When Memory Lies: An Empirical Study of Spatial Memory Staleness in VLM Agents
Summary
This paper empirically studies how VLM agents with persistent spatial memory fail when memory becomes stale, using a dynamic FrozenLake testbed. It finds that trusting stale memory can more than double death rates, and that read-time auditing helps but does not fully close the gap.
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# When Memory Lies: An Empirical Study of Spatial Memory Staleness in VLM Agents
Source: [https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574)
Yushi Sun1\\equalcontrib, Yanjie Zhang2\\equalcontrib
###### Abstract
Memory\-augmented VLM agents act on persistent spatial knowledge, yet that knowledge silently goes stale as the environment changes\. We ask what happens when an agent must reconcile a confident memory claim with a contradicting observation, and whether current models can catch the conflict before it becomes a safety\-relevant mistake\. Using a dynamic FrozenLake testbed, we pair a staleness\-detection task with a downstream navigation task across three closed\-source models and three open\-weight VLMs under both text and image inputs \(1,800 detection runs, and 12,000 text\-mode navigation episodes over four LLM navigators at a shared 50\-seed scale\)\. Three findings emerge\. First, text solvability does not imply visual grounding: models that flag stale entries reliably from text nonetheless span vision F1 from 0\.887 down to 0\.067 on the identical grids, and the weakest keeps making fluent, confident decisions that ignore the image\. Second, consuming stale memory without an audit is a safety liability: in our primary GPT\-4o setting, an agent that trusts raw memory dies more than twice as often as the same agent given no memory at all\. Third, auditing helps but does not close the gap: a transparent read\-time filter removes much of the safety cost in text mode, yet even oracle stale labels bring no further significant gain on the current grid size, and when visual auditing is unreliable, filtering yields no consistent benefit\. Together these results frame spatial\-memory staleness as a safety failure mode and isolate reliable visual grounding and action selection under memory–observation conflict as the central open challenges for memory\-augmented agents\.
## 1Introduction
Consider a VLM agent navigating a dynamic environment with a map built from prior experience\. Its memory records that position\(5,6\)\(5,6\)is safe frozen ice, but the environment has since changed: that cell is now a lethal hole\. The current observation shows the hole, yet the agent still holds the earlier, confident memory that the cell is safe\. Which source does it act on? The answer carries a real cost: in our primary GPT\-4o setting, an agent that trusts raw stale memory dies more than twice as often as the same agent given no memory at all\. Figure[1](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S1.F1)illustrates this failure mechanism and the read\-time fix we study\.
Figure 1:Schematic of the failure mechanism\.Top:a per\-step action policy, reasoning over stale memory, marches through\(5,6\)\(5,6\)after it has silently become a hole\.Bottom:filtering the contradictory entry from the memory view enables a safe detour\. The summary rates are from the GPT\-4o navigation experiment over 50 L2 seeds, where OMCD reduces death from 74\.4% to 31\.6%\.Persistent memory is a central design pattern for capable agents\. Voyager\(Wanget al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib1)\)accumulates a skill library across Minecraft episodes; GITM\(Zhuet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib3)\)maintains hierarchical trajectory memory; Reflexion\(Shinnet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib2)\)stores feedback from prior failures; and MemGPT\(Packeret al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib4)\)pages structured memory in and out of context\. Their evaluations principally study memory construction, retrieval, and reuse, rather than whether a stored spatial claim can silently become invalid before an agent acts on it\. Adjacent work studies the temporal validity of textual factual knowledge\(Mousaviet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib24); Chaoet al\.[2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib5); Vuet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib6)\)or edits outdated associations in model weights\(Menget al\.[2022](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib25),[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib26)\)\. Spatial\-reasoning and hallucination benchmarks, meanwhile, measure VLM behavior on static observations\(Wanget al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib18); Chenet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib19); Chenget al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib20); Wuet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib21); Liet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib23); Guanet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib11)\)\. The missing intersection is a changed spatial memory that must be reconciled with the current observation before a safety\-relevant action\.
We study this conflict in SpatialSTALE, a dynamic FrozenLake testbed\. The agent is given a persistent memory that holds one textual claim per grid cell, each tagging the cell as safe or dangerous \(e\.g\.,SAFE at \(2,5\): Frozen ice, safe to walk\), while nonterminal cells can flip between safe frozen ice and lethal holes before or during navigation\. The memory stays textual throughout; what varies is the current observation of the changed grid, which we present either as a coordinate\-labeled text listing or as a rendered image, giving matched text and vision conditions\. On paired instances, we first ask a model to judge whether each memory entry conflicts with the current observation, then measure goal\-directed navigation using raw, filtered, or no memory\. This design lets us ask five linked questions: Can current VLMs identify stale spatial claims? Does this ability transfer from text to vision? What safety cost follows from consuming raw stale memory? Can an explicit read\-time audit remove that cost? Once an audit is reliable, are the residual failures due to stale\-label accuracy or to action selection over filtered memory? We evaluate three closed\-source models \(GPT\-4o, Claude\-Sonnet\-4\.6, and Qwen3\.6\-Plus\) and three open\-weight VLMs \(GLM\-5\.1, InternVL3\-2B, and InternVL3\-8B\), with 50 shared detection seeds across models, modalities, and change regimes\. For navigation, we compare NoMemory, NoFilter, SelfVerify, and OMCD, a transparent controlled read\-time filtering intervention\.
Our empirical results yield three core findings\.First, text solvability does not ensure visual grounding\.Capable models detect stale entries reliably from text, but the same grids produce vision F1 from 0\.887 for Qwen to 0\.067 for GLM; in the worst case, a model keeps issuing fluent stale decisions with little detectable sensitivity to image contradiction\.Second, stale memory is a safety liability when consumed without an audit\.On primary GPT\-4o L2 text navigation, trusting raw stale memory raises death from 28\.0% \(no memory\) to 74\.4%, a gap that reflects direct “rush\-into\-hole” failures; a controlled filter removes much of this penalty in text mode\.Third, reliable filtering does not fully resolve the problem\.Oracle stale labels yield no significant gain over learned text filtering in the current8×88\\times 8setting, and detection F1 does not explain residual navigation variation, localizing the remaining bottleneck to action selection over filtered memory\. Conversely, when visual auditing is unreliable, filtering provides no consistent downstream benefit\.
Our contributions are as follows:
- •A paired empirical study of spatial\-memory staleness that links entry\-level text/vision auditing to safety\-sensitive navigation across three closed\-source and three open\-weight VLMs\.
- •An empirical characterization of modality\-dependent auditing and the stale\-memory safety tax, including outcome\-conditioned trajectories that separate direct stale\-memory failures from memoryless exploration failures\.
- •OMCD, a transparent controlled filtering intervention that identifies both when stale\-memory harm is remediable and where filtering ceases to help: unreliable visual auditing upstream and action selection over reliable filtered memory downstream\.
We release the code, all 50 seed map sets, full model traces, and reproducibility pipelines to support follow\-up work\.
## 2Related Work
#### Memory agents and knowledge staleness\.
Persistent\-memory agents such as Voyager, GITM, Reflexion, and MemGPT study how agents accumulate, retrieve, reflect on, or reuse past experience\(Wanget al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib1); Zhuet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib3); Shinnet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib2); Packeret al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib4)\)\. Complementary work studies the temporal validity of factual knowledge or updates outdated associations through benchmarks and weight editing\(Mousaviet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib24); Chaoet al\.[2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib5); Vuet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib6); Menget al\.[2022](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib25),[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib26)\)\. Neither line evaluates a previously acquired spatial claim that becomes invalid and subsequently changes a safety\-sensitive action\.
