@DIGITALYCHEE: 本篇将在不透露任何商业机密的情况下,讲讲我们如何靠努力卖微软 Office,亏掉上百万的。 书接上回。我们对电话会议的认真准备,迎来了微软的好感。 因为他们之前对接的公司,基本都不太会讲故事。 我说「数码荔枝」讲究调性,只销售精品 bla…
摘要
数码荔枝创始人讲述10年前成为微软Office经销商后,因业绩目标和价格战巨亏上百万的经历,复盘了与微软合作中的教训。
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本篇将在不透露任何商业机密的情况下,讲讲我们如何靠努力卖微软 Office,亏掉上百万的。
书接上回。我们对电话会议的认真准备,迎来了微软的好感。
因为他们之前对接的公司,基本都不太会讲故事。
我说「数码荔枝」讲究调性,只销售精品 blablabla … 他们很认可。
我后知后觉。其实大家都喜欢听故事,包括我。
在进行多次电话以及线下面聊后,我们签了协议,成为微软正儿八经的经销商。
我们每月保证销售几百套 Office 365。
实际上,我们确实也做到了。
这里插一句经销商与微软的合作方式。
虽然是很常见的“提货 + 返点”形式,但也给未有从商经历的读者比划一下:
假设一套 Office 进货价 100 元,我们付钱,拿货。
然后淘宝上的销售价大概是 90 元,我们也卖 90 元。
卧槽?怎么当正经经销商还亏了?
别着急,下个月月初,微软会返 20 元。
但这 20 元不是真还给你,仅用于下次提货时抵货款。
然后,每个月这样循环下去。
本来事情到此,就是 GOOD ENDING:我们是微软经销商,业绩目标也不重,现金流无压力。
但,随着时间的推移 (我是指 2-3 年后),事情逐渐蹊跷:
怎么淘宝上 Office 价格,比【提货价 - 返点】后的价格还便宜啊?
总不可能真有人在亏钱卖吧(看完全文后会发现,还真有!)
就在此时,负责我们的微软销售来电话了,说:现在公司有个核心代理商机制,能拿到市场上最低价,要不要试试?
哦?还有这种好事?
对啊,但就是对业绩有要求,大概要做到你们现在销量的 10 倍才行,但我觉得你们可以做到…
写到这里,我的眼角有忍不住抽动了几下。
但我当时是亢奋的。
和公司其他几个负责人聊了,也和家里谈了,他们都觉得试试,是公司踏入新阶段的「好机会」。
没有人在意业绩目标翻 10 倍,是什么压力。
没有人在意核心代理商的额外返点,是按季度发放,前几个月要自己垫钱。
也没有人在意额外返点,是必须达到【季度销售目标】才会发放。
也没人在意合同是一年一签的,中途没法退出。
更没人在意,微软一共找了多少家签。
直到大厦开始崩塌,大坝开始决堤。
在接下来的一整年,我们不谈发展,不搞创新,每天张开眼,先看销量是否下降。
一周换好几个法子,推 Office 的文章。
每月的销售目标,压的我们喘不过气来,无心发展任何其他业务。
据我所知,当年一共有 X 家签了这个协议,大家为了各自的销售目标,疯狂压价。
先是 —— 你赚 30 元?好,那我降价只赚 15 元。
然后 —— 只要不亏本就好。
最后 —— 离季度销售目标还差点,亏本再卖 200 套就能完成了。
然后每个月初,账上看上去钱挺多,瞬间全用来进货 Office,再要翻倍倒贴进去。
…
被反复抽打了一整年后,终于结束了。
至于「数码荔枝」后来是怎么挺过来,其实很简单,因为我家里人掏出一百多万填进去了。
再往后的多年,慢慢还。
这段往事,其实公司内部很多小伙伴也不知道。
毕竟我们是远程办公,我在焦头烂额时,电脑打字框很安静。
而我,未来遇到类似的「机会」时,则警惕很多,甚至过于警惕了。
直至现在,我们依然是微软经销商,
只是业绩目标不重,现金流无压力。
现在就是 GOOD ENDING。
数码荔枝 (@DIGITALYCHEE): 今天聊聊我们和「微软」故事。
考虑双方仍处于合作关系,只说 10 年前的事情,但同样精彩。
如果,当初,我要是知道和微软合作,能让「数码荔枝」一年巨亏上百万 …
我一定乘时光机回到过去,掐断那通电话。
但 2015 年前后,微软刚刚发布了 Office 365 订阅版。
This article will talk about how we hustled to sell Microsoft Office and ended up losing over a million bucks—without spilling any trade secrets.
