A2A solved how agents talk. It didn’t solve what a stranger agent is allowed to do - how are you handling authz?
Summary
This article discusses how A2A (agent-to-agent) protocol solves communication between agents but leaves unresolved the issue of authorization — what a stranger agent is allowed to do.
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