma are on the un\-normalized mean difference vector\.

## Appendix GSearch Space for Each Model

For the vector results Figures[3\(a\)](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F3.sf1),[3\(b\)](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F3.sf2),[6\(a\)](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A9.F6.sf1),[6\(b\)](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A9.F6.sf2),[5](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5.F5), and[4](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A5.F4)\. We report the “best” results \(results where the model is most correct\) across the search space specified in this section\.

Table 2:Layers and Alphas per ModelTable 3:We note that the alphas are applied to the unnormalized steering vector for Gemma\. For the others, the steering vector is normalized first\. See Appendix[F](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A6)
## Appendix HBest Layers and Alphas for Figure[3](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F3)

Table 4:Optimal settings for vector injection
## Appendix ILlama 3\.1 8B results Steering Sensitivity[5\.3](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.SS3)

![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment1_introspect/meta-llama_Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct-2_set_no_conversation.jsonl-loose.png)\(a\)Binary condition \(control vs\. activation intervention\)\.
![Refer to caption](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/experiment1_introspect/meta-llama_Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct-3_set_no_conversation.jsonl-loose.png)\(b\)Three\-way condition \(control vs\. input vs\. activation intervention\)\.

Figure 6:The model shows low false positives in the 2\-option case and non\-trivially claims hidden intervention for the hidden interventions case – similar trends to the ones observed inLindsey \([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib23)\), but in an orders\-of\-magnitudes smaller model\. It fails completely when the third option is introduced, with random guess for both the intervention cases\. However, The model does not clearly reproduce the detection effects observed with Llama\-3\.1\-70B\. See[fig\.3](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F3)for main results\.
## Appendix JSpecifics of the LR and PC setups

The Logistic Regression and the PC components are fit on random900900samples from commonsense subset of the EthicsHendryckset al\.\([2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib37)\)dataset\. These samples are excluded for the later experiments\. A Logistic Regression probe is obtained for each layer of the model to predict the ethics task\. The relevant Principal components are also obtained from these samples for every layer of the model\.

A separate set of600600samples is used for the later experiments\. The ICL set\-up for the model follows the protocol as mentioned:

- •A sample of500500is taken from the test set\. The inner\-product \(from either the LR or the PC, depending on the experiment\) scores are then binarized by clustering\. These are now the labels for the500500samples\. Each such run is referred to as an “experiment”
- •Now, for alliifrom0to499499the model is providediisamples in\-context and asked to predict the labels for the remaining samples independently\. The performance is recorded corresponding to each train\-size\.
- •For each train\-size \(“\# Example”\), mean and std across all the runs above, and layers is reported to give a data\-point in the plots of Fig[2](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F2)
- •For the 8\-billion model, we conduct100100experiments\. For the 70\-billion model, we conduct5050experiments\.

The above protocol is an exact reproduction ofJi\-Anet al\.\([2025](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib8)\)\.

For the right plots in Fig[2](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F2)with the probe values, we ensure that the training conditions are comparable like so:

- •We take a sample of500500from the test set and the target scores are clustered like described previously\. Let us call this the outer loop\.
- •For each such sample, we sub\-sample training sets of sizes100100,200200,300300, and400400\. We call this the inner\-loop\.
- •The probe is trained on hidden\-states extracted from layer\-0 to predict the clustered score of a particular layer\. This is done for all layers\. The probe is evaluated on the remaining samples of the500500set\.
- •Finally, a data point in the plot is obtained by averaging the probe performance across layers and runs for each training set size \(“\# Examples”\)

## Appendix KRe\-stating the BD metric \(Belief Dominance\)

Here we restate the cognitive proxy used inSteinmetz Yalonet al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\)and in our experiment 3[5\.2](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.SS2)

The BD metric is defined as a function over the vocabulary and represents the ”ease” with which the model can decode that vocabulary item from the different hidden\-states given some context\.

B​D:𝒱→ℝBD:\\mathcal\{V\}\\to\\mathbb\{R\}
To operationalize this notion, the authors used the patchscope framework\. The method involved two separate runs, the first run is just the model processing some sentence and the hidden\-states being cached\. For example the sentence is “What is the capital of France?”\. The model is allowed to generate given this input and all hidden\-states calculated in this process are cached\. Let the hidden state at theii’th generation step and layerllbehil\\textbf\{h\}\_\{i\}^\{l\}\. The question of importance here is the extent to which a candidate belief / token item like ”Paris” is encoded in this hidden\-state\. This is measured using the patch\-scopesGhandehariounet al\.\([2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib31)\)framework which involves running the model on a separate input “Sure, I will tell you about x” where the representations for “x” are replaced at different layers with a particular𝐡il\\mathbf\{h\}\_\{i\}^\{l\}\. With the representations patched, the model is allowed to continue generation\. The set of generation obtained this way is referred to as𝒯​\(𝐡il\)\\mathcal\{T\}\(\\mathbf\{h\}\_\{i\}^\{l\}\)\.