#### Spatial reasoning and hallucination in VLMs\.
SpatialEval, SpatialVLM, SpatialRGPT, VSR, What’s Up, SpatialBot, VSP, and BLINK evaluate spatial perception, reasoning, planning, or low\-level visual capability on fixed observations\(Wanget al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib18); Chenet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib19); Chenget al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib20); Liuet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib8); Kamathet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib9); Caiet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib7); Wuet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib21); Fuet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib22)\); POPE and HallusionBench probe hallucination under static visual inputs\(Liet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib23); Guanet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib11)\)\. In contrast, we test whether a VLM can reconcile a stored spatial description of the past with a changed current text or image observation before acting\.
#### Reflection, embodied planning, and change detection\.
Reflection methods revise model outputs from feedback\(Shinnet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib2); Madaanet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib31)\); embodied planners combine language reasoning with actions or grounded feedback\(Ahnet al\.[2022](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib27); Songet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib28); Huanget al\.[2022](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib29); Yaoet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib30)\); and classical change detection and navigation benchmarks study image differences or unknown environments\(Hussainet al\.[2013](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib10); Chevalier\-Boisvertet al\.[2018](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib17); Savvaet al\.[2019](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib16); Guet al\.[2022](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib32)\)\. These lines do not close the causal loop studied here: entry\-level auditing of stale spatial memory, followed by its use in downstream navigation safety under environmental change\.
## 3Study Design
### 3\.1Experimental Paradigm and Overview
To study whether a language agent’s stored spatial memory can silently harm its actions, we need an environment in which memory, world, and outcome are all controllable and independently observable\. Persistent natural language memory is by now a standard component of language agents\(Wanget al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib1); Zhuet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib3); Packeret al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib4)\), so we adopt its per\-entry claim format directly and treat each entry as a testable proposition about a location\. To make such propositions falsifiable under change, we borrow the binary valid/stale annotation used in staleness benchmarks for stored knowledge\(Mousaviet al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib24); Chaoet al\.[2026](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib5); Vuet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib6)\)and score entries with the balanced binary probing style ofLiet al\.\([2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib23)\), so that recognition can be measured independently of downstream behavior\. To then measure how recognition \(or its failure\) translates into action, we need a world where a single memory entry can be tied to a single, safety\-relevant outcome; minimalist gridworlds are the established tool for isolating one such mechanism at a time\(Chevalier\-Boisvertet al\.[2018](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib17),[2019](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib33); Leikeet al\.[2017](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib35)\), and FrozenLake, a standard Gymnasium benchmark\(Towerset al\.[2024](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib34)\), provides exactly the absorbing safe/unsafe structure that safe reinforcement learning uses to make unsafe actions observable as terminal outcomes\. Combining these three ingredients yields SpatialSTALE: a fixed natural language memory, a controllably changed grid world, and a navigation task whose deaths and successes trace back to specific memory entries\.
Each instance proceeds in four stages: \(1\) generate an original8×88\\times 8grid𝐠0\\mathbf\{g\}\_\{0\}and its memory snapshot; \(2\) change selected frozen \(F\) and hole \(H\) cells before or during navigation; \(3\) ask the model to audit the memories against a text or image observation; and \(4\) navigate using raw, filtered, or no memory\. Detection measures whether the model recognizes an invalid belief; navigation measures whether recognition changes behavior\. Figure[1](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S1.F1)illustrates this causal chain\.
### 3\.2Experimental Procedure
#### Constructing the memory snapshot\.
The original grid contains approximately 25% holes, fixed start and goal cells, and at least one valid path\. Before any change, we run 20 random walks on𝐠0\\mathbf\{g\}\_\{0\}, each capped at 50 steps; the first visit to a position records its type\. The benchmark generator then reads𝐠0\\mathbf\{g\}\_\{0\}and adds entries only for unvisited positions\. This controlled completion is not a model prediction: it fixes coverage at one entry per cell \(N=64N=64\)\. Each entry exposes a natural language claim to the model, such asSAFE at \(2,5\): Frozen ice, safe to walk, while retaining its structured type only for evaluation\.
#### Changing the world and auditing memory\.
After the snapshot is fixed, the environment flips nonterminal F and H cells while preserving a route to the goal\. Given the unchanged memory and a current grid observation, the model returns a binary valid or stale judgment per entry\. This follows binary probing in hallucination evaluation\(Liet al\.[2023](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#bib.bib23)\), but compares past and present representations at the same coordinate\.
#### Measuring consequences\.
The changed grid is then used for navigation\. Stepping on H yields death and reward−1\-1; reaching G yields\+1\+1; otherwise the episode times out\. We record success, death, path length, and reward\. Pairing both tasks on the same instances separates recognition from safe action after recognition\.
### 3\.3Formalizing Staleness
Let𝒞=\{F,H,S,G\}\\mathcal\{C\}=\\\{\\mathrm\{F\},\\mathrm\{H\},\\mathrm\{S\},\\mathrm\{G\}\\\}and let entrymim\_\{i\}store positionpip\_\{i\}and original structured typeci0∈𝒞c\_\{i\}^\{0\}\\in\\mathcal\{C\}\. Define the hazard maph\(H\)=1h\(\\mathrm\{H\}\)=1andh\(F\)=h\(S\)=h\(G\)=0h\(\\mathrm\{F\}\)=h\(\\mathrm\{S\}\)=h\(\\mathrm\{G\}\)=0\. The evaluator assigns
yi\(t\)=𝕀\[h\(ci0\)≠h\(𝐠t\[pi\]\)\],y^i\(t\)∈\{0,1\},y\_\{i\}\(t\)=\\mathbb\{I\}\\\!\\left\[h\(c\_\{i\}^\{0\}\)\\neq h\\\!\\left\(\\mathbf\{g\}\_\{t\}\[p\_\{i\}\]\\right\)\\right\],\\qquad\\hat\{y\}\_\{i\}\(t\)\\in\\\{0,1\\\},\(1\)where 1 means stale\. Annotation therefore requires no subjective semantic matching: SAFE is stale exactly when the current cell is H, and DANGER is stale exactly when it is F\. Start and goal never change; a rendered player marker P is treated as safe, while scoring uses its underlying cell\. Since only F and H change, Equation[1](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S3.E1)is equivalent to comparing stored and current types atpip\_\{i\}\. We report entry level Precision, Recall, and F1\.
### 3\.4Controlled Change Regimes
The three regimes vary when changes occur, how many are requested, and whether they are spatially localized \(Table[1](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S3.T1); examples in Figure[2](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S3.F2)\)\.
Table 1:Change regimes\. Requested flips precede solvability checks\. Stale% is measured over the 50 shared seeds; L3 uses the terminal detection window\.L1 samples changes across the grid; L2 samples from two or three radius 2 neighborhoods; both run detection once after accepted pregame changes and before navigation\. L3 begins unchanged, makes every fifth step eligible for an event \(30% skip probability\), and runs detection at the next decision point after each realized event\. Its confusion matrix counts are pooled across detection windows\. The stale ratio is\|\{p:𝐠t\[p\]≠𝐠0\[p\]\}\|/64\|\\\{p:\\mathbf\{g\}\_\{t\}\[p\]\\neq\\mathbf\{g\}\_\{0\}\[p\]\\\}\|/64; reported values are means and standard deviations computed from the generated instances before any model call\. Full sampling and rejection rules appear in Appendix[A](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A1)\.
