Chat Control 1.0 and 2.0 Explained

# Chat Control 1.0 vs 2.0 Source: [https://fightchatcontrol.eu/chat-control-overview](https://fightchatcontrol.eu/chat-control-overview) The temporary, voluntary scanning regime — adopted in 2021, rejected by Parliament in March 2026, expired in April 2026, and now the subject of an unprecedented revival attempt\. Jul 14, 2021 ### Temporary derogation adopted Regulation \(EU\) 2021/1232 creates a temporary exception to the ePrivacy Directive, giving providers a legal basis to*voluntarily*scan private messages for child sexual abuse material\. Originally set to expire 3 August 2024\. Apr 29, 2024 ### First extension With the permanent regulation \(Chat Control 2\.0\) nowhere near agreement, the derogation is extended until 3 April 2026\. Dec 18, 2025 ### Commission proposes second extension The Commission proposes extending the derogation by another two years, to April 2028\. Mar 2, 2026 ### LIBE committee rejects the extension In a surprise vote, the Parliament's civil liberties committee rejects the draft extension by 38 votes to 28\. Mar 11, 2026 ### Parliament adopts a protective position The plenary votes 458–103 for a compromise: extend to 2027, but only with targeted and proportionate detection of known content, no end\-to\-end encrypted communications, and limiting scanning to suspected users or groups identified by the competent judicial authority\. Mid\-Mar 2026 ### Trilogue on the extension collapses The Council rejects Parliament's conditions and shows no flexibility in negotiations; talks on the extension break down\. Mar 26, 2026 ### Parliament rejects the extension outright 311 MEPs vote against extending the derogation \(228 in favour, 92 abstentions\)\. The critical Amendment 34, rejecting automated assessment of unknown photos and texts, passes by a single vote \(307–306\)\. Apr 4, 2026 ### Chat Control 1\.0 expires The legal ground for voluntary, indiscriminate scanning ends\. Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Snap state they will continue scanning private messages regardless\. Jun 26, 2026 ### Council moves to resurrect the expired law EU ambassadors agree to push a temporary revival — unprecedented, as Parliament's rejection was considered final\. Because an expired regulation cannot be extended, the Council proposes a formally*new*law with identical content via an expedited procedure\. Jul 2, 2026 ### Council adopts its position The Council adopts its position on the "new" regulation via written procedure\. Jul 7, 2026 \(expected\) ### Urgency vote in Parliament The draft is on Parliament’s agenda for deciding on whether to apply the urgency procedure, just before summer recess\. If the urgency is approved, the proposal will skip the standard route to the responsible Committee for drafting a recommendation, and will be voted directly on Thursday\. Treated as a second reading, an**absolute majority of all MEPs**would be needed to stop or amend it — a very high hurdle\. This is happening**now**\. The permanent CSA Regulation — proposed in 2022, deadlocked for years, and still unagreed after five rounds of trilogue negotiations\. Encryption remains the red line\. May 11, 2022 ### Commission proposes the CSA Regulation Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson unveils a proposal for a permanent regulation making detection and reporting of child sexual abuse material a legal requirement for platforms — including a requirement to bypass end\-to\-end encryption\. Nov 2023 ### Parliament adopts a protective mandate No scanning of end\-to\-end encrypted services, detection limited to visual material, judicial warrants targeted at specific suspects, and no mandatory age verification\. Oct 2025 ### Germany breaks the Council deadlock After years of Council deadlock, Germany announces it will vote against mandatory suspicionless scanning\. The Danish presidency drops detection orders and shifts to risk assessment and mitigation obligations for providers, while proposing to make the voluntary suspicionless scanning \(interim regulation\) permanent\. Nov 26, 2025 ### Council endorses its position The Council adopts the softened Danish compromise, opening trilogue negotiations\. Critics note the text still allows “voluntary” suspicionless detection and imposes broad risk\-mitigation duties, including mandatory age verification, that could reshape private messaging in practice\. Dec 2025 – May 2026 ### Four trilogue rounds Negotiations between Parliament, Council, and Commission take place on 9 December 2025, 26 February, 16 April, and 11 May 2026 — without agreement on the core issues\. Jun 10, 2026 ### Council's own lawyers raise the alarm The Council Legal Service states that the "voluntary" scanning proposal still constitutes generalised scanning of communications — incompatible with Article 7 of the EU Charter absent reasonable suspicion and prior judicial authorisation\. Jun 29, 2026 ### "Final" trilogue fails The fifth trilogue, billed as the last with adoption targeted for July, produces no deal\. Negotiators cannot agree on making suspicionless scanning permanent, as requested by Council\. Progress is reported on excluding mandatory age