Anthropic requires 30 day data retention for Fable and Mythos

Hacker News Top News

Summary

Anthropic announces a 30-day data retention policy for Mythos-class models (Claude Mythos 5 and Fable 5) for safety and misuse detection, affecting enterprise and zero-data-retention customers starting June 9, 2026.

<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.theverge.com&#x2F;report&#x2F;947575&#x2F;microsoft-claude-fable-5-restricted-internally" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.theverge.com&#x2F;report&#x2F;947575&#x2F;microsoft-claude-fabl...</a>
Original Article
View Cached Full Text

Cached at: 06/10/26, 11:47 PM

# Data retention practices for Mythos-class models Source: [https://support.claude.com/en/articles/15425996-data-retention-practices-for-mythos-class-models](https://support.claude.com/en/articles/15425996-data-retention-practices-for-mythos-class-models) 1. [All Collections](https://support.claude.com/en/) 2. [Team and Enterprise plans](https://support.claude.com/en/collections/9387370-team-and-enterprise-plans) 3. [Security and compliance](https://support.claude.com/en/collections/10351014-security-and-compliance) 4. Data retention practices for Mythos\-class models Updated in the last 15 minutes To ensure we’re responsibly deploying Mythos\-class models,**we are requiring limited data retention and review as part of our safety work\. Prompts submitted to, and outputs generated by, Mythos\-class models are retained for 30 days for trust and safety purposes, on every platform where these models are offered\.** This applies to Mythos\-class models and future models with similar capabilities that we designate as**[covered models](https://support.claude.com/en/articles/15425695)**\. For all other models, everything you use is unaffected and stays under the current terms\. This policy, described below, goes into effect on June 9, 2026\. For more information on the threat model for retained data and associated privacy controls, please see the corresponding**[technical white paper](https://trust.anthropic.com/resources?s=7ksqkied5hn0pocsj206m&name=[anthropic]-security-and-privacy-design-of-anthropic-data-retention-and-review)**on our Trust Center\. ## Who this applies to Consumer plans \(Claude Free, Pro, and Max\) across our web, desktop, and mobile apps—including Claude\.ai and Claude Code—are unaffected by this update, since we already retain inputs and outputs for safety purposes on these surfaces\. Learn more about**[how we retain data](https://privacy.claude.com/en/articles/10023548-how-long-do-you-store-my-data)**for consumer plans\. This change only applies to organizations that have set up workspaces with**[zero data retention](https://privacy.claude.com/en/articles/8956058-i-have-a-zero-data-retention-agreement-with-anthropic-what-products-does-it-apply-to)**\(ZDR\) in Claude Console, use Claude Code with ZDR in Claude Enterprise, or access Claude through AWS Bedrock, Google Cloud Agent Platform, or Microsoft Foundry with ZDR\. The rest of this article applies only to these organizations\. ## Why we’re doing this Claude Mythos 5 represents a substantial increase in model capabilities, some of which can be used for both benign and malicious purposes\. Claude Fable 5 shares the same underlying model as Claude Mythos 5, but with additional safeguards, particularly in the cyber and bio domains\. While these safeguards allow us to share this intelligence more broadly, we are taking a conservative approach that allows us to look for patterns of misuse with this class of model\. Some attacks only become visible across multiple requests\.**[Best\-of\-N jailbreaking](https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.03556)**, for example, sends hundreds of slight variations of a prompt in the hope that one will work\. Larger patterns of misuse, such as**[state\-sponsored espionage](https://www.anthropic.com/news/disrupting-AI-espionage)**or**[data extortion campaigns](https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-countering-misuse-aug-2025)**, only surface when our safeguards classifiers can zoom out across many requests\. Detecting these threats requires temporarily retaining prompts and outputs so they can be analyzed together, rather than one at a time\. ## How we protect your data Anthropic employees cannot access your conversations unless they are flagged for potential serious harm or upon a customer’s written request\. These reviews can only be performed by a small set of approved reviewers through tooling that prevents export, copying, or downloading\. Every instance of access is recorded in a tamper\-proof log that reviewers cannot suppress or modify\. After 30 days, the data is deleted automatically, except in the rare cases where it's part of a safety investigation or we're legally required to keep it\. Eligible organizations also have the option to add customer\-managed encryption keys and access transparency audit logs\. Anthropic maintains a documented information security program with technical and organizational measures that are designed to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer data\. Our risk\-based program is built for and evolves to defend against known and anticipated threat models and is tested regularly\. For more information, see the**[technical white paper](https://trust.anthropic.com/resources?s=7ksqkied5hn0pocsj206m&name=[anthropic]-security-and-privacy-design-of-anthropic-data-retention-and-review)**in our Trust Center\. ## What, if anything, do I need to configure? This change only applies to organizations that have set up workspaces with zero data retention \(ZDR\) in Claude Console, use Claude Code with ZDR in Claude Enterprise, or access Claude through AWS Bedrock, Google Cloud Agent Platform, or Microsoft Foundry with ZDR\. For all other organizations, there is no change and there's nothing to configure\. The rest of this section is for organizations that access Claude without data retention today and need to set up data retention in order to use designated models when they become available\. ### If your developers use the Claude API ### If your team uses Claude Code ### If your team uses Claude chat or Cowork through Claude for Enterprise --- Related Articles [Business Associate Agreements \(BAA\) for Commercial Customers](https://support.claude.com/en/articles/8114513-business-associate-agreements-baa-for-commercial-customers)[Public Sector FAQs](https://support.claude.com/en/articles/13756069-public-sector-faqs)[Use Claude for Microsoft 365 with third\-party platforms](https://support.claude.com/en/articles/13945233-use-claude-for-microsoft-365-with-third-party-platforms)[Real\-time cyber safeguards on Claude](https://support.claude.com/en/articles/14604842-real-time-cyber-safeguards-on-claude)[Covered Models](https://support.claude.com/en/articles/15425695-covered-models)

Similar Articles

The real Fable 5 story is the data retention clause

Reddit r/artificial

Anthropic's Claude Fable 5 release is notable not just for its capabilities but for the controlled access, data retention policies, and infrastructure requirements that signal a shift towards gated frontier AI deployment.

Anthropic releases its first Mythos-class model Claude Fable 

The Verge

Anthropic announced Claude Fable 5, its most powerful widely available AI model, part of the Mythos class previously considered too dangerous for public release. The model features new safeguards that fall back to Opus 4.8 in high-risk areas.

Anthropic’s Claude Fable 5 is a version of Mythos the public can access today

TechCrunch AI

Anthropic launched Claude Fable 5, a publicly accessible version of its powerful Mythos model, with safety guardrails that block responses in high-risk areas and fall back to a weaker model. The release follows Anthropic's warning about AI becoming too dangerous and its push for coordinated safety measures.

Anthropic cuts off Fable 5 and Mythos 5 access following government order

The Verge

Anthropic cut off access to its Fable 5 and Mythos 5 AI models following a government export control directive citing national security concerns, blocking all foreign nationals and even internal employees. The company complied but criticized the lack of specific evidence, stating the alleged vulnerabilities were minor and available in other models like GPT-5.5.