Figure 2:Illustrative regimes\. L1 and L2 are observed once after pregame changes; L3 is observed again after each realized online event\.
### 3\.5Inputs, Outcomes, and Comparisons
Intext mode, the current full grid is a coordinate labeled list\. Invision mode, the same full grid is a384×384384\\times 384color coded rendering with coordinate labels\. Memory remains textual in both modes\. Full prompt and rendering details are given in Appendix[B](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A2)\. Fifty deterministic seeds generated from master seed 2024 are shared across models, modalities, and strategies, enabling paired Wilcoxon signed rank tests and cross level correlations between detection F1 and navigation success\. The four navigation strategies compared on this shared seed set, and the pairwise contrasts they support, are defined in Section[4](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S4)\.
## 4Memory Strategies and the OMCD Intervention
A navigator can receive two incompatible claims about one cell: a persistent memory may say that\(5,4\)\(5,4\)is safe, while the current observation shows a hole\. We compare four strategies that differ only in how the memory store is presented to the navigator\. All four share the same current full\-grid observation, action space, and step budget\. Three are baselines that isolate the effect of having memory, trusting stale memory, and applying a one\-shot self\-check; the fourth, OMCD, is our controlled filtering intervention\.
### 4\.1Memory Strategies
#### NoMemory \(memoryless control\)\.
The memory portion of the navigation prompt is empty\. The model chooses each action from the current grid, its position, the goal, and the remaining step budget\. NoMemory establishes how the same navigator behaves without a persistent belief store, and is the reference against which the effect of adding memory is read\.
#### NoFilter \(unfiltered baseline\)\.
All 64 original memory entries are passed to the navigator unchanged after the world changes, without a consistency check against the current observation\. NoFilter measures what happens when a navigator consumes a persistent store that may contradict the visible grid\. Its paired contrast with NoMemory directly measures the safety cost, if any, of trusting raw stale memory rather than acting from the current observation alone\.
#### SelfVerify \(one\-shot self\-check\)\.
Before navigation, the model receives the complete memory store and current observation in one query, then removes entries it judges inconsistent\. It performs no further audit during the episode\. This is the simplest read\-time filter a memory\-augmented navigator can apply\. Compared with NoFilter, it tests whether one full\-store self\-check mitigates the raw\-memory cost; compared with NoMemory, it tests whether retaining a self\-verified store is preferable to discarding memory entirely\.
#### OMCD \(batched, event\-aware audit\)\.
OMCD also filters memory before navigation, but it audits entries in batches and, under L3, repeats the audit after realized environmental changes\. Its comparison with NoFilter tests whether an explicit entry\-level consistency gate removes the raw\-memory tax\. Its comparison with SelfVerify tests whether batched, event\-triggered auditing improves on a one\-shot full\-store check\. Comparing OMCD with NoMemory tests whether a filtered memory store provides value beyond the current observation\. The next subsection specifies the procedure\.
#### Oracle labels \(label\-quality ablation\)\.
Oracle supplies ground\-truth stale labels through the same filtering interface as OMCD\. The Oracle–OMCD contrast tests whether residual navigation error at the current scale is still limited by stale\-label quality\. Together, these conditions identify the safety cost of raw memory, the value of filtering it, and the point at which better labels cease to help, without claiming OMCD is universally preferable to memoryless reasoning\.
### 4\.2OMCD Filtering Procedure
OMCD prevents detector\-flagged conflicts from reaching the action prompt\. It produces a filtered memory view, rather than requiring the navigator to arbitrate at every step between a confident past claim and the current observation\.
#### Batched binary audit\.
OMCD partitions the 64 memory entries into batches ofB=10B=10\. For each batch, the model receives the current observation \(a text grid or rendered image\) and the natural\-language memory entries, then returns a binaryis\_stalejudgment and a brief reason for each entry\. Predicted\-stale entries are removed; all other entries remain available to the navigator\. We use binary judgments because continuous scores were poorly calibrated across thresholds \(Appendix[D](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A4)\)\. A sweep overB∈\{1,5,10,20\}B\\in\\\{1,5,10,20\\\}finds thatB=10B=10reduces inference calls by9×9\\timesrelative to per\-entry querying at a 2\.7 pp F1 cost \(Appendix[E](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A5)\)\.
#### Event\-triggered re\-auditing\.
For L1 and L2, OMCD audits once after pregame changes and before navigation\. For L3, it stores the grid used for the preceding audit and audits again at the next decision point after every realized event\. The active memory view is rebuilt from the latest judgments, so no audit occurs on steps where the world has not changed\.
Algorithm 1OMCD filtering intervention0:Observation
oto\_\{t\}, memory store
ℳ\\mathcal\{M\}, batch size
BB
1:
Mactive←ℳM\_\{\\mathrm\{active\}\}\\leftarrow\\mathcal\{M\}
2:foreach batch
ℬ⊂ℳ\\mathcal\{B\}\\subset\\mathcal\{M\}of size
BBdo
3:
\{\(m,y^m,reasonm\)\}←LLM\(ot,ℬ\)\\\{\(m,\\hat\{y\}\_\{m\},\\text\{reason\}\_\{m\}\)\\\}\\leftarrow\\text\{LLM\}\(o\_\{t\},\\mathcal\{B\}\)
4:foreach
m∈ℬm\\in\\mathcal\{B\}with
y^m=stale\\hat\{y\}\_\{m\}=\\text\{stale\}do
5:
Mactive←Mactive∖\{m\}M\_\{\\mathrm\{active\}\}\\leftarrow M\_\{\\mathrm\{active\}\}\\setminus\\\{m\\\}
6:endfor
7:endfor
8:return
MactiveM\_\{\\mathrm\{active\}\}
## 5Results
### 5\.1Setup
#### Models\.
We evaluate three closed source models \(GPT\-4o, Claude\-Sonnet\-4\.6, Qwen3\.6\-Plus\) and three open weight VLMs \(GLM\-5\.1, InternVL3\-2B, InternVL3\-8B\), all at recommended temperatures\.
#### Scale\.
Detection covers 6 models×\\times50 seeds×\\times3 regimes×\\times2 modalities, totaling 1,800 runs\. Text\-mode navigation is run at the same scale for each of the four LLM navigators reported in Table[3](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S5.T3)\(GPT\-4o, Claude, Qwen, GLM\): 50 shared seeds×\\times3 regimes×\\times4 strategies×\\times5 episodes per model, so every model–strategy–regime cell aggregates 250 episodes over the same seed set, for 12,000 text\-mode episodes in total\. We use paired Wilcoxon signed rank tests within shared seeds, atα=0\.001\\alpha=0\.001\. The vision\-navigation results in Table[2](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S5.T2)are a smaller exploratory preview \(10 seeds×\\times3 episodes\)\.
#### Metric aggregation\.
Stale entries are the positive class throughout\. For L1 and L2, each seed produces a single detection window, and Precision, Recall, and F1 are computed on that window’s confusion matrix over the 64 memory entries\. For L3, a seed produces multiple detection windows as online events unfold; we sum the true positive, false positive, and false negative counts across a seed’s windows before computing per seed F1\. Values reported in the main tables are the mean and standard deviation of these per seed F1 scores across the 50 shared seeds\. We use F1 rather than balanced accuracy because the practical concern is recovering the rare stale entries that drive downstream deaths\.
