Tag
The article discusses warnings from AI leaders about the risk of AI enabling bioweapon creation, highlighting concerns from researchers and the need for enhanced safeguards in AI and biotech development.
This review paper examines the capabilities of artificial intelligence in biological research and the associated biosecurity risks, advocating for defense-in-depth governance to mitigate threats while preserving beneficial uses.
An expert with experience in training frontier LLMs and engineering viruses argues against the doomer scenario of an AI-created supervirus.
The article discusses security gaps in DNA synthesis supply chains and advocates for mandatory screening to mitigate AI-enabled bioterrorism risks, based on a strategic report from IFP.
Anthropic has claimed to have blocked potential attempts to use AI technologies for building biological weapons, highlighting ongoing concerns in AI safety and responsible development.
ABLE is a benchmark for evaluating LLM agents' ability to use biological AI models like ProteinMPNN and AlphaFold3 in protein design workflows. It assesses 15 frontier models, finding that Claude Sonnet 4 and Gemini 3 Pro achieve the highest scores, while some models refuse all tasks.
This research report presents a U.S. strategy to prevent the creation of mirror life, a hypothetical form of life with reversed chirality that could cause irreversible biological disruption and global catastrophic risks.
RAND research project outlines strategies to prevent the creation of mirror life, a form of synthetic life that could evade biological defenses and cause irreversible global harm.
Scientists have used AI to design novel bacteriophages, raising concerns about biosecurity and the pace of regulation for AI-enabled biotechnology.
The author warns that AI-engineered pandemics are becoming a top existential risk, noting that AI has already created a brand new virus and that future frontier model innovations could lead to threats worse than COVID.
Researchers used large genome models Evo 1 and Evo 2 to design new bacteriophage genomes, producing viruses with distinct features challenging to evolve naturally, raising questions about potential future design of vertebrate-targeting viruses.
US researchers used generative AI models Evo1 and Evo2 to design complete virus genomes for the first time, creating 16 novel bacteriophages that can kill E. coli. The breakthrough could enable new disease treatments but raises urgent safety and security concerns.
AI has created the first synthetic viruses, a significant breakthrough in synthetic biology that raises biosecurity concerns.
This paper introduces Intern-BioBreaker, a bio-red-teaming model, and a computational-to-physical framework to evaluate biosecurity risks of frontier LLMs, finding widespread jailbreak vulnerabilities and demonstrating that model-generated biological designs can be physically realized, underscoring the need for stronger safety mechanisms.
Google DeepMind and Isomorphic Labs outline their joint approach to bioresilience, focusing on preventing misuse of AI models and using AI to improve prevention, detection, and response to infectious disease outbreaks through partnerships and tools like AlphaFold, Gemini, and SynthID.
This paper introduces safeguard-conditioned uplift, a protocol for measuring how different deployment access conditions (e.g., helpful prompting, safety prompting, external safeguards) affect the utility-risk frontier in dual-use biology AI assistants, based on human-judged evaluations of Claude Sonnet 4.6 and Gemini 3.5 Flash.
OpenAI publishes its National Security Principles, outlining its approach to government partnerships and defensive uses of AI in areas like cyber and biosecurity, while restricting uses such as mass surveillance and autonomous weapons.
The article announces the winners of an essay contest on big questions about AI, featuring essays on using AI foundations for biosecurity, economic policies for countries outside the AI supply chain, and AI lab business models.
The OpenAI Foundation is joining Intercept as a founding partner in an AI resilience program to address biosecurity risks from AI misuse.
This article warns that current and upcoming AI models significantly lower the barrier to creating bioweapons, citing distillation attacks on open-weight models and the inability to prevent safety ablation. It calls for public funding of broad-spectrum countermeasures as a necessary response.