verification, but agreement is postponed and talks continue under the incoming Irish presidency\. Jul 14, 2021 Chat Control 1\.0 ### Temporary derogation adopted Regulation \(EU\) 2021/1232 creates a temporary exception to the ePrivacy Directive, giving providers a legal basis to*voluntarily*scan private messages for child sexual abuse material\. Originally set to expire 3 August 2024\. May 11, 2022 Chat Control 2\.0 ### Commission proposes the CSA Regulation Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson unveils a proposal for a permanent regulation making detection and reporting of child sexual abuse material a legal requirement for platforms — including a requirement to bypass end\-to\-end encryption\. Nov 2023 Chat Control 2\.0 ### Parliament adopts a protective mandate No scanning of end\-to\-end encrypted services, detection limited to visual material, judicial warrants targeted at specific suspects, and no mandatory age verification\. Apr 29, 2024 Chat Control 1\.0 ### First extension With the permanent regulation \(Chat Control 2\.0\) nowhere near agreement, the derogation is extended until 3 April 2026\. Oct 2025 Chat Control 2\.0 ### Germany breaks the Council deadlock After years of Council deadlock, Germany announces it will vote against mandatory suspicionless scanning\. The Danish presidency drops detection orders and shifts to risk assessment and mitigation obligations for providers, while proposing to make the voluntary suspicionless scanning \(interim regulation\) permanent\. Nov 26, 2025 Chat Control 2\.0 ### Council endorses its position The Council adopts the softened Danish compromise, opening trilogue negotiations\. Critics note the text still allows “voluntary” suspicionless detection and imposes broad risk\-mitigation duties, including mandatory age verification, that could reshape private messaging in practice\. Dec 18, 2025 Chat Control 1\.0 ### Commission proposes second extension The Commission proposes extending the derogation by another two years, to April 2028\. Dec 2025 – May 2026 Chat Control 2\.0 ### Four trilogue rounds Negotiations between Parliament, Council, and Commission take place on 9 December 2025, 26 February, 16 April, and 11 May 2026 — without agreement on the core issues\. Mar 2, 2026 Chat Control 1\.0 ### LIBE committee rejects the extension In a surprise vote, the Parliament’s civil liberties committee rejects the draft extension by 38 votes to 28\. Mar 11, 2026 Chat Control 1\.0 ### Parliament adopts a protective position The plenary votes 458–103 for a compromise: extend to 2027, but only with targeted and proportionate detection of known content, no end\-to\-end encrypted communications, and limiting scanning to suspected users or groups identified by the competent judicial authority\. Mid\-Mar 2026 Chat Control 1\.0 ### Trilogue on the extension collapses The Council rejects Parliament’s conditions and shows no flexibility in negotiations; talks on the extension break down\. Mar 26, 2026 Chat Control 1\.0 ### Parliament rejects the extension outright 311 MEPs vote against extending the derogation \(228 in favour, 92 abstentions\)\. The critical Amendment 34, rejecting automated assessment of unknown photos and texts, passes by a single vote \(307–306\)\. Apr 4, 2026 Chat Control 1\.0 ### Chat Control 1\.0 expires The legal ground for voluntary, indiscriminate scanning ends\. Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Snap state they will continue scanning private messages regardless\. Jun 10, 2026 Chat Control 2\.0 ### Council’s own lawyers raise the alarm The Council Legal Service states that the “voluntary” scanning proposal still constitutes generalised scanning of communications — incompatible with Article 7 of the EU Charter absent reasonable suspicion and prior judicial authorisation\. Jun 26, 2026 Chat Control 1\.0 ### Council moves to resurrect the expired law EU ambassadors agree to push a temporary revival — unprecedented, as Parliament’s rejection was considered final\. Because an expired regulation cannot be extended, the Council proposes a formally*new*law with identical content via an expedited procedure\. Jun 29, 2026 Chat Control 2\.0 ### “Final” trilogue fails The fifth trilogue, billed as the last with adoption targeted for July, produces no deal\. Negotiators cannot agree on making suspicionless scanning permanent, as requested by Council\. Progress is reported on excluding mandatory age verification, but agreement is postponed and talks continue under the incoming Irish presidency\. Jul 2, 2026 Chat Control 1\.0 ### Council adopts its position The Council adopts its position on the “new” regulation via written procedure\. Jul 7, 2026 \(expected\) Chat Control 1\.0 ### Urgency vote in Parliament The draft is on Parliament’s agenda for deciding on whether to apply the urgency procedure, just before summer recess\. If the urgency is approved, the proposal will skip the standard route to the responsible Committee for drafting a recommendation, and will be voted directly on Thursday\. Treated as a second reading, an**absolute majority of all MEPs**would be needed to stop or amend it — a very high hurdle\. This is happening**now**\.