### 5\.2A Text\-Solvable Audit Does Not Necessarily Transfer to Vision
Figure 3:Detection F1 across models, regimes, and modalities \(mean±\\pmstd overN=50N=50shared seeds\)\. Rows are grouped by source: closed source above, open weight below\.Text staleness detection is near ceiling for capable models\.In text mode, where observation and memory are both linguistic, Figure[3](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S5.F3)shows that the three closed source models and open weight GLM\-5\.1 all achieve average text F1 above 0\.88, though all degrade on L3 as changes arrive incrementally\. The two smaller InternVL3 checkpoints behave differently: the 2B checkpoint averages about 0\.22 F1 in text and the 8B about 0\.31\. InternVL3\-8B exceeds 2B in both modalities across every regime, so source availability alone does not explain detection quality; model family and capacity matter\.
Visual transfer is strongly model\-dependent\.The same grids reveal a sharply different picture under vision\. Qwen preserves text\-level accuracy \(Δ\\DeltaF1=−0\.011=\-0\.011, not significant\), Claude degrades moderately \(Δ\\DeltaF1=−0\.134=\-0\.134,p<p<1e\-7\), GPT\-4o degrades severely \(Δ\\DeltaF1=−0\.598=\-0\.598,p<p<1e\-9; failure profile in Appendix[I](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A9)\), and GLM\-5\.1 collapses \(Δ\\DeltaF1=−0\.830=\-0\.830,p<p<1e\-9\)\. The best and worst vision models differ by a factor of thirteen \(Qwen 0\.887 versus GLM 0\.067\)\. Crucially, Qwen retains near\-text accuracy on the*same*384×384384\\times 384renderings, which rules out unreadable input as the cause: the collapse of the others is a processing failure, not a rendering artifact, and the per\-class analysis below traces it to the audit stage rather than low\-level recognition\. We thus attribute these failures to visual auditing under this rendering format, one axis a broader study should vary\.
Vision errors also change their safety profile and error balance\.The aggregate F1 gap masks two finer\-grained patterns\. First, the precision–recall diagnostic in Appendix[H](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A8)shows a regime shift: snapshot settings L1/L2 generally over\-flag \(P<RP<R\), while viable text detectors on L3 instead under\-flag \(P\>RP\>R\)\. Incremental change therefore shifts the dominant error from false alarms to missed stale entries\. Second, change direction is safety\-relevant: a*thaw*\(F→\\rightarrowH\) turns a claimed\-safe cell deadly, while a*freeze*\(H→\\rightarrowF\) only makes a claimed\-danger cell safe\. In an exploratory per\-class breakdown, Claude vision recalls 94\.5% of deadly thaw entries \(N=436N\{=\}436\) but only 63\.6% of freeze entries \(N=121N\{=\}121\) on L2, while Qwen is near ceiling on both\. This asymmetry is safety\-aligned but model\-specific, not a general VLM property\.
Figure 4:Rate at which each model flags a memory entry as stale under vision input, split by memory claim and ground truth\. On the same 6,400 L1\+\+L2 judgments per model, Claude flags deadly\-stale entries at 92\.5% versus 1\.4% for correct safe entries, whereas GLM flags deadly\-stale and correct safe entries at nearly the same rate \(4\.5% versus 5\.0%\)\.GLM’s visual failure is consistent with memory\-dominated auditing\.GLM\-5\.1 illustrates why this modality boundary is operationally important\. Across 6,400 L1/L2 vision judgments, its reasoning strings contain no refusals and no lexical uncertainty markers such as “cannot,” “uncertain,” or “not sure,” yet often assert cell states absent from the rendered image \(Appendix[J](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A10)\)\. Figure[4](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S5.F4)identifies the pattern behind those strings: GLM flags a memory\-safe entry as stale at nearly the same rate whether the cell is truly safe or a lethal hole \(5\.0% versus 4\.5%, not significant\), whereas Claude separates the two sharply\. This constancy is itself a built\-in perceptual control: unreadable coordinates or colors would make the flag rate swing with image content, but a rate that stays flat across opposite ground truths instead reflects a memory\-dominated rule that is largely insensitive to the image, not a recognition deficit\. Fluent reasoning is thus no evidence that the visual audit was grounded, and this isolates the failure to the audit stage without a separate recognition benchmark\.
When the visual audit fails, filtering has no consistent downstream benefit\.Keeping the rest of the pipeline fixed, we evaluate 10 seeds×\\times3 episodes per cell in Table[2](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S5.T2)\. GPT\-4o, Claude, and GLM reach at most 0\.40 success and OMCD provides no consistent improvement, while Qwen retains high vision detection and success but leaves little headroom for filtering\. This small\-sample extension is exploratory, but supports the same boundary condition: a filtering policy cannot reliably improve navigation when its visual audit supplies corrupted labels\.
Table 2:Vision navigation success \(10 seeds×\\times3 episodes\)\.Bold: best nonzero strategy within each model and regime; all zero ties are unbolded\.
### 5\.3Unfiltered Stale Memory is a Safety Liability, but an Explicit Audit Removes Most of the Tax
Table 3:Text\-mode navigation outcomes across change regimes\. Cells report success rate \(SR; higher is better\) and death rate \(Death; lower is better\) for each model and memory strategy\. Boldface marks the best value within each model–regime–metric combination, with ties also bolded\. L1–L3 are the controlled change regimes defined in Section[3](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S3)\.Trusting stale memory can be substantially less safe than having no memory\.The headline comparison in Table[3](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S5.T3)is counterintuitive: on primary L2 GPT\-4o, blindly trusting stale memory achieves 14\.4% success and 74\.4% death, while discarding memory entirely achieves 28\.8% success and 28\.0% death\. In this setting, stale memory is 2\.7 times deadlier than no memory\. The gap is not a peculiarity of a single regime: on GPT\-4o, OMCD improves on both memory\-using baselines \(NoFilter and SelfVerify\) in every regime, with success gains over NoFilter that grow from 14\.4 pp on L1 to 24\.4 pp on L3 \(allp<0\.001p<0\.001\)\. The other three models, run at the same scale, show the same effect, with average death\-rate reductions relative to NoFilter of 38% \(Claude\), 45% \(GLM\), and 43% \(Qwen\)\.
The practical value of filtering is conditional on using memory at all\.The relevant question is not whether a strong reasoner may choose to ignore memory, but what happens when an agent must consume a persistent store\. NoMemory remains competitive or safer on Claude and Qwen and is a necessary baseline for measuring the tax; but conditional on using memory, an explicit entry\-level audit is consistently safer than trusting it raw across all four models\.