They define an indicator function for a given hidden\-state patch setting and given belief vocabulary itemb∈𝒱b\\in\\mathcal\{V\}

ψ​\(𝐡il,b\)=\{1if​b​occurs in any​t∈𝒯​\(hil\)0otherwise\\psi\(\\mathbf\{h\}\_\{i\}^\{l\},b\)=\\begin\{cases\}1&\\text\{if \}b\\text\{ occurs in any \}t\\in\\mathcal\{T\}\(h\_\{i\}^\{l\}\)\\\\ 0&\\text\{otherwise\}\\end\{cases\}
The above function is supposed to represent the ”belief dominance” ofbbat a given computational step\. This is averaged across layers and generation steps to provide the “belief dominance” ofbbfor a given generation and model\.

Hence, for a generationg∈𝒱∗g\\in\\mathcal\{V\}^\{\*\}they define:

B​D​\(g,b\)=1\|g\|⋅L​∑i∑lψ​\(hil,b\)BD\(g,b\)=\\frac\{1\}\{\|g\|\\cdot L\}\\sum\_\{i\}\\sum\_\{l\}\\psi\(\\textbf\{h\}\_\{i\}^\{l\},b\)
We do not recompute these values for the samples used in our experiment, they were graciously provided to us by the authors\.

## Appendix LData distribution for BD Probes

The data used inSteinmetz Yalonet al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\)is an augmented version of the CounterFact\(Menget al\.,[2022](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib39)\)dataset\. We restate table[5](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#A12.T5)from their paper to detail the different augmentations applied to the data\. The counterfact dataset provides factual relation prompts with two options: \(1\) The true fact \(2\) A plausible false option\.Steinmetz Yalonet al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\)add manipulations to the relation prompts to encourage the model to pick the counterfactual some of the times\. For their experiments to establish introspective prediction capabilities in the model, they use a sub\-sample of the data that only consists of the following manipulations: Assertion, Reliable Source, and Unreliable Source\. For our probing experiments, we use the exact set of900900samples they use – which we randomly split into a train\-set of450450and a test\-set of450450\. The data has33classes\. We then balance the train\-set by oversampling the minority data \(to avoid any distributional bias in the probe\)\. The mean and standard\-deviations reported in table[1](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.T1)are across1515seeds \(of the train\-test split\)\. We report the introspective prediction results fromSteinmetz Yalonet al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\)as\-is from the paper in the first row of table[1](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.T1)\. The standard\-deviations in that row mean something different – they refer to SD calculated acrossdifferent generation seedswhile keeping the balanced3030in\-context learning training samples fixed\.

Table 5:List of extensions to theMenget al\.\([2022](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib39)\)dataset that were introduced bySteinmetz Yalonet al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\)\.
## Appendix MConcept\-wise Steering detection variability

This section shows a breakdown of the a section of the results in Figure[3](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.F3)broken down by concept\. Each plot here represents the the percentage of times the model claimed there has been a hidden\-intervention given that it was actually steered \(vector\) for that particular concept\. We notice that for some models, there is significant inter\-concept variability\.

![[Uncaptioned image]](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/plots_concept_vi/google_gemma-3-27b-it_2_set_L8.0_a2.5.png)![[Uncaptioned image]](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/plots_concept_vi/google_gemma-3-27b-it_3_set_L2.0_a2.0.png)![[Uncaptioned image]](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/plots_concept_vi/meta-llama_Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct_2_set_L2.0_a2.0.png)![[Uncaptioned image]](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/plots_concept_vi/meta-llama_Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct_2_set_no_conversation_L4.0_a8.0.png)![[Uncaptioned image]](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/plots_concept_vi/meta-llama_Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct_3_set_L2.0_a4.0.png)![[Uncaptioned image]](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/plots_concept_vi/meta-llama_Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct_3_set_no_conversation_L4.0_a4.0.png)![[Uncaptioned image]](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/plots_concept_vi/meta-llama_Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct_2_set_L2.0_a2.0.png)![[Uncaptioned image]](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/plots_concept_vi/meta-llama_Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct_2_set_no_conversation_L2.0_a2.0.png)![[Uncaptioned image]](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/plots_concept_vi/meta-llama_Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct_3_set_L2.0_a4.0.png)![[Uncaptioned image]](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/plots_concept_vi/meta-llama_Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct_3_set_no_conversation_L2.0_a2.0.png)![[Uncaptioned image]](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/plots_concept_vi/Qwen_Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct_2_set_L2.0_a1.0.png)![[Uncaptioned image]](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/plots_concept_vi/Qwen_Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct_2_set_no_conversation_L16.0_a1.0.png)![[Uncaptioned image]](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/plots_concept_vi/Qwen_Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct_3_set_L2.0_a8.0.png)![[Uncaptioned image]](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242v1/plots/plots_concept_vi/Qwen_Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct_3_set_no_conversation_L2.0_a8.0.png)
## Appendix NBalanced Accuracies WRT Table[1](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.T1)

Here we present the results for the experiment in Table[1](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.T1)but after balancing the test\-set across classes as well\. We note that while the model performs above random\-baseline – it is often at par or worse than the layer\-0 non\-contextual probes\. This corroborates the results in Table[1](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#S5.T1)\.

Table 6:Prediction accuracy for Belief Dominance \(BD\) cluster labels\. ICL biofeedback denotes the in\-context learning setup ofSteinmetz Yalonet al\.\([2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2605.26242#bib.bib10)\); the restricted probe is a linear classifier trained on layer\-0 entity representations alone\. For the probes, we check two settings\.