LLMs know when they are wrong. I made a fix relating to Anthropic's new "global workspace" paper [R]
Summary
The author presents a method to make LLMs verbalize calibrated confidence by using a linear probe on mid-layer states and a small trained bridge to confidence logits, requiring only 200 labeled examples and no weight modification. This is linked to Anthropic's global workspace paper explaining the know-say gap.
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