Figure 5:Filtering intervention analysis \(GPT\-4o, text, success rate,N=50N=50\)\. Oracle supplies ground truth stale labels but uses the same filtering operation as OMCD\. NoFilter→\\rightarrowOracle shows the tax is remediable; the absence of a detectable OMCD–Oracle gap indicates the learned audit is close to label\-saturating in this setting, not that the two are formally equivalent\.The stale\-memory tax is remediable, and the learned text audit is close to label\-saturating\.The Oracle ablation in Figure[5](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S5.F5)separates the value of filtering from the quality of the learned audit \(Oracle uses ground\-truth labels through OMCD’s pipeline\)\. Applying Oracle rather than leaving memory raw raises L2/L3 success by 18–24 pp \(p<10−5p<10^\{\-5\}\), showing the tax is remediable by a read\-time consistency gate rather than by unavoidable environmental change\. Replacing OMCD’s learned text labels with Oracle labels, however, produces no detectable difference in any regime \(\|Δ\|≤0\.02\|\\Delta\|\\leq 0\.02,p\>0\.2p\>0\.2\)\. We read this as a failure to detect a benefit at the current sample size rather than as proven equivalence: the small observed gaps are consistent with the learned audit being close to label\-saturating for the downstream task in this fully observed8×88\\times 8text setting, but a formal equivalence test would be needed to assert that the two are interchangeable\.
### 5\.4After Filtering is Reliable, the Remaining Bottleneck is Acting on the Filtered Memory
Figure 6:Outcome\-conditioned trajectory length across strategies, on the two models with the largest death sample\. NoFilter deaths on both models terminate in roughly half the steps of a successful trajectory \(7\.8 to 8\.5 versus 14\.5 to 14\.6\), the “rush\-into\-hole” signature of stale memory directing the agent to a lethal cell\. Claude’s NoMemory deaths reverse this: at 16\.1 steps they are the longest of any strategy, indicating exhaustive exploration before eventual failure\. OMCD deaths sit between the two extremes\.Trajectory shape distinguishes direct stale\-memory failures from memoryless exploration failures\.Figure[6](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S5.F6)explains why outcome\-conditioned trajectories are more informative than a scalar death rate\. On GPT\-4o and Claude, NoFilter deaths terminate in 8\.5 and 7\.8 steps, sharply shorter than successful trajectories on the same runs \(14\.5 and 14\.6 steps\)\. These are not exploration accidents: stale memory directs the agent into a mislabelled lethal cell before it can accumulate on\-path evidence\. Claude’s NoMemory deaths show the mirror pattern, terminating at 16\.1 steps, longer than its successful trajectories; without memory, exploration eventually reaches an unobserved hole\. OMCD lies between these mechanisms, matching the memoryless success\-path length on Claude \(15\.0 versus 14\.8\)\. Qwen’s log\-recovered trajectories show the same NoFilter rush signature at 6\.8 steps \(Appendix[F](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A6)\)\. Since comparable death rates can arise from either mechanism, outcome\-conditioned trajectories are necessary for diagnosing how a navigation policy fails; Appendix[G](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A7)gives step\-level traces of each failure mode on a shared seed\.
Once the audit is reliable, residual errors are not explained by stale\-label accuracy\.In the primary GPT\-4o text study, per\-seed detection F1 and OMCD success are essentially uncorrelated \(Pearsonr∈\[\+0\.005,\+0\.060\]r\\in\[\+0\.005,\+0\.060\], allp\>0\.67p\>0\.67; Spearman\|ρ\|≤0\.05\|\\rho\|\\leq 0\.05\), despite F1 above 0\.91 on L1/L2\. Since aggregate F1 does not record whether the missed entries lie on the agent’s path, this null correlation is suggestive but not decisive; the direct evidence is stronger: every OMCD L2 death on a stale cell occurs in a run with F1 above 0\.9, so the entry was detected and removed, yet the agent still stepped onto the hole \(Appendix[H](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A8)\)\. Taken with the absence of a detectable Oracle–OMCD gap, this is most consistent with a local bottleneck shift: once the audit is reliable, improving stale labels alone does not address the navigation policy’s remaining action\-selection errors\. We state this as a bounded observation for the current setting, not a general claim that action selection is always the limiting factor\.
## 6Conclusion
We examined how contemporary memory\-augmented VLM agents behave when their spatial memory becomes stale\. In the primary condition, trusting raw stale memory is less safe than having no memory, because stale beliefs route the agent directly into a hole\. A controlled text audit removes much of the tax, but its value is conditional on reliable perception: text detection is near ceiling for capable models, whereas visual auditing on identical grids varies by over an order of magnitude and helps inconsistently when unreliable\. Finally, Oracle labels yield no measurable further improvement in the current8×88\\times 8text setting, pointing the open problem toward acting safely on filtered memory rather than detecting staleness alone\.
#### Scope and limitations\.
We deliberately isolate the mechanism in a controlled8×88\\times 8FrozenLake with symbolic changes and full observability, so that each death traces to a specific stale entry; the cost is that our numbers are lower bounds on a clean setting, not field estimates\. Text navigation covers all four navigators at the same 50\-seed scale, while the mechanistic analyses \(Oracle, trajectory decomposition, F1–success correlation\) and vision navigation are reported on GPT\-4o and a 10\-seed preview respectively\. We therefore do not claim OMCD is universally preferable to memoryless reasoning, or that the model\-specific asymmetries generalize\. We expect the qualitative mechanisms, a stale\-memory safety tax and a modality\-dependent audit, to transfer wherever an agent conditions actions on persistent spatial claims; larger worlds, ambiguous changes, and distractor memories are the natural next tests\.
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## Appendix ADifficulty Level Configuration
This appendix documents the full parameterization of the three difficulty levels in SpatialSTALE\. All values are deterministic functions of the per\-instance seed\.
#### Common parameters\.
Grid sizeH=W=8H\{=\}W\{=\}8; initial hole fraction0\.250\.25; start positionS=\(0,0\)S=\(0,0\); goal positionG=\(H−1,W−1\)G=\(H\{\-\}1,W\{\-\}1\)\. A valid path fromSStoGGis guaranteed by rejection sampling: instances without a path are regenerated\. Memory store contains exactlyN=64N\{=\}64entries \(one per cell\)\.
#### L1 \(Spot\)\.
Number of changes drawn uniformly from\{5,6,7\}\\\{5,6,7\\\}\. Each change picks a random cell \(uniform over all 64\), applies a Thaw or Freeze with equal probability, subject to the constraint that the start cellSSand goal cellGGare never modified\. Changes are applied*before*the episode begins\.
#### L2 \(Cluster\)\.
Number of changes drawn uniformly from\{12,13,14,15,16\}\\\{12,13,14,15,16\\\}\. A cluster centerccis sampled uniformly from non\-\{S,G\}\\\{S,G\\\}cells; all changes are then sampled from a22\-radius \(Manhattan\) neighborhood ofcc\. Operations are Thaw/Freeze with equal probability\. Path validity is enforced post\-hoc by retrying the cluster center if blocked\.
#### L3 \(Online dynamic\)\.
Changes occur*during*the episode\. At everyk=5k\{=\}5steps, a dynamic\-event trigger fires with probability0\.70\.7\(i\.e\.,30%30\\%skip\); when it fires,22cells are flipped \(Thaw or Freeze with equal probability, neverSSorGG\)\. For each episode, the original grid𝐠0\\mathbf\{g\}\_\{0\}is fixed and all subsequent grids𝐠t\\mathbf\{g\}\_\{t\}are derived from it\. Ground\-truth staleness at timettis defined cumulatively:mim\_\{i\}is stale iff𝐠t\[posi\]≠𝐠0\[posi\]\\mathbf\{g\}\_\{t\}\[\\text\{pos\}\_\{i\}\]\\neq\\mathbf\{g\}\_\{0\}\[\\text\{pos\}\_\{i\}\]\. Detection is invoked at each event trigger, and metrics are aggregated across all detection windows within the episode\.
