How are you actually catching unsafe stuff before an agent runs it, not after?
Summary
The author discusses the lack of robust safety enforcement in AI coding agents like Claude Code and Cursor, relying on prompt instructions and manual review, and seeks input on actual pre-execution policy enforcement methods.
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@akshay_pachaar: https://x.com/akshay_pachaar/status/2067646389291725258
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