Picking up from last time. Our serious prep for those conference calls earned us some goodwill from Microsoft.
Because the companies they’d dealt with before basically had no knack for storytelling.
I said “Digital Lychee” is all about the vibe, only selling premium stuff blablabla … and they totally bought it.
It hit me later. Turns out everyone loves a good story—including me.
After a bunch of phone calls and in-person chats, we signed the agreement and became legit Microsoft distributors.
We committed to selling a few hundred Office 365 suites every month.
And in reality, we actually pulled it off.
Quick aside here on how distributors work with Microsoft.
It’s the classic “stock up + rebates” setup, but for readers who haven’t dipped into business yet, let me sketch it out:
Say a suite of Office costs 100 yuan to stock—we pay up and take delivery.
Then the selling price on Taobao is about 90 yuan, so we sell at 90 too.
WTF? How are we losing money as legit distributors?
Hold up—early the next month, Microsoft rebates 20 yuan.
But that 20 isn’t straight cash back; it’s just a credit toward your next stock-up.
And then it loops like that every month.
At this point, things were looking like a GOOD ENDING: We’re Microsoft distributors, the sales targets aren’t brutal, cash flow’s a breeze.
But as time wore on (I’m talking 2-3 years later), things started getting fishy:
How come Office prices on Taobao are cheaper than [stock price - rebate] nets out to?
No way someone’s really selling at a loss, right? (Read the whole thing and you’ll see—yep, they were!)
Right around then, our Microsoft sales rep calls and says: Hey, the company’s rolling out this core agent program—gets you the rock-bottom market price. Wanna give it a shot?
Oh? Something that good?
Yeah, but it comes with sales requirements—basically 10x what you’re doing now. I think you guys could swing it though…
Writing this, my eye twitched a few times—I couldn’t help it.
But back then, I was pumped.
Chatted it over with the other leads at the company, talked it through with family—they all saw trying it as a “great opportunity” for the company to level up.
Nobody clocked what 10x-ing the sales target really meant for the pressure.
Nobody cared that the extra core agent rebates came quarterly, so you’d have to front the cash for the early months.
Nobody cared that those extra rebates only dropped if you hit the [quarterly sales target].
Nobody cared the contract was a one-year lock-in, no early outs.
And nobody cared how many outfits Microsoft had signed up altogether.
Until the whole building started crumbling, the dam burst wide open.
For the entire next year, we weren’t talking growth, weren’t innovating—just waking up every day to check if sales were dipping.
Swapping out half a dozen tactics a week, churning out Office promo posts.
The monthly targets crushed us, left us too winded to build any other business.
From what I know, there were X companies that signed on that year, all slashing prices like mad to hit their own targets.
First it was — You’re making 30 yuan profit? Fine, I’ll drop to 15.
Then — As long as we don’t lose money, we’re good.
Finally — So close to the quarterly target, let’s eat the loss and sell 200 more to close it out.
Then every month-start, the books look flush with cash—boom, it’s all sunk into stocking Office, and you end up doubling down out of pocket.
…
After a full year of getting whipped like that, it finally wrapped.
As for how “Digital Lychee” clawed through later—simple: family shelled out over a million to plug the hole.
And over the years after, we paid it back bit by bit.
Not many folks in the company even know about this old saga.
We were remote, after all—and when I was buried in the mess, the chat box on my screen stayed dead quiet.
Me? These days, when a “opportunity” like that pops up, I’m way more on guard—maybe too much.
Even now, we’re still Microsoft distributors,
just with sales targets that aren’t brutal, cash flow that’s a breeze.
Now it’s a GOOD ENDING.
本来还想上传一张【几乎打满马赛克】的合同某页的,
最后还是删掉了。
这就是故事,我不需要证明什么。
是真是假,对读者而言,也没那么重要。
可以搭配其他软件销售。
不过和餐饮不同,要购买指定软件的人,通常只会购买自己想要的那个软件。
只有经销商受伤的世界达成了。
也许吧,但我们背着业绩压力。
早知道直接啃老更省钱。
至少十年前了吧
死人是不会说话的,活着的企业才有机会经历各种事情。
并且有人愿意听他们说。
那真是太惨了。
我将用最直白、最不绕弯子的…
那当然是连季度返点都没有啦,亏的更多。
有没有一种可能性,那就是数码荔枝在推特开设账号,且玩推特的用户用正版的概率会更高一些?
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