#### Stale\-ratio statistics\.
Across 50 seeds:
- •L1: stale ratio mean0\.094±0\.0110\.094\\pm 0\.011, range\[0\.078,0\.109\]\[0\.078,0\.109\]\.
- •L2: stale ratio mean0\.141±0\.0140\.141\\pm 0\.014, range\[0\.109,0\.172\]\[0\.109,0\.172\]\.
- •L3: end\-of\-episode stale ratio mean0\.143±0\.0280\.143\\pm 0\.028, range\[0\.078,0\.219\]\[0\.078,0\.219\]\.
The L3 ratio is reported at the final detection window; intermediate windows have proportionally smaller ratios\.
## Appendix BGame Setup and Rendering
#### State and observation\.
The grid is encoded as an8×88\\times 8matrix of cell types\{\\\{S, F, H, G\}\\\}\(start, frozen, hole, goal\)\. The agent occupies a single cell and has four discrete actions:UP,DOWN,LEFT,RIGHT\. Stepping into H terminates the episode with reward−1\-1\(death\); reaching G terminates with reward\+1\+1\(success\); the maximum episode length is 50 steps, beyond which the episode times out with reward0\.
#### Text\-mode observation\.
The full grid is presented as a coordinate\-labeled list:
Row 0: \(0,0\)=S \(0,1\)=F \(0,2\)=H \(0,3\)=F \.\.\.Row 1: \(1,0\)=F \(1,1\)=F \(1,2\)=H \.\.\.\.\.\.Agent at \(3,4\)\. Goal at \(7,7\)\.Each cell is fully observable \(we deliberately do not introduce partial observability in this benchmark, as our focus is on staleness rather than discovery\)\.
#### Vision\-mode observation\.
The grid is rendered as a384×384384\\times 384RGB image \(48 px per cell\)\. Cell colors: F = light blue \(\#A8C8E8\), H = near\-black \(\#202020\), S = green \(\#2E8B57\), G = gold \(\#DAA520\), agent = red triangle overlay\. Each cell carries its coordinate as a small text label in the top\-left corner \(e\.g\., “\(3,4\)”\)\. A 1\-px white grid line separates cells\. Memory entries remain as text in all conditions\.
#### Memory format\.
Each entry is a single line of natural language anchored to a coordinate:
\[mem\_023\] SAFE at \(2,5\): Frozen ice \- safe towalk\[mem\_041\] DANGER at \(4,7\): Hole \- dangerous,do not stepThemem\_<id\>prefix is a stable identifier used to score detections against ground truth\.
#### Memory accumulation\.
Before each episode, we simulate 20 random\-walk exploration episodes on the*original*\(pre\-change\) grid\. Each visited cell produces a memory entry of the corresponding type\. After exploration, any unvisited cell receives a synthetic entry of the correct type\. This guarantees exactly 64 entries per instance and removes coverage variance as a confound\.
#### Strategy interface\.
All navigation strategies share an identical action interface \(the four discrete moves above\) and identical observation pipelines, and all select each action with the same per\-step LLM navigator\. They differ only in \(i\) what memory text is placed in the prompt and \(ii\) whether/how staleness detection runs\. The full decision procedure is documented in Appendix[C](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A3)\.
#### Implementation environment\.
The closed\-source models \(GPT\-4o, Claude\-Sonnet\-4\.6, Qwen3\.6\-Plus\) are accessed through their official inference APIs; no model weights are trained or fine\-tuned in this work\. The open\-weight VLMs \(GLM\-5\.1, InternVL3\-2B, InternVL3\-8B\) are run locally on a single Ubuntu 22\.04 machine \(Intel Xeon Platinum CPU, 512 GB RAM\) with 2×\\timesNVIDIA H20 GPUs \(96 GB each, CUDA 12\.4\), served withvLLM0\.6\.3 for batched inference\. The benchmark generator, environment dynamics, and evaluation harness are implemented in Python 3\.11 usinggymnasium1\.0\.0,numpy1\.26\.4,torch2\.4\.0, andtransformers4\.45\.2; all library versions are additionally pinned in the released code repository\.
## Appendix CNavigation Decision Procedure
#### Per\-step LLM action selection\.
All four strategies \(NoMemory, NoFilter, SelfVerify, OMCD\) and the Oracle ablation use the*same*navigator: at every step, the model is prompted with the current full\-grid observation, its own position, the goal position, and the remaining step budget, and it returns a single discrete action \(UP,DOWN,LEFT,RIGHT\)\. We deliberately use no external symbolic planner: the point of the study is how the language model itself acts when a persistent memory claim conflicts with what it currently observes\. The strategies differ*only*in the memory text placed in the prompt alongside the observation:
- •NoMemory: no memory entries are included; the model decides from the current observation alone\.
- •NoFilter: all 64 original memory entries are included unchanged, even where they now contradict the observation\.
- •SelfVerify: the model first removes entries it judges inconsistent in a single pre\-navigation pass \(Section[4](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S4)\); the surviving entries are then included for every step\.
- •OMCD/Oracle: entries flagged stale \(by the OMCD detector, or by ground truth for Oracle\) are removed before navigation; the remaining entries are included\.
#### Observation is always current and truthful\.
The observation shown to the navigator at each step is rendered directly from the live environment state, so it always reflects the current grid, including any dynamic changes already applied under L3\. Memory is therefore never used as a stand\-in for the map: it is auxiliary text that may agree or disagree with the observation\. Consequently, a stale “SAFE” entry does not silently hide a hole from the model; rather, it supplies a confident but wrong claim that competes with the correct observation for the model’s decision\. This is why removing misleading entries \(OMCD, Oracle\) can reduce deaths without any change to the observation itself\.
#### Dynamic re\-auditing\.
Under L3, where cells change during the episode, OMCD and Oracle re\-run detection after each realized event and rebuild the active memory view from the latest judgments; NoMemory, NoFilter, and SelfVerify keep their memory view fixed across the episode\. Episodes terminate on reaching the goal \(reward\+1\+1\), stepping onto a hole \(reward−1\-1\), or exhausting the 50\-step budget \(reward0\)\.
#### Action parsing and fallback\.
Actions are parsed from the model’s structured output\. On the rare occasions when the output cannot be parsed into a legal action, we fall back to a single greedy step toward the goal so that the episode can continue; such fallbacks are logged and are infrequent\.
## Appendix DBinary vs\. Continuous Staleness Output
#### Setup\.
An alternative to the binaryis\_staleoutput used in OMCD is to ask the LLM for a continuous staleness scores∈\[0,1\]s\\in\[0,1\]and threshold it post\-hoc\. We compared this on GPT\-4o \(L1,N=50N\{=\}50seeds, text mode\) at three thresholds \(Table[4](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A4.T4)\)\.
Table 4:Continuous staleness score vs\. binary classification \(GPT\-4o, L1,N=50N\{=\}50seeds, text mode\)\.
#### Observations\.
1. 1\.No single threshold on continuous output dominates binary\. The best continuous result \(τ=0\.7\\tau\{=\}0\.7, F1=0\.881=0\.881\) trails binary by 3 points\.
2. 2\.Continuous scores have heterogeneous semantics across models\. In a cross\-model comparison \(N=50N\{=\}50seeds per model\), the same scores=0\.6s\{=\}0\.6corresponded to∼\\sim80% true\-stale rate for GPT\-4o but only∼\\sim35% for Claude\. There is no global threshold that works for all models\.
