How are you all handling prompt injection for agents that read external content?

Reddit r/AI_Agents News
prompt-injection security agents production defenses

Summary

A discussion about handling prompt injection attacks in AI agents that read external content like emails and webpages, exploring production-level defenses and the subtle threats beyond obvious patterns.

I'm currently working on a project in this area and I'm curious about the approaches that others are using in production. Specifically, I'm interested in agents that read emails, webpages, documents, or tool results. I've noticed that the real attack surface isn't the user prompt itself, but rather the content that the agent ingests. For instance, an email can instruct your agent to perform an action, and a webpage can change its behavior. Most defenses I've encountered focus on detecting obvious patterns, but they often overlook more subtle threats. What does your current setup look like? Are you implementing any measures at the proxy level, relying on model guardrails, or simply accepting the risks?
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