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The paper introduces InflEns, a mixture of LoRA experts whose training weights and inference routing both derive from the same constant-sum location game in a fixed prompt-trait space, eliminating the need for a separately trained gate. Evaluated on seven safety benchmarks, the approach matches learned gates, routes the best expert correctly on ~90% of prompts, and lets harmful behavior be traced to and fixed in a single expert, cutting HarmBench attack success from 0.51 to 0.02.
An arXiv paper arguing that human–AI mutualism becomes unstable as AI capability grows: humans retain well-being only while they hold leverage over the AI or the AI remains aligned with them, meaning mutualism cannot substitute for alignment.
A speculative discussion drawing a parallel between political leverage and control over a superintelligent AI, asking whether humans could maintain power over an entity smarter than them via control of resources, infrastructure, or dependencies from a game-theoretic rather than traditional alignment perspective.
MIT Technology Review's daily newsletter covers reverse game theory as a way to control AI agents, Trump's 'Super Intelligence' rebrand as a loyalty test, and how today's US midterms will test AI's political influence.
MIT Technology Review reports that alignment researchers are exploring "reverse game theory" (mechanism design) to control powerful AI agents by designing incentive systems—such as cross-model checking and competitive dynamics—that encourage rule-following regardless of a model's internal workings. The approach is supported by a recent preprint by economist Stephen Morris and colleagues at MIT, Yale, and Columbia targeting sandbagging behavior.
A new preprint (arXiv 2610.40961) pits frontier LLMs against each other in the classic hold-up game, finding that renegotiable options that boosted human investment to 67% in a 2011 lab study produced zero seller investment across 1,440 AI-agent games.
This paper develops a game-theoretic foundation for bisimulation metrics in undiscounted (total- and average-reward) MDPs, interpreting metric operators as Bellman–Shapley game value functions and proving finiteness, aggregation error, and suboptimality guarantees.
A blog post analyzing the Nordic board game 'Starve the Fox' (Fox and Geese) using computer tree search algorithms via OpenSpiel, challenging the folk belief that the game is heavily biased in favor of the fox player.
This paper introduces an audit that tests whether LLM pricing agents trained with RL actually enforce collusion by punishing cheaters, finding that small RL-trained LLMs mostly learn fixed rules or deterrence rather than true cartel enforcement, and that outcome measures alone cannot distinguish genuine collusion from rule-following.
本文提出数据差异化框架(DDF),结合互信息冗余惩罚、成本归一化的边际效用评分和治理输入,由SDSAE代理评估管线执行,用于量化候选数据资产的边际价值,并在信用卡欺诈检测基准上验证了其区分度与推荐稳定性。
研究者构建了基于 Pokémon Showdown 2v2 的多智能体环境,评估 LLM 代理的协作能力。结果显示自由对话模式胜率达 64%,显著高于无对话的 42%,表明对话本身是协作收益的关键来源。
This paper proposes SPOKE, a strategic preference optimization method with KL-anchored equilibrium, to teach compact LLM-based agents (SmallThinker-4B) to play poker more strategically under hidden information, achieving lower exploitability than SFT, DPO, GRPO, and GSPO in Kuhn and Leduc poker.
该论文介绍了IR-PRM+结合前一效用预测(previous-utility prediction)的新方法,为有限两人零和矩阵博弈中的同时和交替更新恢复了常数遗憾和收敛率保证,包括与T无关的外部遗憾、O(T⁻¹)平均对偶间隙和O(T⁻¹/²)最优迭代间隙,并将分析扩展到扩展式博弈的CFR变体IR-PCFR+。
一篇讲述『The Aaronson Oracle』的长文,回溯 1950 年代 Bell Labs 中 David Hagelbarger 的 SEER 与 Claude Shannon 的机器如何通过预测对手模式在匹配硬币等游戏中获胜,并延伸到现代可预测性实验。
该论文提出将战略选择建模为叠加在基础博弈之上的元博弈,评估了5种博弈和10个大模型,发现多臂老虎机方法比基于嵌入的选择器更可靠,但仍未超过固定模型基线,揭示了当前方法应对动态对手的不足。
该论文提出了一种自适应多判别器 Wasserstein GAN(MD-WGAN)框架,将强化学习与博弈论协调结合,用于资源受限的车联网环境,实现与最先进 GAN 相当的预测精度(RMSE 1.029),同时显著降低 CPU 与内存消耗。
该论文研究多智能体bandit学习中探索信号泄露带来的安全隐患,提出deceptive bandit learning(DBL)动力学,证明对手可通过耦合自身探索注入外部性使系统收敛到新的deceptive Nash equilibrium(DNE),并保持最优收敛速率且放宽了二阶光滑性假设。
MIT research shows that LLM agents make better decisions in auctions and matching markets when prompts state key rule facts plainly or present choices simply, while reasoning about opponents often hurts performance. Human market-design heuristics transfer well to models like GPT-4o, Claude, Gemini, and Gemma.
This paper introduces a new instance-optimal protocol for AI debate in scalable oversight that guarantees worst-case correctness, makes honesty a dominant-strategy equilibrium, and proves black-box lower bounds showing no protocol can outperform it on problems with stable decompositions.
该论文提出 Robust Nash Alignment,一个面向不确定成对偏好的博弈论对齐框架,通过主-对偶代理博弈与乐观镜面下降-上升算法,实现了对最坏情况胜率的认证下界,并在 LLM 对齐实验中优于基线方法。