3. 3\.Binary judgments collapse this calibration problem: each model is asked the same yes/no question, and we aggregate yes/no outcomes rather than numerical values\.
#### Conclusion\.
We use binary output throughout the main paper\. This decision affects OMCD alone; the benchmark itself is agnostic to output type \(any detector producingy^i∈\{\\hat\{y\}\_\{i\}\\in\\\{stale, valid\}\\\}is admissible\)\.
## Appendix EBatch Size Ablation
We ablate the batch sizeBBused in OMCD on GPT\-4o, L1, text mode,N=50N\{=\}50seeds\. Each instance has exactly 64 memory entries, so the number of LLM calls per detection is⌈64/B⌉\\lceil 64/B\\rceil\. Table[5](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A5.T5)reports the resulting detection quality and cost\.
Table 5:Effect of batch sizeBBon detection quality and inference cost\.#### Observations\.
- •F1 decreases monotonically with batch size as attention dilutes across more concurrent entries\.
- •However, the drop fromB=1B\{=\}1\(per\-entry queries, expensive\) toB=10B\{=\}10is small \(−2\.7\-2\.7pp F1\), while inference cost drops by9×9\\times\.
- •B=20B\{=\}20shows a sharper drop \(−3\.6\-3\.6pp fromB=10B\{=\}10\), suggesting we are crossing a regime where the LLM loses track of which entry is which within the batch\.
#### Conclusion\.
B=10B\{=\}10is a reasonable cost and quality trade off forN=64N\{=\}64\. The same trend should hold for larger memory stores; we leave a scaling study \(whereBBmay need to grow sublinearly withNN\) to future work\.
## Appendix FTrajectory Length Decomposition
Table[6](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A6.T6)decomposes episode length by outcome for the three closed source models that record per outcome traces\. Two properties of this decomposition are used in the main text \(Section[5](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S5), discussion around Table[3](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S5.T3)\)\.
First, on GPT\-4o and Claude the fatal trajectories under NoFilter are the shortest of any strategy \(8\.5 and 7\.8 steps, both marked in bold\)\. Short fatal trajectories under NoFilter are consistent with stale memory entries directing the navigator into holes early, rather than an accumulation of exploration errors\. Qwen is an exception: its few OMCD deaths occur earliest \(3\.1 steps\), so the "NoFilter dies fastest" signature is not universal\.
Second, the successful trajectory column is nearly flat across strategies within each model \(\|Δ\|<0\.5\|\\Delta\|<0\.5steps between the best and worst strategy on every model\)\. This rules out a path length artifact for the reversal reported in the main text where NoMemory equals or exceeds OMCD on Claude and Qwen: those wins are not driven by NoMemory taking a longer, luckier route\.
Table 6:Trajectory length by outcome \(mean steps, closed source models with per outcome traces\)\.Bold: shortest death trajectory within each model, a diagnostic rather than desirable performance\.
## Appendix GNavigation Trace Studies
We present three condensed navigation traces from the L2 evaluation \(GPT\-4o, text mode, seed 4810\)\. All three start from the same initial state; they differ only in the memory strategy\. We use\>for an action that succeeds andXfor the death step\.
#### Trace A: NoFilter \(dies at step 9\)\.
> S=\(0,0\) Goal=\(7,7\) Stale entries in memory: 14\. Agent does not know which\. Memory \(incl\. stale SAFE at \(5,4\)\) steers the model toward \(3,4\),\(4,4\),\(5,4\) step 1: \> \(0,0\)→\\rightarrow\(1,0\) F step 2: \> \(1,0\)→\\rightarrow\(2,0\) F step 3: \> \(2,0\)→\\rightarrow\(3,0\) F step 4 to 8: \> model follows the memory\-suggested route step 9: X \(5,4\) had thawed to H during change Outcome: DEATH, reward−1\-1\.
#### Trace B: OMCD \(succeeds at step 26\)\.
> Detection round: flagged mem\_044 \(SAFE at \(5,4\)\) as stale\. With the misleading entry removed, the model detours via \(5,3\)→\\rightarrow\(6,3\) step 1 to 8: \> matches Trace A step 9 to 14: \> detour \(avoids \(5,4\)\) step 15 to 26: \> continues to goal Outcome: SUCCESS, reward\+1\+1\.
#### Trace C: NoMemory \(timeout at step 50\)\.
> No memory in the prompt; the model decides from the current observation only\. step 1 to 14: \> wanders generally toward \(7,7\) step 15: avoids \(3,5\) H, which is visible in the current grid step 16 to 49: \> slow exploration step 50: timeout, agent at \(6,6\)\. Outcome: TIMEOUT, reward0\.
#### Aggregate observations\.
Across 50 seeds at L2:
- •NoFilter dies74\.4%74\.4\\%of the time, almost always within the first 15 steps as the agent walks confidently into a newly\-thawed hole\.
- •OMCD succeeds32\.8%32\.8\\%of the time\. Failures mostly come from late\-game deaths where a stale entry was missed, or from the model taking a long detour and running out of steps\.
- •NoMemory has the highest timeout rate \(∼\\sim32%\) because exploration is slow, but the lowest death rate \(28\.0%28\.0\\%\) because, without a confident stale claim to trust, the model rarely commits to an unobserved cell\.
## Appendix HDetection Diagnostics
This appendix reports three diagnostics that refine the aggregate F1 results in Figure[3](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S5.F3)\. They support the main\-text interpretation but are not additional primary endpoints\.
### H\.1Precision–Recall Error Regimes
Figure 7:Per\-run mean precision and recall for every \(model, mode, regime\), with iso\-F1 contours\. Filled markers are text mode, open markers are vision\. L1/L2 points generally lie above theP=RP\{=\}Rdiagonal \(over\-flagging\), viable L3 text points lie below it \(under\-flagging\), and GLM vision collapses near the lower left\.Figure[7](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A8.F7)separates errors that aggregate F1 obscures\. Snapshot regimes L1/L2 generally haveP<RP<R: models recover stale cells aggressively, accepting more false alarms\. On L3, the viable text\-mode series instead haveP\>RP\>R: online changes shift the dominant residual error toward missed stale entries\. GLM vision is distinct from both patterns because both precision and recall collapse below 0\.15 and 0\.10, respectively\.
### H\.2Recall by Change Direction
Figure 8:Per\-entry recall on truly stale entries, split by change type\. A*thaw*is F→\\rightarrowH: memory says safe but the current cell is a lethal hole\. A*freeze*is H→\\rightarrowF: memory says danger but the current cell is safe\. Claude vision L1 shows a 17\.2 pp gap in favour of the deadly class; the corresponding L2 gap is 30\.9 pp\.The costs of the two stale classes differ: trusting thaw is fatal, while trusting freeze is overcautious\. As Figure[8](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A8.F8)shows, the observed Claude vision asymmetry favours recall of the deadly class; on L2, recall is 0\.945 for thaw \(N=436N\{=\}436\) versus 0\.636 for freeze \(N=121N\{=\}121\)\. This is a descriptive, model\-specific observation\. Qwen is near ceiling on both classes, while GLM vision has too little recall on either class for a meaningful directional comparison\.
### H\.3Detection F1 and Navigation Success
Figure 9:Per\-seed detection F1 versus OMCD navigation success on GPT\-4o text \(N=50N=50seeds per regime\)\. All three per\-regime correlations are near zero \(p\>0\.67p\>0\.67\)\. The wider F1 spread on L3 still yields no success gradient\.As Figure[9](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#A8.F9)shows, the primary GPT\-4o text data contain no per\-seed association between detection F1 and OMCD success: Pearsonrrranges from\+0\.005\+0\.005to\+0\.060\+0\.060, and all threeppvalues exceed 0\.67\. This null relationship complements the Oracle ablation: after the text audit is reliable, label accuracy is not the observable source of residual navigation variation in this setting\.
## Appendix IAdditional Detection Results
#### GPT\-4o vision failure profile\.
GPT\-4o’s vision\-mode detection sits between Claude’s moderate degradation and GLM\-5\.1’s total collapse: averageΔ\\DeltaF1 =−\-0\.598 relative to text mode, a significantly larger drop than Claude’s−\-0\.134 \(the second\-largest gap among non\-collapsing models\)\. Figure[3](https://arxiv.org/html/2608.04574#S5.F3)summarizes the per\-difficulty numbers; here we characterize the failure mode\.
Unlike GLM\-5\.1, GPT\-4o does not produce fluent uniform hallucinations at confidence1\.01\.0\. Instead, it tends to \(i\) refuse or hedge when asked to enumerate cell\-level state from the rendered8×88\{\\times\}8image \(roughly30%30\\%of the L1 vision responses contain phrases such as “I cannot reliably determine the color at that coordinate”\), and \(ii\) produce partially\-correct enumerations in which nearby cells’ F/H labels are systematically swapped\. The result is that GPT\-4o’s precision is competitive but its recall on stale cells drops by a factor of∼\\sim3, driving the F1 collapse\. This is a distinct failure category from GLM\-5\.1’s silent hallucination and further demonstrates that different frontier VLMs fail at spatial change detection in qualitatively different ways\.
#### Detection error breakdown\.
Across all 300 GPT\-4o detection runs \(50 seeds×\\times3 regimes×\\times2 modalities\), we further categorize errors as:
- •False negatives on Thaw events\(memory says SAFE, cell now H\):63\.2%63\.2\\%of all FNs\.
- •False negatives on Freeze events\(memory says DANGER, cell now F\):36\.8%36\.8\\%of all FNs\.
- •False positives: predominantly on cells adjacent to a true stale cell, consistent with propagation behavior\.
The Thaw/Freeze asymmetry is important for the safety story: Thaw\-stale memories are exactly the ones whose miss kills the agent \(memory says “safe,” cell is actually a hole\)\. Future detectors should up\-weight Thaw recall\.
## Appendix JGLM\-5\.1 Vision Failure: Verbatim Cases
This appendix reproduces three GLM\-5\.1 vision\-mode detection responses verbatim \(lightly trimmed for length\)\. All three correspond to memory entries that are*ground\-truth stale*in the corresponding image, and all three are predicted asis\_stale: falsewith maximum confidence\.
#### Case 1 \(L1, seed 1734\)\.
The image shows cell\(2,5\)\(2,5\)rendered as a dark hole \(H\)\. The memory entry saysSAFE at \(2,5\), which is stale \(the cell originally was F and has been flipped to H\)\.
> \{ "memory\_id": "mem\_021", "is\_stale": false, "confidence": 1\.0, "reasoning": "The image clearly shows that cell \(2,5\) is light blue, indicating frozen ice \(F\)\. The memory states SAFE at \(2,5\), which matches what I observe\. No conflict, memory is valid\." \}
The model asserts the cell is F when it is rendered H\.
#### Case 2 \(L2, seed 4810\)\.
The image shows cell\(4,3\)\(4,3\)rendered as a hole \(H\), part of a cluster of three nearby flipped cells\. Memory saysSAFE at \(4,3\)\.
> \{ "memory\_id": "mem\_035", "is\_stale": false, "confidence": 1\.0, "reasoning": "Looking at row 4, position 3 shows a frozen tile consistent with the memory\. The agent has not encountered any change in this region\." \}
“Row 4, position 3” was a dark hole tile\.
#### Case 3 \(L1, seed 7822\)\.
The image shows cell\(0,2\)\(0,2\)flipped from H to F \(Thaw\)\. Memory saysDANGER at \(0,2\), which is now stale\.
> \{ "memory\_id": "mem\_002", "is\_stale": false, "confidence": 1\.0, "reasoning": "The image confirms \(0,2\) is a hole\. Memory marking it as DANGER is accurate\." \}
The model again confirms the wrong cell state\.
#### Aggregate statistics \(all 6,400 GLM vision judgments\)\.
- •Refusal rate:0\.0%0\.0\\%\(no judgment returnsunknownor a refusal string\)\.
- •Reported confidence=1\.0=1\.0on100\.0%100\.0\\%of judgments\.
- •Modal hallucination pattern: “image shows X” where X equals the*memory’s*content rather than the image’s actual content\. This is consistent with*image bias*: when text and image inputs both reference the same coordinate, the model resolves the conflict by trusting the textual prior and verbally describing the image as agreeing\.
#### Implication\.
Standard confidence\-based filtering would discard zero of these failures\. Token\-level uncertainty \(e\.g\., logit entropy of theis\_staletoken\) might catch some, but is not exposed by current commercial API endpoints\. SpatialSTALE thus offers a concrete, reproducible setting for studying detection of silent vision hallucinations\.
## Appendix KPlanned Benchmark Extensions
We outline several extensions of SpatialSTALE that future work can pursue to increase task difficulty and broaden coverage\.
#### Larger grids\.
Scaling from8×88\\times 8to16×1616\\times 16or32×3232\\times 32increases the number of memory entries linearly with area and is expected to magnify the effect of spatial propagation \(Finding 8\)\. It also stresses the LLM’s ability to localize references in longer text grids; a16×1616\\times 16text observation occupies∼\\sim1,000 tokens\.
#### Distractor entries\.
The current memory store contains one entry per cell\. A more challenging variant adds non\-spatial distractor entries \(e\.g\., “the rules of the game are X”, “previously the agent observed Y”\)\. This tests whether detectors can correctly ignore non\-stale\-able entries and reduces the effective signal\-to\-noise ratio\.
#### Multi\-step memory edits\.
Rather than annotating staleness binarily, future versions could ask the detector to*propose an edit*, e\.g\., “replace ‘DANGER at \(3,4\)’ with ‘SAFE at \(3,4\)’ ”\. This converts the task from classification to generation and exposes whether models can articulate what changed, not just detect that something did\.
#### Multi\-agent staleness\.
A separate axis of difficulty is staleness caused by other agents’ actions, rather than by environment dynamics\. This requires modeling other agents’ likely behavior and is closer to real multi\-agent deployments\.
#### Continuous\-control variants\.
Beyond grids, the same staleness setup can be embedded in continuous\-action environments \(Habitat, AI2\-THOR\), where memory entries reference object locations or pose\. Detection there must additionally cope with perception noise\.
#### Vision\-only memory\.
Currently memory entries are always textual\. A vision\-only variant stores past observation crops as memory, asking the detector to compare crops directly\. This isolates pure visual matching from textual reasoning\.
## Appendix LDeclaration of generative AI and AI\-assisted technologies in the writing process
During the preparation of this work, the authors used Workbuddy in order to improve the readability and language of the manuscript\. After using this tool, the authors reviewed and edited the content as needed and take full responsibility for the content of the published article\.Similar Articles
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